Research -- Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
Micro-level conflict processes are inextricably linked to public opinion. I explore these dynamics in a series of papers on foreign policy. This work investigates diverse questions related to mass attitudes on gender, climate change, and conflict. My work in this vein devotes particular emphasis to how behavioral factors like stereotypes, identity, and emotions impact public perceptions and beliefs.
Gender Stereotypes
How do gender stereotypes impact audience costs? The growing prevalence of women in high political office raises important questions about the role of leaders’ gender in the conduct of war and peace. In a paper with Josh Schwartz, we develop and test a theory about how gender stereotypes affect how the public evaluates threats leaders make (IO 2020). We argue if women leaders demonstrate “weakness” by backing down from threats, they activate descriptive gender stereotypes about women’s ill-preparedness for the demands of high office. At the same time, women are punished less than men for initiating militarized threats. We find support for these expectations in a series of survey experiments. Our results point to particular advantages and disadvantages women have in international crises. Women leaders are better able to tie hands--an efficient mechanism for establishing credibility in crises. However, this bargaining advantage means women leaders will also have a harder time backing down from threats. Our theoretical framework and results account for the seemingly disparate facts that women's leadership is associated with peace, and that women are as or more likely than men to initiate conflicts.
Do gender stereotypes affect leaders' abilities to pursue conciliation with foreign adversaries? There is an old adage that “only Nixon could go to China.” The logic is simple: conciliatory policies pursued by dovish leaders are perceived as dispositional, and rooted in those leaders’ personal, ideological preferences, whereas conciliatory policies pursued by hawkish leaders are perceived as situational and rooted in prudent evaluations of the circumstances at hand. By engaging in “out-of-character” actions, leaders signal credibility and moderation. Extending this logic, in a paper with Josh Schwartz (ISQ 2023), I examine whether it is similarly more difficult for women leaders to pursue peace than male leaders . Because women are gender-stereotypically perceived as dovish, we argue the public will view peace proposals they initiate as less prudent than identical proposals by men. By acting according to their gender-stereotypical type, women leaders who pursue conciliation are seen as less credible and hence pay a domestic political penalty. In a series of survey experiments, we find evidence of a gendered peace premium. Women’s conciliatory policy proposals are perceived as less likely to be in the national interest than identical policies pursued by male leaders. Partisanship dynamics significantly moderate the gendered peace premium, with higher costs imposed on out-partisan women. However, policy success can attenuate women leaders’ disadvantage.
Conflict and Norms
How should we measure public opinion on the use of normatively proscribed weapons? Prominent research holds that the use of weapons of mass destruction, like chemical weapons is taboo. But recent research suggests important limits to the strength of these alleged “taboos.” In a paper with Jonathan Chu and Josh Schwartz (JCR 2022), we develop an additional rationale for why people might voice support for an anti-weapons norm. Because norms and taboos in particular are strongly held and morally salient, individuals may fear that publicly expressing counter-normative beliefs will lead to social sanctioning. As a result, some respondents who do not genuinely, privately support a norm may still publicly express support when asked directly. We introduce a list experimental technique to detect these insincere norm-holders. Our results, which draw from three surveys of the U.S. public, show that insincere norm-holders exist and accounting for them nearly doubles the percentage of Americans that are willing to use chemical weapons in war.
What do military servicemembers think about weapons non-use norms, and what role does military training play in shaping these attitudes? Little is known about military attitudes toward weapons taboos, or the durability of non-use norms in wartime. Chemical weapons are a key case given public revulsion and clear international prohibitions. In a paper with Michael Horowitz (JOP 2024), we explore soldiers’ attitudes in a salient setting: the Pacific theater of World War II. We draw on a declassified survey covering a representative sample of enlisted US soldiers in Hawaii in 1944. This unique context, during a total war against an adversary that had employed chemical weapons, represents a hard test for the chemical weapons taboo. Up to 91% of soldiers supported using chemical weapons against the Japanese. To understand the influence of military instruction, we exploit a novel regimen still used in basic training, which saw some troops subjected to simulated gas attacks. We find exposure to chemical weapons in training reduced support for use. Visceral experiences can mobilize support for weapons taboos in otherwise permissive environments.
