Supplementary Materials for Leadership Targeting and Militant Alliance Breakdown

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Table A.1: Variable Definitions and Sources

Variable	Definition	Source
Dependent Variables		
Alliance Termination	Alliance between groups 1 and 2 ends	MGAR
Targeted Group Collapse	Group 1 collapses outright rendering its alliances terminated	MGAR
Inter-organizational Split	Groups 1 and 2 are allied in *t-1* but not *t*	MGAR
Independent Variables		
Leader Decapitation	Leader removal by state-initiated targeting	Price (2012, 2018)
Founder Decapitation	Founder removal by state-initiated targeting	Price (2012, 2018)
Leader Killed	Leader removal by state-initiated targeted killing	Price (2012, 2018)
Founder Killed	Founder removal by state-initiated targeted killing	Price (2012, 2018)
Leader Captured	Leader removal by state-initiated targeted capture	Price (2012, 2018)
Founder Captured	Founder removal by state-initiated targeted capture	Price (2012, 2018)
Other Leader Exit	Leader removal by means other than state-initiated targeting	Price (2012, 2018)
Mutual Breakup	Leader agrees to leave group and group consents to departure	Price (2012, 2018)
Expulsion	Leader expelled from group	Price (2012, 2018)
Death by Natural Causes	Leader dies of natural causes	Price (2012, 2018)
Control Variables		
Shared Ideology	Groups 1 and 2 are co-religionists, or share leftist/communist, rightist, nationalist/separatist, or environmentalist aims	MGAR
Shared Sponsor	Groups 1 and 2 have the same state sponsor	MGAR
Capability Ratio	$\frac{\text{(Group 1 Attacks + 1)}}{\text{((Group 1 Attacks + 1) + (Group 2 Attacks + 1))}}$	GTD
Age	Age of Group 1 or 2	MGAR
Age Difference	| Group 1 Age - Group 2 Age |	MGAR
New Alliances	Number of new alliances formed by Group 1 or 2 in *t-1*	MGAR
Intercapital Distance	Log (1 + intercapital distance between base countries of groups 1 and 2)	CShapes
Population	Log population in base countries of groups 1 and 2	PWT
GDP/Capita	Log PPP-adjusted GDP/capita in base countries of groups 1 and 2	PWT
Polity 2	Polity 2 Score	Polity
Cold War	Indicator for years 1970-1989	
Post 9/11	Indicator for years 2002-2009	

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis can be found here.

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent Variables:					
Alliance Termination	5305	.0808671	.2726566	0	1
Targeted Group Collapse	5305	.0094251	.0966333	0	1
Inter-organizational Split	5305	.071442	.2575861	0	1
Independent Variables:					
Any Leader Decapitation	4548	.0490325	.2159597	0	1
Founder Decapitation	4548	.032102	.1762904	0	1
Non-Founder Decapitation	4548	.0169305	.1290253	0	1
Any Leader Killed	4548	.0230871	.1501966	0	1
Founder Killed	4548	.0145119	.1196011	0	1
Any Leader Capture	4548	.026825	.1615894	0	1
Founder Captured	4548	.0186895	.135441	0	1
Other Leader Exit	4548	.0112137	.105311	0	1
Mutual Breakup	4548	.0050572	.0709415	0	1
Expulsion	4548	.0015391	.039206	0	1
Death by Natural Causes	4548	.0046174	.067802	0	1
Control Variables:					
Shared Ideology	5305	.9212064	.2694417	0	1
Shared Sponsor	4548	.0787159	.2693245	0	1
Age (Group 1)	5305	18.96833	13.95653	1	88
Age (Group 2)	5305	16.15042	13.3813	1	122
Age Difference	5305	11.20622	12.2773	0	116
Capability Ratio	4198	.5521461	.3030036	.0020243	.9980431
New Alliances (Group 1)	4548	.83927	1.338433	0	7
New Alliances (Group 2)	4545	.630363	1.135515	0	7
Log Intercapital Distance	5090	4.543968	3.716931	0	9.667755
Log Population (Group 1)	4630	3.893607	1.722952	.8317794	7.087632
Log Population (Group 2)	4832	3.819891	1.720982	-.3835016	7.190443
Log GDP/Capita (Group 1)	4630	8.838125	.9959122	5.565552	10.60097
Log GDP/Capita (Group 2)	4832	8.762936	1.029261	5.565552	10.75928
Polity 2 (Group 1)	4716	4.735157	5.997529	-9	10
Polity 2 (Group 2)	4854	4.235888	6.229965	-9	10
Cold War (1970-1989)	5305	.3295005	.4700761	0	1
Post 9/11 (2002-2009)	5305	.3624882	.4807641	0	1

Section A.3: Estimation Strategy

In our initial empirical tests we use a conditional frailty gap-time Cox model. This choice is based on the fact that our data include repeated failures. Ample simulation evidence suggests that conditional frailty models are the best choice for modeling repeated failures with event dependence and unit heterogeneity (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and Joyce 2007). In our data, alliance termination and termination by inter-organizational split are both repeated events because militant groups can ally, suffer an alliance breakdown, and then re-ally in the future. This phenomenon is relatively common in our data, affecting 17 of our 720 dyads. Unlike terminations by inter-organizational split, terminations by targeted group collapse cannot repeat because militant groups that collapse outright drop out of our data permanently.

Given our primary interest in modeling alliance termination, an event that can repeat, we opt for conditional frailty models in our primary specifications. The advantage of these models is that they can simultaneously account for two inferential threats: event dependence and unit heterogeneity. Event dependence occurs if experiencing one failure changes the probability of experiencing another failure. Unit heterogeneity occurs if some dyads are more or less prone to failure for reasons unaccounted for by the inclusion of covariates. As described in the main text, both of these issues are likely present in our data. Unit heterogeneity is likely to be an especially severe problem in our data because militant dyads vary considerably in their propensities for alliance cohesion, and because social scientists generally lack the wealth of fine-grained data that would be needed to control for every possible variable related to the likelihood of alliance termination between militant groups. If unit heterogeneity in the propensity for alliance termination is also correlated with the likelihood of facing leadership targeting, effect estimates are biased. This is likely to be the case because allies often pose an operational security risk for militant groups, and governments have used intelligence gleaned from militant groups' allies to hone targeting of groups themselves, exacerbating mistrust between groups (Mir 2018, 54).

Our conditional frailty gap-time Cox models are conditional because they stratify the risk set by the number of failures a dyad has experienced. By allowing the baseline hazard to vary by the number of failures, stratification helps control for event dependence. Our models are called frailty models because they include frailty terms for each militant dyad. In essence, these frailty terms are dyad-level random effects. Following Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and Joyce (2007), we use gamma-distributed frailties. Variance of the frailties is estimated with an expectation-maximization algorithm. By including frailties, we account for unobserved heterogeneity in each dyad's propensity to fail. This shared frailty approach allows for partial pooling across dyads while accounting for heterogeneity. Our models are estimated in gap-time rather than elapsed time because we are substantively interested in the time since the unit experienced the preceding event, rather than the time since the unit first entered the risk set.

In our primary models we employ a Cox proportional hazards estimator, which, usefully for our purposes, makes no additional parametric assumptions about the shape of the hazard function. In parametric approaches, the baseline hazard is assumed to follow a specific distribution (e.g. exponential, Weibull, or Gompertz). In contrast, Cox models do not directly model the baseline hazard because they do not specify a parametric distribution for the hazard. While parametric approaches directly model the hazard ratio and allow for out-of-sample prediction, coefficient estimates are dependent on a correctly-chosen distribution of the hazard. Cox models are more flexible because they do not specify a parametric distribution of the hazard rate. We opt for the Cox approach in our primary models because we are not concerned with out-of-sample prediction so much

as accurate coefficient estimation. See Crabtree, Darmofal, and Kern (2015) for a further discussion and empirical application of the conditional frailty gap-time Cox estimator.

