Research -- Migration & Forced Displacement
How do policymakers respond to forcibly displaced people, and how do migration policies affect where people move and the consequences of their flight? My research in this area advances and tests a theory of displacement policymaking in the Global South. I explore both the causes and consequences of migration policies in the developing world, with a focus on the role of cross-border kinship, civil war, and local integration capacity.
Temporary UNHCR shelters in Nakivale, Uganda
Global South Displacement Policy
More than 85% of the world's forcibly displaced people originate and reside in the Global South. Nevertheless, much empirical migration scholarship focuses on developed countries. The most important contribution of my research on migration is an original dataset, the Developing World Refugee and Asylum Policy (DWRAP) dataset, which covers 54 de jure policy provisions across 92 countries from 1952 to 2017. I introduce and study these data in two papers with Guy Grossman and Jeremy M. Weinstein (IO 2022, APSR 2022).
What determines how Global South policymakers respond to inflows of forcibly displaced people? Using original data from DWRAP, we study descriptive trends in asylum and refugee policymaking in the Global South, and develop and test a theory of policy reform (IO 2022). We argue and find evidence that intense episodes of civil war in neighboring countries are the primary impetus for forced displacement policy reform in the developing world. By shifting expectations of FDP inflows, regional civil wars raise the salience of forced displacement, spurring policy change. The direction of policy reform hinges on related considerations. In particular, we anticipate and show that states pursue liberalization when political elites have co-ethnics who are discriminated against in neighboring countries. In this circumstance, forced displacement policy can provide relief to non-citizen ethnic kin and ease their integration. We also expect that displacement policy liberalization is used by regimes dependent on external economic assistance to curry political favor with Western governments keen to deflect asylum flows from the Global North. While this dynamic is present in some notable cases (e.g., Uganda under Museveni), we do not find evidence that these salient cases generalize broadly. Descriptively, our data suggest that developing countries have been gradually liberalizing their asylum and refugees policies. Importantly, the liberalizing trend in asylum policy across the Global South is taking place at a time when refugee policies are becoming increasingly restrictive in OECD countries. Divergent asylum policy trajectories across the Global North and Global South reinforce our study’s assumption that a different set of analyses is needed to understand migration policymaking in the developing world.
Do de jure displacement policies affect potential migrants' decisions about whether and where to flee? There is a strong presumption that de jure migration policies are inconsequential in the Global South. This belief is premised on two assumptions: (1) that developing countries suffer enforcement gaps stemming from resource and accountability deficits, resulting in de facto environments inferior to de jure policies; and (2) that prospective developing world migrants are unaware of policies in destination countries. We challenge these assumptions, and argue that growing connections between origin and host countries facilitate the diffusion of knowledge about migration policies in potential destinations (APSR 2022). Using data from DWRAP, we assess whether more liberal de jure migration policies attract forcibly displaced people in the Global South. Estimates from gravity, synthetic control, and interrupted time-series models provide support for this expectation. Interviews with 100 FDP and 26 humanitarian and government officials corroborate our quantitative findings. Gravitation toward more liberal policy environments is conditional on factors like transnational ethnic kin, who facilitate the diffusion of information on potential host countries’ asylum and refugee policies. Policies supporting free movement, service provision, and employment are especially attractive.
Climate Migration
How does the public view migrants displaced by climatic disasters? Do considerations about climate migration affect support for climate change mitigation? Around the world, recent climatic disasters have uprooted millions of people. As anthropogenic climate change worsens, the magnitude of the threat of climate-induced displacement will continue to grow. Potential economic consequences like labor market competition mean public support will be key for integrating climate migrants in host communities, and easing migrant-host tensions. In a paper with Sabrina Arias (JOP 2022), we argue that climate migrants occupy an intermediate position in the public view, garnering greater support than traditional economic migrants but less support than refugees. Evidence from a conjoint experiment embedded in nationally representative surveys of 2160 respondents in the U.S. and Germany provide support for this claim. These findings suggest the importance of humanitarian considerations and empathy in shaping migration attitudes. We use a follow-up factorial experiment to explore potential policy implications of public support for climate migrants. We find no evidence that priming climate migration increases support for climate change mitigation, echoing existing work on the difficulty of mobilizing climate action, and suggesting that climate migration is unlikely to spur greater support for mitigating climate change.