How does combat exposure impact foreign policy attitudes? Military service is a ubiquitous and transformative life event, and combat is perhaps the most politically consequential military experience. A central debate in international relations surrounds the influence of combat exposure on foreign policy attitudes. One prominent view contends that military experience breeds militarism. A competing perspective sees combat exposure as fostering conservatism about the use of force. In a submitted paper with Michael Horowitz, we use unique, archival data and micro-level empirical techniques to help adjudicate this seminal debate. Specifically, we study a set of declassified, military surveys from the “American Soldier in World War II” (ASWW2) collection, which were gathered by the War Department during World War II (WWII) and cover thousands of soldiers across branches, ranks, and theaters. The surveys we analyze were fielded in summer 1945, and cover large, representative samples of active-duty US soldiers deployed on or recently returned from the front-lines. To assess the causal effect of combat exposure, we rely on a flexible stratification approach, which allows us to rule out multiple sources of confounding, including from selection into military service, unit cohesion, campaign history, access to news about postwar planning, and individual differences in valor. We find that combat reduces soldiers’ support for an active US role in postwar global affairs, including reducing support for the formation of the United Nations (UN) and for Marshall Plan aid to allies. Relatedly, combat veterans express greater support for isolationism and less enthusiasm about further military service. Combat also increases support for a punitive peace imposed on the Axis powers. In contrast with research on combat exposure in civil wars, we find no evidence that combat exposure in WWII increased out-group hostility. This latter result suggests that combat veterans’ support for a punitive peace did not result from generalized hatred of the adversary, but rather a more functional desire to cripple the Axis powers’ future war-making capabilities. Overall, this study offers micro-level evidence for existing theories about how combat experience fosters conservatism about foreign policy in general, but hardens attitudes in support of military action to preserve hard-won victories.
Climate Change
How does the public view migrants displaced by climatic disasters? Do considerations about climate migration affect support for climate change mitigation? Around the world, recent climatic disasters have uprooted millions of people. As anthropogenic climate change worsens, the magnitude of the threat of climate-induced displacement will continue to grow. Potential economic consequences like labor market competition mean public support will be key for integrating climate migrants in host communities, and easing migrant-host tensions. In a paper with Sabrina Arias (JOP 2022), we argue that climate migrants occupy an intermediate position in the public view, garnering greater support than traditional economic migrants but less support than refugees. Evidence from a conjoint experiment embedded in nationally representative surveys of 2160 respondents in the U.S. and Germany provide support for this claim. These findings suggest the importance of humanitarian considerations and empathy in shaping migration attitudes. We use a follow-up factorial experiment to explore potential policy implications of public support for climate migrants. We find no evidence that priming climate migration increases support for climate change mitigation, echoing existing work on the difficulty of mobilizing climate action, and suggesting that climate migration is unlikely to spur greater support for mitigating climate change.
How do gender stereotypes impact audience costs? The growing prevalence of women in high political office raises important questions about the role of leaders’ gender in the conduct of war and peace. In a paper with Josh Schwartz, we develop and test a theory about how gender stereotypes affect how the public evaluates threats leaders make (IO 2020). We argue if women leaders demonstrate “weakness” by backing down from threats, they activate descriptive gender stereotypes about women’s ill-preparedness for the demands of high office. At the same time, women are punished less than men for initiating militarized threats. We find support for these expectations in a series of survey experiments. Our results point to particular advantages and disadvantages women have in international crises. Women leaders are better able to tie hands--an efficient mechanism for establishing credibility in crises. However, this bargaining advantage means women leaders will also have a harder time backing down from threats. Our theoretical framework and results account for the seemingly disparate facts that women's leadership is associated with peace, and that women are as or more likely than men to initiate conflicts.
Do gender stereotypes affect leaders' abilities to pursue conciliation with foreign adversaries? There is an old adage that “only Nixon could go to China.” The logic is simple: conciliatory policies pursued by dovish leaders are perceived as dispositional, and rooted in those leaders’ personal, ideological preferences, whereas conciliatory policies pursued by hawkish leaders are perceived as situational and rooted in prudent evaluations of the circumstances at hand. By engaging in “out-of-character” actions, leaders signal credibility and moderation. Extending this logic, in a paper with Josh Schwartz (ISQ 2023), I examine whether it is similarly more difficult for women leaders to pursue peace than male leaders . Because women are gender-stereotypically perceived as dovish, we argue the public will view peace proposals they initiate as less prudent than identical proposals by men. By acting according to their gender-stereotypical type, women leaders who pursue conciliation are seen as less credible and hence pay a domestic political penalty. In a series of survey experiments, we find evidence of a gendered peace premium. Women’s conciliatory policy proposals are perceived as less likely to be in the national interest than identical policies pursued by male leaders. Partisanship dynamics significantly moderate the gendered peace premium, with higher costs imposed on out-partisan women. However, policy success can attenuate women leaders’ disadvantage.