Although our initial models are conditional-frailty gap-time Cox models, in the paper and appendix we show that our results are robust to our choice of estimator. Our secondary tests use competing risks, which allow us to model multiple causes of the event of interest. In these analyses we treat alliance termination by inter-organizational split and alliance termination by targeted group collapse as competing causes of our event of interest, alliance termination. Our competing risks models follow the approach outlined by Fine and Gray (1999), who describe a method of estimating the cumulative incidence function based on the sub-distribution hazard. Finally, apart from conditional frailty and competing risks models, we show that our results hold in parametric frailty models, where the baseline hazard is assumed to follow either an exponential, Weibull, or Gompertz distribution. We include gamma-distributed frailty terms in our parametric models to absorb unit heterogeneity.

Kaplan-Meier Failure Plots

Figure A.4: KM Plots and Log-Rank Test Results for Targeted Killing/Capture

(a) Targeted Leader Killing

(b) Targeted Founder Killing

(c) Targeted Leader Capture

(d) Targeted Founder Capture

Note: Associated p-values from a log-rank test of equality of the survival distribution are in the bottom right corner of each panel. Dashed lines denote the survival curve when the respective targeting variable is equal to 1. Solid lines denote the survival curve when the respective targeting variable is equal to 0. The blue shaded area marks a 95% confidence interval around the dashed line. The red shaded area marks a 95% confidence interval around the solid line.

Full Model Results for Table 3

Table A.5: Full Model Results for Table 3

	Termination by Targeted Group Collapse		Termination by Inter-Organizational Split			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Leader Decapitated $_{t-1}$	-0.173		0.324**			
	(1.057)		(0.119)			
Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$		0.357		0.320*		0.328**
		(1.059)		(0.124)		(0.126)
Non-Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$					0.245	0.300*
					(0.142)	(0.140)
Dyadic Age Difference	-0.024	-0.024	0.023*	0.023*	0.023*	0.023*
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age (Group 1)	-0.054*	-0.053*	-0.026**	-0.026**	-0.026**	-0.026**
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age (Group 2)	0.013	0.012	-0.018*	-0.018*	-0.018*	-0.018*
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Capability Ratio	-0.769	-0.795	-0.057	-0.064	-0.060	-0.057
	(0.721)	(0.720)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.125)
New Alliances (Group 1)	-0.092	-0.093	-0.012	-0.014	-0.018	-0.012
	(0.248)	(0.250)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)
New Alliances (Group 2)	-0.267	-0.268	-0.027	-0.026	-0.025	-0.027
	(0.240)	(0.237)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Intercapital Distance	0.085	0.086	0.038*	0.039*	0.036*	0.038*
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Population (Group 1)	-0.291	-0.290	0.084**	0.087**	0.086**	0.084**
	(0.207)	(0.208)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Population (Group 2)	0.078	0.075	0.062*	0.062*	0.066*	0.062*
	(0.206)	(0.205)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)
GDP/Capita (Group 1)	-0.147	-0.154	0.047	0.049	0.055	0.047
	(0.253)	(0.253)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.084)
GDP/Capita (Group 2)	0.360	0.361	0.017	0.020	0.016	0.018
	(0.233)	(0.231)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Polity 2 (Group 1)	-0.061	-0.060	-0.010	-0.010	-0.012	-0.010
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Polity 2 (Group 2)	-0.028	-0.028	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Cold War	-1.114	-1.117	-0.215	-0.210	-0.177	-0.215
	(0.672)	(0.671)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.104)	(0.112)
Post 9/11	0.063	0.055	-0.418**	-0.418**	-0.413**	-0.418**
	(0.577)	(0.574)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Shared Ideology			-0.399**	-0.397**	-0.382**	-0.399**
			(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.123)
Shared State Sponsor			0.035	0.049	0.016	0.036
			(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.123)	(0.127)
Log-Likelihood	-98.439	-98.401	-625.665	-625.735	-626.175	-625.664
AIC	228.878	228.802	1287.330	1287.469	1288.133	1289.329
Observations	2680	2680	2680	2680	2680	2680

Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; robust standard errors clustered by dyad are in parentheses; the table displays standardized coefficients rather than hazard ratios; models in columns 1 and 2 are stratified by shared ideology and shared sponsorship; models in columns 3 through 6 are stratified by the number of inter-organizational splits a dyad has experienced; frailty terms for dyad are included in all models; Efron's method is used for ties; time-variant covariates are lagged one year.

Competing Risks

Our primary modeling strategy is the conditional frailty approach. This is the preferred method to estimate repeated-failure duration models in the presence of event dependence and unit heterogeneity (Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef 2006; Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and Joyce 2007). These benefits of the conditional frailty approach notwithstanding, conditional frailty models do not take competing risks into account. Competing risks occur when an event of interest (e.g. alliance termination) can occur in various ways (e.g. targeted group collapse, inter-organizational split). When any cause of failure can occur, but the occurrence of one cause alters the probability or precludes the observation of the other cause(s), competing risks models are required. In the presence of competing risks, standard Cox models are upwardly biased because they treat competing events as censored. By contrast, competing risks models estimate cause-specific hazards. The drawback of competing risks estimators is that they do not take repeated failures into account. In other words, selecting between conditional frailty and competing risks estimators entails a trade-off: flexible handling of unit heterogeneity and event dependence but not competing risks, or flexible handling of competing risks but not unit heterogeneity or event dependence. We employ conditional frailty models in our main specifications because of the numerous repeated failures in our data, and because event dependence and unit heterogeneity are both present. Nevertheless, in Table A.7 we show that our core results are robust to competing risks estimation. Competing risks models in Table A.7 follow the approach outlined by Fine and Gray (1999), who describe a method of estimating the cumulative incidence function based on the subdistribution hazard. Cumulative incidence functions are portrayed in Figure A.6.

Figure A.6: Cumulative Incidence Functions

Note: Plots depict cumulative incidence functions (CIF) based on the estimator from Fine and Gray (1999). The solid line denotes the CIF when a founding leader is decapitated, and the dashed line denotes the CIF when a founding leader is not decapitated.

Table A.7: Competing Risks Estimates

	Termination by Targeted Group Collapse		Termination by Inter-Organizational Split			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Leader Decapitated $_{t-1}$	-0.064		0.295			
	(1.042)		(0.265)			
Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$		0.379		0.640*		0.629*
		(1.031)		(0.261)		(0.262)
Non-Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$					-0.804	-0.777
					(0.727)	(0.729)
Dyadic Age Difference	0.022	0.022	0.047**	0.046**	0.046**	0.046**
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age (Group 1)	-0.102**	-0.101**	-0.050**	-0.050**	-0.050**	-0.050**
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age (Group 2)	-0.026	-0.026	-0.046**	-0.046**	-0.046**	-0.046**
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Capability Ratio	-0.695	-0.712	0.023	0.025	0.035	0.032
	(0.775)	(0.778)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.247)
New Alliances (Group 1)	-0.009	-0.009	0.285**	0.284**	0.276**	0.279**
	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
New Alliances (Group 2)	-0.130	-0.132	0.329**	0.334**	0.340**	0.341**
	(0.192)	(0.187)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Intercapital Distance	0.102	0.104	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Population (Group 1)	-0.254	-0.256	0.061	0.061	0.065	0.063
	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Population (Group 2)	0.079	0.078	0.028	0.026	0.020	0.022
	(0.208)	(0.207)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
GDP/Capita (Group 1)	-0.182	-0.187	-0.045	-0.042	-0.029	-0.034
	(0.240)	(0.239)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.121)
GDP/Capita (Group 2)	0.379	0.381	-0.201	-0.201	-0.208	-0.205
	(0.268)	(0.265)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Polity 2 (Group 1)	-0.074	-0.073	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.003
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Polity 2 (Group 2)	-0.043	-0.044	0.018	0.018	0.019	0.018
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Cold War	-1.530*	-1.544*	0.552**	0.544*	0.534*	0.532*
	(0.625)	(0.627)	(0.213)	(0.211)	(0.212)	(0.212)
Post 9/11	-0.155	-0.163	-0.014	-0.015	0.000	-0.008
	(0.593)	(0.587)	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.207)	(0.206)
Shared Ideology			-0.519	-0.533	-0.511	-0.533
			(0.322)	(0.322)	(0.321)	(0.322)
Shared State Sponsor			-0.602*	-0.601*	-0.604*	-0.601*
			(0.304)	(0.304)	(0.304)	(0.305)
Observations	2680	2680	2680	2680	2680	2680

Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; robust standard errors clustered by dyad are in parentheses; the table displays standardized coefficients rather than hazard ratios; models in columns 1 and 2 treat termination by targeted group collapse as the focal event and termination by inter-organizational split as a competing event; models in columns 3 through 6 treat termination by inter-organizational split as the focal event and targeted group collapse as a competing event; time-variant covariates are lagged one year.