How do climate disasters impact attitudes toward climate migration? Climate disasters raise the salience of climate change’s negative consequences, including climate-induced migration. Policy action to address climate displacement is especially contentious in the U.S., where weak support for tackling climate change intersects with high opposition to immigration. Do climate disasters foster receptivity toward climate migrants and broader willingness to combat climate change? In a paper with Sabrina Arias (APSR 2024) we study this question, leveraging the occurrence of Hurricane Ian during fielding of a representative survey in autumn 2022. Hurricane exposure increased concern about and support for policies to address climate migration. Hurricane exposure also increased support for climate action and belief in anthropogenic climate change. Effects of hurricane exposure cross-cut partisanship, education, age, and other important correlates of climate attitudes, but decay within six months. Together, these results suggest that climate disasters may briefly increase favorability toward climate migrants and climate policy action, but are unlikely to durably mobilize support even in severely-impacted areas.
Refugee Repatriation
How does refugee return affect conflict in origin communities? Answering this question is difficult because when and where refugee returnees move is directly linked to security conditions in prospective destination communities. A number of recent policies have aimed at facilitating repatriation by providing returnees with cash transfers to ease reintegration. In a paper with Austin Wright (R&R at AER), we estimate the causal effect of a large cash assistance program for refugee returnees on conflict in Afghanistan. The program led to a significant increase in repatriation. Leveraging historical returnee settlement patterns and previously unreleased combat records, we find that policy-induced refugee return had cross-cutting effects, reducing insurgent violence, but increasing social conflict. The program’s cash benefits were substantial and may have raised reservation wages in communities where returnees repatriated. Consistent with this hypothesis, returnee encashment had heterogeneous effects on insurgent violence, decreasing use of labor-intensive combat, while also reducing the effectiveness of counterinsurgent bomb neutralization missions. Additionally, kinship ties and access to informal institutions for dispute resolution significantly offset the risks of refugee return for communal violence. These results highlight unintended consequences of repatriation aid and clarify the conditions under which refugee return affects conflict.
More than 85% of the world's forcibly displaced people originate and reside in the Global South. Nevertheless, much empirical migration scholarship focuses on developed countries. The most important contribution of my research on migration is an original dataset, the Developing World Refugee and Asylum Policy (DWRAP) dataset, which covers 54 de jure policy provisions across 92 countries from 1952 to 2017. I introduce and study these data in two papers with Guy Grossman and Jeremy M. Weinstein (IO 2022, APSR 2022).
What determines how Global South policymakers respond to inflows of forcibly displaced people? Using original data from DWRAP, we study descriptive trends in asylum and refugee policymaking in the Global South, and develop and test a theory of policy reform (IO 2022). We argue and find evidence that intense episodes of civil war in neighboring countries are the primary impetus for forced displacement policy reform in the developing world. By shifting expectations of FDP inflows, regional civil wars raise the salience of forced displacement, spurring policy change. The direction of policy reform hinges on related considerations. In particular, we anticipate and show that states pursue liberalization when political elites have co-ethnics who are discriminated against in neighboring countries. In this circumstance, forced displacement policy can provide relief to non-citizen ethnic kin and ease their integration. We also expect that displacement policy liberalization is used by regimes dependent on external economic assistance to curry political favor with Western governments keen to deflect asylum flows from the Global North. While this dynamic is present in some notable cases (e.g., Uganda under Museveni), we do not find evidence that these salient cases generalize broadly. Descriptively, our data suggest that developing countries have been gradually liberalizing their asylum and refugees policies. Importantly, the liberalizing trend in asylum policy across the Global South is taking place at a time when refugee policies are becoming increasingly restrictive in OECD countries. Divergent asylum policy trajectories across the Global North and Global South reinforce our study’s assumption that a different set of analyses is needed to understand migration policymaking in the developing world.