Conflict and Norms
How should we measure public opinion on the use of normatively proscribed weapons? Prominent research holds that the use of weapons of mass destruction, like chemical weapons is taboo. But recent research suggests important limits to the strength of these alleged “taboos.” In a paper with Jonathan Chu and Josh Schwartz (JCR 2022), we develop an additional rationale for why people might voice support for an anti-weapons norm. Because norms and taboos in particular are strongly held and morally salient, individuals may fear that publicly expressing counter-normative beliefs will lead to social sanctioning. As a result, some respondents who do not genuinely, privately support a norm may still publicly express support when asked directly. We introduce a list experimental technique to detect these insincere norm-holders. Our results, which draw from three surveys of the U.S. public, show that insincere norm-holders exist and accounting for them nearly doubles the percentage of Americans that are willing to use chemical weapons in war.
What do military servicemembers think about weapons non-use norms, and what role does military training play in shaping these attitudes? Little is known about military attitudes toward weapons taboos, or the durability of non-use norms in wartime. Chemical weapons are a key case given public revulsion and clear international prohibitions. In a paper with Michael Horowitz (JOP 2024), we explore soldiers’ attitudes in a salient setting: the Pacific theater of World War II. We draw on a declassified survey covering a representative sample of enlisted US soldiers in Hawaii in 1944. This unique context, during a total war against an adversary that had employed chemical weapons, represents a hard test for the chemical weapons taboo. Up to 91% of soldiers supported using chemical weapons against the Japanese. To understand the influence of military instruction, we exploit a novel regimen still used in basic training, which saw some troops subjected to simulated gas attacks. We find exposure to chemical weapons in training reduced support for use. Visceral experiences can mobilize support for weapons taboos in otherwise permissive environments.
How does combat exposure impact foreign policy attitudes? Military service is a ubiquitous and transformative life event, and combat is perhaps the most politically consequential military experience. A central debate in international relations surrounds the influence of combat exposure on foreign policy attitudes. One prominent view contends that military experience breeds militarism. A competing perspective sees combat exposure as fostering conservatism about the use of force. In a submitted paper with Michael Horowitz, we use unique, archival data and micro-level empirical techniques to help adjudicate this seminal debate. Specifically, we study a set of declassified, military surveys from the “American Soldier in World War II” (ASWW2) collection, which were gathered by the War Department during World War II (WWII) and cover thousands of soldiers across branches, ranks, and theaters. The surveys we analyze were fielded in summer 1945, and cover large, representative samples of active-duty US soldiers deployed on or recently returned from the front-lines. To assess the causal effect of combat exposure, we rely on a flexible stratification approach, which allows us to rule out multiple sources of confounding, including from selection into military service, unit cohesion, campaign history, access to news about postwar planning, and individual differences in valor. We find that combat reduces soldiers’ support for an active US role in postwar global affairs, including reducing support for the formation of the United Nations (UN) and for Marshall Plan aid to allies. Relatedly, combat veterans express greater support for isolationism and less enthusiasm about further military service. Combat also increases support for a punitive peace imposed on the Axis powers. In contrast with research on combat exposure in civil wars, we find no evidence that combat exposure in WWII increased out-group hostility. This latter result suggests that combat veterans’ support for a punitive peace did not result from generalized hatred of the adversary, but rather a more functional desire to cripple the Axis powers’ future war-making capabilities. Overall, this study offers micro-level evidence for existing theories about how combat experience fosters conservatism about foreign policy in general, but hardens attitudes in support of military action to preserve hard-won victories.
Climate Change
How does the public view migrants displaced by climatic disasters? Do considerations about climate migration affect support for climate change mitigation? Around the world, recent climatic disasters have uprooted millions of people. As anthropogenic climate change worsens, the magnitude of the threat of climate-induced displacement will continue to grow. Potential economic consequences like labor market competition mean public support will be key for integrating climate migrants in host communities, and easing migrant-host tensions. In a paper with Sabrina Arias (JOP 2022), we argue that climate migrants occupy an intermediate position in the public view, garnering greater support than traditional economic migrants but less support than refugees. Evidence from a conjoint experiment embedded in nationally representative surveys of 2160 respondents in the U.S. and Germany provide support for this claim. These findings suggest the importance of humanitarian considerations and empathy in shaping migration attitudes. We use a follow-up factorial experiment to explore potential policy implications of public support for climate migrants. We find no evidence that priming climate migration increases support for climate change mitigation, echoing existing work on the difficulty of mobilizing climate action, and suggesting that climate migration is unlikely to spur greater support for mitigating climate change.