Stabilized Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights (IPTW)

To calculate IPTW used in Table 4 we estimated the following equations in Table A.8. Weights were produced according to the steps outlined by Fewell et. al. (2004) and Blackwell (2013).

Table A.8: First-Stage Estimates to Generate IPTW

	Numerator	Denominator
	(1)	(2)
Nationalist	0.080	-0.361
	(0.365)	(0.296)
Leftist	-0.048	-0.248
	(0.364)	(0.352)
Right-Wing	-0.207	0.360
	(0.797)	(0.533)
Environmentalist	1.003	-0.522
	(0.880)	(1.083)
Sunni/Jihadist	0.603	0.699*
	(0.415)	(0.337)
Transnational Base	0.801	0.496
	(0.531)	(0.640)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.340*	-0.120
	(0.636)	(0.832)
Group Attacks (Logged)		0.142
		(0.102)
Group Age		-0.027*
		(0.012)
Population (Logged)		0.090
		(0.117)
GDP/Capita (Logged)		0.507*
		(0.226)
Repression		0.228
		(0.319)
Major Power		-0.016
		(0.484)
Polity 2		-0.017
		(0.034)
Civil War Ongoing		-0.526
		(0.695)
Constant	-2.642**	-7.129**
	(0.477)	(2.330)
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-724.7	-1056
Observations	5305	3537

Note: ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$; robust standard errors clustered by group are in parentheses; the table displays results for a series of logistic regressions with leadership decapitation as the outcome; covariates used in the numerator equation are time-invariant.

IPTW Diagnostics

Following Cole and Hernán (2008) and Blackwell (2013, 516-517) we check our IPTW model based on the distribution of the weights. As they describe, weights are pushed farther from 1 when they are subject to confounding of time-variant covariates. If the mean of the stabilized weights is lower than 1, there are few "surprise" treatments—cases where the observed covariate history would not predict that the "treated" unit would have experienced leadership decapitation. To verify that our IPTW are well-behaved, in Figure A.9 we plot the interquartile range of the stabilized weights over time. Encouragingly, all weights are centered with a mean around 1 with no very large or small values.

Figure A.9: The Stabilized IPTW are Well-Behaved

Note: Black lines mark the yearly mean and dashed lines mark the upper and lower quartiles by year. The red line marks 1.

Table A.10: Full Model Results for Table 4

	Any Leader	Founding Leader	Non-Founding Leader	Any Leader	Any Leader			Founding Leader		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Leader Decapitated $_{t-1}$	0.287 (0.317)									
Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$		0.745* (0.313)		0.723* (0.313)						
Non-Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$			-1.430 (0.774)	-1.385 (0.769)						
Targeted Killing $_{t-1}$					0.427 (0.407)		0.429 (0.407)	0.989* (0.422)		0.971* (0.422)
Targeted Capture $_{t-1}$						0.144 (0.446)	0.150 (0.446)		0.534 (0.468)	0.507 (0.468)
Dyadic Age Difference	-0.015* (0.007)	-0.015* (0.007)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.015* (0.007)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.015* (0.007)	-0.015* (0.007)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.015* (0.007)	-0.015* (0.007)
Age (Group 1)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.008)	0.000 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.000 (0.008)
Age (Group 2)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)
Shared Ideology	-0.337 (0.225)	-0.352 (0.224)	-0.314 (0.224)	-0.341 (0.225)	-0.330 (0.224)	-0.329 (0.224)	-0.335 (0.225)	-0.336 (0.224)	-0.337 (0.224)	-0.348 (0.224)
Shared State Sponsor	-0.011 (0.398)	0.004 (0.400)	-0.022 (0.411)	0.000 (0.409)	0.002 (0.398)	-0.021 (0.401)	-0.001 (0.398)	0.005 (0.398)	-0.014 (0.402)	0.008 (0.399)
Capability Ratio	-0.127 (0.231)	-0.133 (0.231)	-0.106 (0.229)	-0.122 (0.230)	-0.117 (0.231)	-0.122 (0.230)	-0.122 (0.231)	-0.105 (0.231)	-0.133 (0.230)	-0.121 (0.231)
New Alliances (Group 1)	-0.006 (0.074)	-0.007 (0.074)	-0.017 (0.074)	-0.013 (0.074)	-0.006 (0.074)	-0.010 (0.074)	-0.006 (0.074)	-0.006 (0.074)	-0.010 (0.074)	-0.005 (0.074)
New Alliances (Group 2)	0.077 (0.063)	0.082 (0.061)	0.084 (0.064)	0.087 (0.061)	0.072 (0.062)	0.080 (0.063)	0.074 (0.062)	0.073 (0.061)	0.083 (0.063)	0.078 (0.061)
Intercapital Distance	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.017 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.017 (0.019)
Population (Group 1)	-0.090 (0.059)	-0.091 (0.059)	-0.083 (0.059)	-0.086 (0.058)	-0.091 (0.059)	-0.088 (0.059)	-0.091 (0.059)	-0.092 (0.058)	-0.088 (0.059)	-0.092 (0.059)
Population (Group 2)	0.009 (0.063)	0.008 (0.064)	-0.001 (0.063)	0.002 (0.064)	0.010 (0.064)	0.006 (0.063)	0.010 (0.064)	0.010 (0.064)	0.005 (0.063)	0.009 (0.064)
GDP/Capita (Group 1)	-0.078 (0.098)	-0.078 (0.098)	-0.063 (0.097)	-0.070 (0.098)	-0.081 (0.098)	-0.072 (0.097)	-0.081 (0.098)	-0.086 (0.098)	-0.071 (0.097)	-0.085 (0.098)
GDP/Capita (Group 2)	-0.164 (0.094)	-0.166 (0.094)	-0.164 (0.094)	-0.166 (0.094)	-0.163 (0.094)	-0.164 (0.094)	-0.163 (0.094)	-0.164 (0.095)	-0.165 (0.094)	-0.166 (0.095)
Polity 2 (Group 1)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.016)
Polity 2 (Group 2)	0.014 (0.016)	0.013 (0.017)	0.015 (0.016)	0.014 (0.017)	0.014 (0.016)	0.014 (0.017)	0.014 (0.017)	0.015 (0.017)	0.013 (0.017)	0.014 (0.017)
Cold War	0.600** (0.220)	0.591** (0.219)	0.600** (0.220)	0.589** (0.219)	0.605** (0.222)	0.602** (0.220)	0.603** (0.221)	0.602** (0.222)	0.597** (0.219)	0.597** (0.221)
Post 9/11	0.240 (0.215)	0.230 (0.214)	0.266 (0.214)	0.242 (0.214)	0.238 (0.216)	0.251 (0.214)	0.236 (0.216)	0.220 (0.216)	0.252 (0.213)	0.217 (0.216)
IPTW	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log-Likelihood	-698.302	-698.362	-698.822	-698.300	-698.505	-698.664	-698.301	-698.520	-698.705	-698.361
AIC	2400.317	2394.775	2397.112	2392.401	2399.991	2401.498	2401.638	2395.611	2399.785	2395.551
Observations	1989	1989	1989	1989	1989	1989	1989	1989	1989	1989

Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; robust standard errors clustered by dyad are in parentheses; the table displays standardized coefficients rather than hazard ratios; IPTW and frailty terms for dyad are included in all models; Efron's method is used for ties; time-variant covariates are lagged one year.