Do de jure displacement policies affect potential migrants' decisions about whether and where to flee? There is a strong presumption that de jure migration policies are inconsequential in the Global South. This belief is premised on two assumptions: (1) that developing countries suffer enforcement gaps stemming from resource and accountability deficits, resulting in de facto environments inferior to de jure policies; and (2) that prospective developing world migrants are unaware of policies in destination countries. We challenge these assumptions, and argue that growing connections between origin and host countries facilitate the diffusion of knowledge about migration policies in potential destinations (APSR 2022). Using data from DWRAP, we assess whether more liberal de jure migration policies attract forcibly displaced people in the Global South. Estimates from gravity, synthetic control, and interrupted time-series models provide support for this expectation. Interviews with 100 FDP and 26 humanitarian and government officials corroborate our quantitative findings. Gravitation toward more liberal policy environments is conditional on factors like transnational ethnic kin, who facilitate the diffusion of information on potential host countries’ asylum and refugee policies. Policies supporting free movement, service provision, and employment are especially attractive.
Climate Migration
How does the public view migrants displaced by climatic disasters? Do considerations about climate migration affect support for climate change mitigation? Around the world, recent climatic disasters have uprooted millions of people. As anthropogenic climate change worsens, the magnitude of the threat of climate-induced displacement will continue to grow. Potential economic consequences like labor market competition mean public support will be key for integrating climate migrants in host communities, and easing migrant-host tensions. In a paper with Sabrina Arias (JOP 2022), we argue that climate migrants occupy an intermediate position in the public view, garnering greater support than traditional economic migrants but less support than refugees. Evidence from a conjoint experiment embedded in nationally representative surveys of 2160 respondents in the U.S. and Germany provide support for this claim. These findings suggest the importance of humanitarian considerations and empathy in shaping migration attitudes. We use a follow-up factorial experiment to explore potential policy implications of public support for climate migrants. We find no evidence that priming climate migration increases support for climate change mitigation, echoing existing work on the difficulty of mobilizing climate action, and suggesting that climate migration is unlikely to spur greater support for mitigating climate change.
How do climate disasters impact attitudes toward climate migration? Climate disasters raise the salience of climate change’s negative consequences, including climate-induced migration. Policy action to address climate displacement is especially contentious in the U.S., where weak support for tackling climate change intersects with high opposition to immigration. Do climate disasters foster receptivity toward climate migrants and broader willingness to combat climate change? In a paper with Sabrina Arias (APSR 2024) we study this question, leveraging the occurrence of Hurricane Ian during fielding of a representative survey in autumn 2022. Hurricane exposure increased concern about and support for policies to address climate migration. Hurricane exposure also increased support for climate action and belief in anthropogenic climate change. Effects of hurricane exposure cross-cut partisanship, education, age, and other important correlates of climate attitudes, but decay within six months. Together, these results suggest that climate disasters may briefly increase favorability toward climate migrants and climate policy action, but are unlikely to durably mobilize support even in severely-impacted areas.
Refugee Repatriation
How does refugee return affect conflict in origin communities? Answering this question is difficult because when and where refugee returnees move is directly linked to security conditions in prospective destination communities. A number of recent policies have aimed at facilitating repatriation by providing returnees with cash transfers to ease reintegration. In a paper with Austin Wright (R&R at AER), we estimate the causal effect of a large cash assistance program for refugee returnees on conflict in Afghanistan. The program led to a significant increase in repatriation. Leveraging historical returnee settlement patterns and previously unreleased combat records, we find that policy-induced refugee return had cross-cutting effects, reducing insurgent violence, but increasing social conflict. The program’s cash benefits were substantial and may have raised reservation wages in communities where returnees repatriated. Consistent with this hypothesis, returnee encashment had heterogeneous effects on insurgent violence, decreasing use of labor-intensive combat, while also reducing the effectiveness of counterinsurgent bomb neutralization missions. Additionally, kinship ties and access to informal institutions for dispute resolution significantly offset the risks of refugee return for communal violence. These results highlight unintended consequences of repatriation aid and clarify the conditions under which refugee return affects conflict.
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5774-5976