Table A.11: IPTW Results for Termination Type

	Termination by Targeted Group Collapse		Termination by Inter-Organizational Split			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Leader Decapitated $_{t-1}$	0.122 (1.118)		0.361 (0.322)			
Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$		0.359 (1.048)		0.854** (0.307)		0.829** (0.306)
Non-Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$					-1.397 (0.810)	-1.341 (0.801)
Dyadic Age Difference	-0.045 (0.024)	-0.024 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.009)	-0.017 (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.017 (0.009)
Age (Group 1)	-0.059 (0.034)	-0.052 (0.032)	0.002 (0.009)	0.002 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)
Age (Group 2)	0.030 (0.020)	0.012 (0.027)	0.007 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)
Capability Ratio	-0.995 (0.587)	-0.788 (0.735)	-0.084 (0.250)	-0.084 (0.250)	-0.053 (0.246)	-0.068 (0.248)
New Alliances (Group 1)	-0.203 (0.323)	-0.097 (0.294)	0.039 (0.074)	0.040 (0.074)	0.028 (0.074)	0.034 (0.074)
New Alliances (Group 2)	-0.330 (0.239)	-0.272 (0.343)	0.144* (0.061)	0.147* (0.059)	0.152* (0.062)	0.154* (0.060)
Intercapital Distance	0.153 (0.080)	0.086 (0.072)	-0.058** (0.022)	-0.060** (0.022)	-0.057** (0.022)	-0.059** (0.022)
Population (Group 1)	-0.704** (0.253)	-0.287 (0.198)	-0.033 (0.070)	-0.033 (0.070)	-0.024 (0.069)	-0.028 (0.069)
Population (Group 2)	0.078 (0.210)	0.073 (0.206)	-0.035 (0.074)	-0.035 (0.075)	-0.045 (0.073)	-0.040 (0.074)
GDP/Capita (Group 1)	0.014 (0.254)	-0.152 (0.329)	-0.148 (0.112)	-0.148 (0.112)	-0.131 (0.111)	-0.138 (0.111)
GDP/Capita (Group 2)	0.126 (0.261)	0.360 (0.340)	-0.230* (0.107)	-0.231* (0.108)	-0.230* (0.107)	-0.230* (0.108)
Polity 2 (Group 1)	-0.036 (0.047)	-0.060 (0.044)	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.017)
Polity 2 (Group 2)	0.005 (0.063)	-0.028 (0.047)	0.013 (0.018)	0.012 (0.018)	0.015 (0.018)	0.012 (0.018)
Cold War	-1.050 (0.803)	-1.107 (0.606)	0.711** (0.266)	0.693** (0.265)	0.712** (0.265)	0.689** (0.264)
Post 9/11	1.410* (0.638)	0.061 (0.623)	-0.003 (0.219)	-0.013 (0.219)	0.020 (0.217)	-0.004 (0.219)
Shared Ideology			-0.392 (0.224)	-0.402 (0.224)	-0.373 (0.224)	-0.395 (0.224)
Shared State Sponsor			0.063 (0.436)	0.084 (0.438)	0.033 (0.456)	0.071 (0.451)
IPTW	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log-Likelihood	-62.085	-98.324	-1107.720	-1105.175	-1106.875	-1103.705
AIC	154.465	231.101	2200.838	2194.242	2199.485	2192.872
Observations	1989	1989	1989	1989	1989	1989

Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; robust standard errors clustered by dyad are in parentheses; the table displays standardized coefficients rather than hazard ratios; models in columns 1 and 2 are stratified by shared ideology and shared sponsorship; IPTW and frailty terms for dyad are included in all models; Efron's method is used for ties; time-variant covariates are lagged one year.

Implication 1: Other Leader Exits

Another implication of our theory is that other types of unexpected leadership turnover should be positively associated with alliance breakdown. As shown below, this is the case. The top panel of Figure A.12 depicts results from two models: (1) with indicators for decapitation and other exits (shown in black); and (2) with indicators for founder decapitation, non-founder decapitation, and other exits (shown in gray). The bottom panel depicts results from a model with indicators for each of the leader removal types listed below. Thick and thin bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals in both panels. Death by natural causes is significant at the 10% level ($p = 0.098$).

Figure A.12: The Effects of Decapitation and Other Leader Exits

Implication 2: Co-Leadership Structures

Another implication of our theory is that when co-leadership structures are in place, leadership decapitation does not correlate with alliance breakdown, since other leaders will be available to step in and fill the leadership role after decapitation in a group with co-leaders. As shown below, this is the case. Figure A.13 depicts results from two models: (1) with decapitation interacted with co-leadership structure (shown in black); and (2) with founder decapitation interacted with co-leadership structure (shown in gray). Thick and thin bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.13: The Effects of Decapitation and Co-Leadership Structures

Extending implication 2 of our theory described above, in Figure A.14 we depict results from an additional model with indicators for decapitation and other leader exits interacted with co-leadership structure. Thick and thin bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Results show that both decapitation and other unplanned leader exits are associated with alliance termination in groups with single leaders, but this effect disappears when groups that lose leaders have co-leadership structures in place. These findings are in line with our theoretical proposition that unplanned leadership turnover increases the probability of alliance breakdown, but that co-leadership structures can relax this pressure by facilitating leadership succession. The observed effect of non-decapitation leader exits for groups without co-leaders is significant at the 10% level (p = 0.066).

Figure A.14: The Effects of Other Exits and Co-Leadership Structures

Robustness to Alternate Estimators

Our core results replicate with alternate unweighted and IPTW estimators. Founder decapitation is significant across models, though only at the 10% level in panel D columns 2 ($p = 0.053$), 4 ($p = 0.061$), and 8 ($p = 0.052$) in Table A.16.

Table A.16: Robustness to Alternate Estimators

	Unweighted				IPTW			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Exponential Hazard Model								
Any Leader Decapitated $_{t-1}$	0.210 (0.253)				0.342 (0.304)			
Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$		0.587* (0.246)		0.573* (0.247)		0.742* (0.293)		0.726* (0.294)
Non-Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$			-0.978 (0.710)	-0.952 (0.712)			-1.258 (0.753)	-1.219 (0.754)
Constant	-1.923* (0.889)	-1.946* (0.880)	-1.954* (0.894)	-1.969* (0.882)	-1.788 (1.029)	-1.758 (1.023)	-1.886 (1.032)	-1.799 (1.022)
Panel B: Weibull Hazard Model								
Any Leader Decapitated $_{t-1}$	0.216 (0.336)				0.431 (0.419)			
Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$		0.675* (0.332)		0.663* (0.334)		0.902* (0.413)		0.885* (0.411)
Non-Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$			-1.211 (0.907)	-1.166 (0.900)			-1.554 (1.117)	-1.478 (1.077)
Constant	-3.449* (1.392)	-3.393* (1.345)	-3.531* (1.418)	-3.442* (1.354)	-3.442 (2.100)	-3.295 (1.972)	-3.588 (2.186)	-3.316 (1.954)
Panel C: Gompertz Hazard Model								
Any Leader Decapitated $_{t-1}$	0.286 (0.258)				0.391 (0.308)			
Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$		0.647* (0.256)		0.637* (0.257)		0.779** (0.299)		0.764* (0.300)
Non-Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$			-0.887 (0.723)	-0.861 (0.724)			-1.202 (0.777)	-1.161 (0.778)
Constant	-1.724 (0.985)	-1.766 (0.976)	-1.750 (0.991)	-1.790 (0.977)	-1.963 (1.123)	-1.947 (1.118)	-2.070 (1.130)	-1.990 (1.118)
Panel D: Logistic Regression								
Any Leader Decapitated $_{t-1}$	0.168 (0.315)				0.453 (0.470)			
Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$		0.649 (0.336)		0.631 (0.337)		1.042* (0.524)		1.018 (0.523)
Non-Founder Decapitated $_{t-1}$			-1.194 (0.801)	-1.167 (0.804)			-1.473 (0.873)	-1.436 (0.881)
Constant	0.323 (1.255)	0.354 (1.270)	0.230 (1.234)	0.289 (1.254)	2.216 (1.983)	2.268 (1.977)	1.892 (1.938)	2.105 (1.958)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
IPTW	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2680	2680	2680	2680	1989	1989	1989	1989

Note: ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$; robust standard errors clustered by dyad are in parentheses; panels A-C display standardized coefficients rather than hazard ratios; panels A-C include frailty terms and panel D includes analogous dyad random effects; time-variant covariates are lagged one year.

Figure A.15: Robustness to Alternate Estimators

Note: Circles denote unweighted models and squares denote IPTW models. Thick and thin bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Dashed lines mark 0.

Robustness to Additional Controls

Taking our core specification from column 1 of Table 2, our finding on the effect of the decapitation of any leader holds when we control for : (1) the type and strength of the alliance between groups; (2) civil war in each group's base country (Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019); (3) whether each group's base country is a major power (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972); (4) repression in each group's base country (Fariss 2019); and (5) the number of U.S. troops per capita in each group's base country (Kane 2016). The results also hold when we restrict our analysis only to dyads in which both groups are coded in Price's (2012, 2018) data. Our decapitation measure is significant at the 10% level for the U.S. troops/capita model (p = 0.079) and the Price dyad sub-sample (p = 0.050).

Figure A.17: The Effect of Decapitation With Additional Controls

Note: Plots denote coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the decapitation of any leader in models with additional controls. The dashed line marks 0.

Taking our core specification from column 4 of Table 2, our finding on the effect of the decapitation of founding leaders also holds across the aforementioned additional tests. Our founder decapitation measure is nearly significant for the U.S. troops/capita model (p = 0.12) and significant at the 10% level the Price dyad sub-sample (p = 0.076).

Similarly, taking our core specification from column 4 of Table 2, our finding on the effect of the decapitation of non-founding leaders is somewhat weaker, but also generally holds across the aforementioned additional tests. Our non-founder decapitation measure is significant at the 5% level when we add controls for repression, significant at the 10% level when we add controls for U.S. troops/capita (p = 0.059) and major powers (p = 0.060), and nearly significant when we control for civil war (p = 0.17).

Figure A.18: The Effect of Founder Decapitation With Additional Controls

Note: Plots denote coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the decapitation of founding leaders in models with additional controls. The dashed line marks 0.

Figure A.19: The Effect of Non-Founder Decapitation With Additional Controls

Note: Plots denote coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the decapitation of non-founding leaders in models with additional controls. The dashed line marks 0.

Considering a Longer Time Lag on Decapitation

Table A.20: Considering a Longer Time Lag on Decapitation

|	Any Leader	Founding Leader	Non-Founding Leader	Any Leader	Any Leader			Founding Leader		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Leader Decapitated $_{t-1,2,3}$	0.300** (0.100)									
Founder Decapitated $_{t-1,2,3}$		0.284** (0.100)		0.297** (0.103)						
Non-Founder Decapitated $_{t-1,2,3}$			0.270* (0.122)	0.311* (0.128)						
Targeted Killing $_{t-1,2,3}$					0.283* (0.120)		0.299* (0.123)	0.296* (0.122)		0.309* (0.125)
Targeted Capture $_{t-1,2,3}$						0.277** (0.106)	0.300** (0.112)		0.237* (0.112)	0.255* (0.117)
Dyadic Age Difference	0.022* (0.010)	0.021* (0.010)	0.021* (0.010)	0.022* (0.010)	0.022* (0.010)	0.021* (0.009)	0.022* (0.010)	0.021* (0.010)	0.021* (0.009)	0.021* (0.010)
Age (Group 1)	-0.025** (0.009)	-0.025** (0.009)	-0.026** (0.009)	-0.025** (0.009)	-0.026** (0.009)	-0.026** (0.009)	-0.025** (0.009)	-0.025** (0.009)	-0.026** (0.009)	-0.025** (0.009)
Age (Group 2)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.017* (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)
Shared Ideology	-0.357** (0.121)	-0.349** (0.119)	-0.328** (0.115)	-0.357** (0.121)	-0.338** (0.118)	-0.339** (0.117)	-0.357** (0.121)	-0.332** (0.116)	-0.336** (0.117)	-0.348** (0.119)
Shared State Sponsor	0.037 (0.135)	0.042 (0.137)	-0.001 (0.128)	0.036 (0.136)	0.024 (0.134)	0.016 (0.129)	0.037 (0.135)	0.019 (0.133)	0.025 (0.132)	0.041 (0.137)
Capability Ratio	-0.048 (0.121)	-0.069 (0.120)	-0.039 (0.120)	-0.047 (0.123)	-0.033 (0.124)	-0.074 (0.120)	-0.048 (0.126)	-0.046 (0.120)	-0.077 (0.121)	-0.066 (0.124)
New Alliances (Group 1)	-0.028 (0.038)	-0.031 (0.038)	-0.035 (0.037)	-0.028 (0.038)	-0.031 (0.038)	-0.035 (0.037)	-0.028 (0.038)	-0.033 (0.037)	-0.036 (0.037)	-0.031 (0.038)
New Alliances (Group 2)	-0.020 (0.033)	-0.021 (0.033)	-0.022 (0.031)	-0.020 (0.033)	-0.025 (0.033)	-0.017 (0.032)	-0.020 (0.033)	-0.026 (0.033)	-0.018 (0.032)	-0.022 (0.034)
Intercapital Distance	0.036* (0.017)	0.037* (0.017)	0.035* (0.017)	0.036* (0.017)	0.039* (0.018)	0.033* (0.016)	0.036* (0.017)	0.039* (0.018)	0.034* (0.017)	0.038* (0.018)
Population (Group 1)	0.075** (0.029)	0.077** (0.029)	0.073* (0.028)	0.074** (0.029)	0.071* (0.028)	0.079** (0.029)	0.075** (0.029)	0.073** (0.028)	0.078** (0.029)	0.076** (0.029)
Population (Group 2)	0.057 (0.030)	0.057 (0.030)	0.061* (0.030)	0.057 (0.030)	0.063* (0.031)	0.056 (0.030)	0.057 (0.031)	0.063* (0.031)	0.057 (0.030)	0.058 (0.030)
GDP/Capita (Group 1)	0.049 (0.081)	0.046 (0.081)	0.062 (0.080)	0.049 (0.082)	0.051 (0.082)	0.057 (0.079)	0.049 (0.082)	0.050 (0.080)	0.055 (0.079)	0.046 (0.081)
GDP/Capita (Group 2)	0.030 (0.085)	0.033 (0.084)	0.032 (0.082)	0.030 (0.084)	0.034 (0.084)	0.031 (0.083)	0.030 (0.085)	0.033 (0.082)	0.035 (0.083)	0.033 (0.084)
Polity 2 (Group 1)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)
Polity 2 (Group 2)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)
Cold War	-0.260* (0.108)	-0.247* (0.105)	-0.241* (0.105)	-0.260* (0.109)	-0.256* (0.109)	-0.232* (0.102)	-0.260* (0.109)	-0.244* (0.105)	-0.232* (0.102)	-0.248* (0.106)
Post 9/11	-0.379** (0.134)	-0.373** (0.133)	-0.366** (0.133)	-0.379** (0.134)	-0.378** (0.134)	-0.362** (0.132)	-0.379** (0.134)	-0.378** (0.134)	-0.359** (0.133)	-0.375** (0.134)
Log-Likelihood	-697.958	-698.197	-698.684	-697.958	-698.394	-698.494	-697.958	-698.453	-698.637	-698.190
AIC	1431.916	1432.188	1432.595	1433.915	1432.570	1432.262	1433.916	1432.390	1432.514	1434.169
Observations	2680	2680	2680	2680	2680	2680	2680	2680	2680	2680

Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; robust standard errors clustered by dyad are in parentheses; the table displays standardized coefficients rather than hazard ratios; models are stratified by the number of alliance terminations a dyad has experienced; frailty terms for dyad are included in all models; Efron's method is used for ties; time-variant covariates are lagged one year, but decapitation variables take a value of 1 if decapitation occurred in the prior three years.

Figure A.21: Iteratively Dropping Dyads Involving Decapitated Groups

Note: Plots show the estimated coefficients and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the decapitation of any leader in models that iteratively exclude the respective, decapitated group denoted on the x-axis. The dashed line marks 0. Results are significant at the 10% level ($p = 0.054$) in the PFLP model.

Figure A.22: Iteratively Dropping Countries Where Decapitation Occurred

Note: Plots show the estimated coefficients and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the decapitation group denoted on the x-axis. The dashed line marks 0. Results are significant at the 5% level ($p = 0.040$) in the India model and the Lebanon model ($p = 0.044$), and at the 10% level ($p = 0.055$) in the Israel model.

Section A.23: Causal Process Observation

Our qualitative process-tracing exercise, causal process observation (CPO), entails inductively studying termination mechanisms for all 30 cases of decapitation-driven alliance breakdown in our data. Brief case narratives for all 30 cases are outlined below. Recall the four specific mechanisms underlying the relationship between leadership targeting and militant alliance termination:

- **Targeted Group Incapacitation**: the targeted group is severely damaged or destroyed by a decapitation strike. It is no longer a desirable alliance partner because it cannot fulfill its alliance role and provide resources to its ally. Leadership targeting reduces the rewards for the non-targeted ally by impinging on the targeted group's capabilities, while increasing the risks.

- **Operational Security Fears**: decapitation makes it riskier for groups allied to a targeted group to sustain ties going forward. Decapitation compounds concern among allied groups about operational security practices in the targeted group. If a group is disrupted by counterterror pressure, its allies become vulnerable to the possibility that the counterterrorist state will uncover intelligence that makes the ally less secure. Decapitation also raises fears among allies of a targeted group that they will attract the counterterrorist state's attention next. When one leader is eliminated, the counterterrorist may extend its campaign to the affiliates of the targeted organization. The state responsible for leadership targeting may escalate its support to the opponents of a targeted group's allies, raising the risks facing the allies of the targeted group. Finally, targeted groups may also become more suspicious of allies after leadership targeting, and thus fear future cooperation.

- **Disintegration of Personal Ties**: militant alliances are often based on stocks of trust between leaders by virtue of their past friendships with one another. When decapitation destroys personal ties through elimination of a leader, personalistic alliances may disintegrate as trust evaporates.

- **Preference Divergence**: decapitation reduced principal control, leading foot-soldiers to wield greater control over civilian victimization and conciliation. Reduced principal control in turn means targeted group may shift tactics and strategy, especially on violence against civilians and negotiation. These shifts may lead to differences with allies over appropriate tactics and strategies, causing rifts.

For each of the 30 cases below we rank which of these mechanisms are relevant (1 = most important; 4 = least important), and provide details about the case.

Finally, before turning to the cases, a brief methodological note is warranted. CPO is a method of tracing causal mechanisms that is amenable to pairing with large-n quantitative work (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2006). Throughout the main text we pair quantitative and qualitative evidence, marshalling each in tandem to make the case for our theoretical argument. Beck (2006), however, offers a prominent critique of this approach, arguing that quantitative evidence should be privileged because it can yield generalizable insights, whereas CPO (he argues) cannot contribute to causal inference. That is, in fact, exactly how we approach our multi-methodological approach by leading with the quantitative assessment and then refining with the CPO. As Beck acknowledges,

process tracing is important for understanding cases and refining statistical models. Hence, we believe our combination of careful quantitative tests refined based on case knowledge described below should assuage concerns about the insights from the CPO.

Action Directe and the Baader-Meinhof Group — (1988)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	—	—

Action Directe was a French far-left militant group founded in 1977, which carried out a campaign of attacks and assassinations in Western Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Similarly, the Baader-Meinhof Group, also referred to as the Red Army Faction (RAF), was a West German far-left group. Action Directe and the RAF first allied in 1984, and shared materiel, funds, training materials—even carrying out joint attacks. However, Action Directe fell under increasing French police pressure, culminating with the capture of its top four leaders on February 18, 1987. Following leadership targeting, the remainder of Action Directe's cadres went underground or dispersed (Alexander and Pluchinsky 1992, 134-136). Because of leadership targeting, Action Directe ceased being a viable ally for the RAF. The remnants of Action Directe, which continued underground operations until 1990, were unable to fulfill any meaningful alliance role for the RAF. Without leader-directed attack plans or access to safehouses and arms, Action Directe had little to provide the RAF following decapitation, so the alliance broke down.

Al Qaeda in Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigades — (2007)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	2	—	1

AQI formed in Iraq under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and quickly became a central actor in the insurgency that emerged after the 2003 U.S. invasion. The 1920 Revolution Brigades was a Sunni nationalist group formed in 2003 and comprised of elements of Saddam Hussein's disbanded Iraqi army. From 2003 to 2006, AQI and the 1920 Revolution Brigades exchanged statements of support and cooperated loosely to combat the occupation. In January 2006, amid escalating U.S. pressure, AQI sought a merger of Sunni and jihadist groups in Iraq under the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), led by Zarqawi. However, on June 7, 2006, Zarqawi was killed in an American airstrike. In the months that followed, AQI and the MSC sought a larger merger of Sunni militant groups into the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). At the same time, AQI escalated its campaign to stoke sectarian tensions and intimidate the tribes in Anbar Province, engaging in a spate of attacks on civilians (Fishman 2006).

Following Zarqawi's death, as part of the expansion of ISI, AQI demanded a loyalty pledge from the 1920 Revolution Brigades. The Brigades balked, citing civilian victimization, especiallyy AQI chlorine gas attacks around Fallujah, as the reason for their refusal to integrate under ISI. As a Brigades spokesman explained in April 2007, "As for fighting to kick [U.S. forces] and those collaborating with them out of the country, we support [AQI/ISI] in this regard... However, we are against [their policy] of killing civilians, bombings, indiscriminate attacks, and attacks on the

mujahedin groups in the country" (Ridolfo 2007). In response, AQI/ISI operatives assassinated Harith Dhahir Khamis al-Dari, the leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, on March 27, 2007. In addition, while both AQI and the 1920 Revolution Brigades rejected American intervention, the 1920 Revolution Brigades were relatively more willing to negotiate with the Iraqi government (Khalil 2007).

The AQI alliance with the 1920 Revolution Brigades collapsed chiefly due to preference divergence over civilian victimization and conciliation, when the latter refused to pledge loyalty to the former. Secondarily, AQI became concerned about operational security as the 1920 Revolution Brigades moved closer to the pro-U.S. Anbar Salvation Council from 2006 to 2007.

Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) and the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC) — (1981)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	2	1

FARN was formed in 1975 in El Salvador after breaking away from the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) in the wake of the Roque Dalton assassination. Dalton was accused of being an insufficiently radical, and his murder was ordered by ERP leader Joaquin Villalobos. Dalton "publicly protested ERP emphasis on terrorism and the adverse effect of such actions on the Salvadoran people." Instead, Dalton and the later FARN leaders advocated organizational work among the urban masses, and sought to build links with civil society. ERP members sympathetic to Dalton founded FARN and split from the ERP. FARN was led by Ernesto Jovel and Ferman Cienfuegos. FARN "ha[d] a reputation both in El Salvador and internationally of being the least doctrinaire and most nationalistic of the five guerrilla factions." The group's "decisions [we]re based on the goals of the insurgency, not on revolutionary theories." FARN sought a "final offensive" to mobilize the masses, rather than a long war, and "[saw] negotiations as a useful tactic for strengthening the insurgent position, while continuing the war." In particular, Cienfuegos of FARN "believe[d] in pushing for a popular insurrection but [was] willing to build a totalitarian system through a temporary power-sharing arrangement with San Salvador" (Central Intelligence Agency 1983). According to the CIA (1984a):

> "disagreements with other guerrilla groups over issues such as the FARN's willingness to negotiate with the government and the animosity between FARN leaders and the heads of other factions have caused considerable friction in the alliance. For example, the FARN left the DRU in 1980 in the aftermath of one wide-ranging dispute–concerning the FARN's opposition to decisionmaking on the basis of democratic centralism, its advocacy of an early 'final offensive', and its opposition to FPL attempts to dominate the insurgency."

In contrast to FARN, the PRTC was a regional group with cells in every Central American country. Founded in 1976 by Fabio Castillo, the PRTC's Salvadoran branch was run by Roberto Roca. The group was comprised of a mix of Trotskyite and Castroite elements. Whereas FARN leaders supported negotiation, PRTC leaders "vacillate[d] on whether to support hardliners or moderates on the negotiation issue" (Central Intelligence Agency 1984). Ultimately, however, PRTC

proved "unpredictably radical" (Central Intelligence Agency 1984b).

Apart from preference divergence over negotiation, which was the chief between FARN and the PRTC, tensions between leaders also mattered. Joaquin Villalobos of ERP, Ferman Cienfuegos of FARN, and Roberto Roca of PRTC all knew one another from University of El Salvador, and generally disliked and competed with one another (Brockett 2005, 76). Villalobos and Roca disliked Cienfuegos, who rose to power in FARN after Jovel was killed, because Cienfuegos was moderate and Christian.

Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) and the Dirección Revolucionaria Unificada (DRU) — (1981)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	2	1

FARN was formed in 1975 in El Salvador after breaking away from the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) in the wake of the Roque Dalton assassination. Dalton was accused of being an insufficiently radical, and his murder was ordered by ERP leader Joaquin Villalobos. Dalton "publicly protested ERP emphasis on terrorism and the adverse effect of such actions on the Salvadoran people." Instead, Dalton and the later FARN leaders advocated organizational work among the urban masses, and sought to build links with civil society. ERP members sympathetic to Dalton founded FARN and split from the ERP. FARN was led by Ernesto Jovel and Ferman Cienfuegos. FARN "ha[d] a reputation both in El Salvador and internationally of being the least doctrinaire and most nationalistic of the five guerrilla factions." The group's "decisions [we]re based on the goals of the insurgency, not on revolutionary theories." FARN sought a "final offensive" to mobilize the masses, rather than a long war, and "[saw] negotiations as a useful tactic for strengthening the insurgent position, while continuing the war." In particular, Cienfuegos of FARN "believe[d] in pushing for a popular insurrection but [was] willing to build a totalitarian system through a temporary power-sharing arrangement with San Salvador" (Central Intelligence Agency 1983). According to the CIA (1984a):

> "disagreements with other guerrilla groups over issues such as the FARN's willingness to negotiate with the government and the animosity between FARN leaders and the heads of other insurgent factions have caused considerable friction in the alliance. For example, the FARN left the DRU in 1980 in the aftermath of one wide-ranging dispute–concerning the FARN's opposition to decisionmaking on the basis of democratic centralism, its advocacy of an early 'final offensive', and its opposition to FPL attempts to dominate the insurgency."

In contrast to FARN, the DRU was a Nicaragua-based, Cuban-supported coordinating body for the FPL, ERP, FARN, PRTC, and PCS-FAL. Apart from FARN, the remainder of DRU opposed using negotiation, and supported a more Castroite revolutionary line. When FARN leader Ernesto Jovel was killed, his successor, Cienfuegos, pushed FARN to pursue a more conciliatory strategy of negotiation. Thus, preference divergence between FARN and DRU over negotiation was the primary cause of the alliance split.

Apart from preference divergence over negotiation, which was the chief between FARN and DRU, tensions between leaders also mattered. Joaquin Villalobos of ERP, Ferman Cienfuegos of FARN, and Roberto Roca of PRTC all knew one another from University of El Salvador, and generally disliked and competed with one another within DRU (Brockett 2005, 76). Villalobos and Roca disliked Cienfuegos, who rose to power in FARN after Jovel was killed, because Cienfuegos was moderate and Christian.

Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) and the People's Revolutionary Army of El Salvador (ERP) — (1981)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	2	1

FARN was formed in 1975 in El Salvador after breaking away from the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) in the wake of the Roque Dalton assassination. Dalton was accused of being an insufficiently radical, and his murder was ordered by ERP leader Joaquin Villalobos. Dalton "publicly protested ERP emphasis on terrorism and the adverse effect of such actions on the Salvadoran people." Instead, Dalton and the later FARN leaders advocated organizational work among the urban masses, and sought to build links with civil society. ERP members sympathetic to Dalton founded FARN and split from the ERP. FARN was led by Ernesto Jovel and Ferman Cienfuegos. FARN "ha[d] a reputation both in El Salvador and internationally of being the least doctrinaire and most nationalistic of the five guerrilla factions." The group's "decisions [we]re based on the goals of the insurgency, not on revolutionary theories." FARN sought a "final offensive" to mobilize the masses, rather than a long war, and "[saw] negotiations as a useful tactic for strengthening the insurgent position, while continuing the war." In particular, Cienfuegos of FARN "believe[d] in pushing for a popular insurrection but [was] willing to build a totalitarian system through a temporary power-sharing arrangement with San Salvador" (Central Intelligence Agency 1983). According to the CIA (1984a):

> "disagreements with other guerrilla groups over issues such as the FARN's willingness to negotiate with the government and the animosity between FARN leaders and the heads of other insurgent factions have caused considerable friction in the alliance. For example, the FARN left the DRU in 1980 in the aftermath of one wide-ranging dispute–concerning the FARN's opposition to decisionmaking on the basis of democratic centralism, its advocacy of an early 'final offensive', and its opposition to FPL attempts to dominate the insurgency."

In contrast to FARN, the ERP was a Salvadoran group founded in 1972 by Joaquin Villalobos. As the CIA (1984b) noted, "Publicly, Villalobos advocated terrorism to achieve political goals. He established himself very early as a skilled battlefield tactician with a sophisticated knowledge of weaponry. More recently, he has focused his attention upon the acquisition of power in the overall [rebel] movement... ." When FARN leader Ernesto Jovel was killed, his successor, Cienfuegos, pushed FARN to pursue a more conciliatory strategy of negotiation, in contrast to ERP terrorism. Thus, preference divergence between FARN and ERP over negotiation and tactics was the primary cause of the alliance split.

Apart from preference divergence over negotiation, which was the chief between FARN and ERP, tensions between leaders also mattered. Joaquin Villalobos of ERP, Ferman Cienfuegos of FARN, and Roberto Roca of PRTC all knew one another from University of El Salvador, and generally disliked and competed with one another within DRU (Brockett 2005, 76). Villalobos and Roca disliked Cienfuegos, who rose to power in FARN after Jovel was killed, because Cienfuegos was moderate and Christian.

Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Islamic State Movement (MEI) — (1995)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	2	3	1

GIA was founded in 1992 in the wake of a military coup against the elected Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), while the Islamic State Movement (MEI) was founded in 1993-4 by Said Makhloufi, an Afghan war veteran. Makhloufi was acquainted with many leaders in the Algerian opposition through his Afghan connection, including GIA leaders Djafar al-Afghani and Cherif Gousmi. As Chasdi (2002, 72) notes, "Said Makhloufi... had brought to the 'Majlis al-Shura' council a wealth of military experience and set of interconnections to terrorist contacts in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan, a locale known as a training base for 'Arab Mujahideen'."

MEI was merged under the GIA banner on May 13, 1994, and yielded a unification communique—an interesting formalization of ties—that declared that GIA, FIS, and MEI jointly agreed: (1) to abide by the Book [the Qur'an], the sunna [the traditions of the Prophet] and the salafiyya tradition; (2) no dialogue, no cease-fire, no reconciliation, and no security and guarantee [dhimma] with the apostate regime; (3) jihad is an Islamic imperative [farida] until judgment day; (4) the GIA is the only legitimate organizational framework for jihad in Algeria; and (5) All holy fighters must join the GIA (Hafez 2000, 577). However, MEI did not fully integrate with GIA after the pledge. This was in part because "In 1993, the GIA expanded its attacks beyond military personnel and government officials to include foreigners, intellectuals, and journalists. This escalation of violence provoked international condemnation..." and angered MEI. Critically, the GIA escalation followed a leadership decapitation, the capture of GIA leader Abdelhak Layada in May 1993 in Morocco (Hafez 2000, 577).

Following Layada's capture, GIA grew increasingly extreme in its ideology and violence, banning cigarettes, mandating hijab-wearing, and attacking all civilians who used government programs. As their spiritual leader noted, "The necessity of waging battle against those infidel and apostate tyrants was made clear and incumbent upon the Muslim community; it must fight them and show them hostility and loathing... Whoever lags behind, or cowers, or leans toward tameness... or says I cannot, or says that those leaders are not infidels... or professes spurious excuses, is an offender deserving punishment..." (Hafez 2000, 587-589). In response, MEI and other factions began to split away, accusing GIA of excommunicating and killing people "without proper reference to Islamic law," and accusing them of being "kharajites." By February 1996, MEI and GIA were openly fighting over MEI captives detained by GIA.

In sum, the primary cause for the alliance breakdown between GIA and MEI was preference divergence. Following leadership decapitation, GIA become more violent and conducted a spate

of attacks against civilian and humanitarian institutions that MEI viewed as illegitimate targets. MEI attracted "more competent elements" like students and former FIS militant who were less violent against civilians, while GIA attracted fanatics (Martinez 1998, 208). Secondarily, MEI grew suspicious of GIA, which largely avoided state repression during a crackdown in 1994. As Martinez (1998, 213) notes, the "'favourable treatment' given by the army to the GIA aroused questions among survivors of the MIA and MEI groups about a rival which had then succeeded in acquiring a monopoly of the jihad." Finally, whereas MEI leaders had ties with earlier GIA leaders from previous time spent together in training camps in Afghanistan, no personal ties were shared between MEI leaders and GIA leaders that rose in the wake of decapitation.

Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) and the Red Brigades — (1978)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	—	—

NAP emerged in Naples, Italy in 1973, and was devoted to the far-left cause, with a particular focus on the abolition of prisons. Like NAP, BR was a far-left Italian group formed in 1970. NAP and BR first allied in 1976, launching a series of joint attacks in Pisa, Rome, Naples, and Florence ("Terrorism and Security: the Italian Experience" 1984, 14). Cooperation between the groups was substantive—NAP provided BR motivated fighters and an operational base in southern Italy in return for access to the BR's supply network and tactical expertise. However, the NAP-BR alliance quickly broke down after Italian police action decimated NAP, culminating with the death of NAP leader Antonio Lo Musico in Rome on July 1, 1977 (Gnosis Rivista Italiana di Intelligence 2006). NAP-BR cooperation immediately waned as NAP's resource and security deficits grew in the second half of 1977. In the months that followed, at least 39 NAP safehouses were raided, eliminating the group's operational capacity through the arrest of its fighters and the seizure of its weaponry ("Terrorism and Security: the Italian Experience" 1984, 20). NAP ceased to exist by mid-1978, and surviving elements were folded into BR. In sum, leadership decapitation incapacitated the Armed Proletarian Nuclei such that it could no longer sustain cooperation with the Red Brigades because it was no longer able to fulfill its alliance role, or even to survive.

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) — (1989)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	2	—	1	—

The case of the alliance between the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) shows how leadership decapitation can fracture cooperation based on personal ties. ASALA was founded by Hagop Hagopian in Beirut in 1975.

Hagopian had resided in Lebanon since 1967, and was active in the Palestinian resistance, joining the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1967 (Hyland 1991, 25-26). By 1974, Hagopian was a "personal friend" of Sabri Banna, better known as Abu Nidal, a Palestinian militant who was expelled from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the early 1970s (Hyland 1991, 47-48). Indeed, Hagopian's friendship with Abu Nidal vexed the PLO leadership so much that PLO operatives passed photos of Hagopian to French intelligence.

When Hagopian formed ASALA in 1975, his group was a natural ally of Abu Nidal's group, the ANO. Ties between ASALA and ANO deepened further in 1982, when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon forced both groups from Beirut. In exchange for financing, training, and sanctuary in the Bekaa Valley, ASALA provided ANO European safehouses. Hagopian ruled ASALA personalistically, contributing to ASALA's alliance with ANO being predicated on Hagopian's relationship with Abu Nidal. Because authority in ASALA was centered around "[Hagopian's] impulses and whims," there were scant opportunities for trust to develop between the groups on other bases (Hyland 1991, 36, 47-48). Consequently, after Hagopian was assassinated by a hit-squad in Athens, Greece on April 28, 1988, ties between ASALA and ANO were severed (Gunter 2007, 112). Absent Hagopian, ANO had little trust in the remnants of ASALA, with whom ANO members had few, if any, connections. Incapacitation of ASALA after Hagopian's death was a secondary cause of termination. After 1988, ASALA operatives largely moved to Armenia and Greece to focus on the Armenian struggle, but shuttered the valuable Middle Eastern and Western European safehouses ANO found valuable.

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Japanese Red Army (JRA) — (1989)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	2	—

ASALA was founded by Hagop Hagopian in Beirut in 1975. Hagopian had resided in Lebanon since 1967, and was active in the Palestinian resistance, joining the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1967 (Hyland 1991, 25-26). When Hagopian formed ASALA in 1975, his group was a natural ally of the Palestinian factions, like the Abu Nidal Organization and the PLO, also based in Lebanon. JRA, formed in 1971 by Fusako Shigenobu, also maintained close links with Palestinian groups. The ASALA-JRA alliance was brokered through these groups mutual contacts with Palestinian militants in Beirut (Department of State 1988).

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, ASALA provided JRA with arms and access to European safehouses in exchange for logistical and operational support. After Hagopian was assassinated by a hit-squad in Athens, Greece on April 28, 1988, ties between ASALA and JRA were severed (Gunter 2007, 112). The main cause of termination was the fact that ASALA had little to provide JRA after Hagopian's death. Specifically, after 1988, ASALA operatives largely moved to Armenia and Greece to focus on the Armenian struggle, but shuttered the valuable Middle Eastern and Western European safehouses JRA found valuable. In short, ASALA had little to provide JRA after Hagopian's death. Secondarily, termination resulted because Hagopian ruled ASALA personalistically. Because authority in ASALA was centered around "[Hagopian's] impulses and

whims," there were scant opportunities for trust to develop between the groups on other bases (Hyland 1991, 36, 47-48). Consequently, after Hagopian was assassinated JRA had little trust in the remnants of ASALA, with whom JRA members had few, if any, connections.

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Communist Labour Party of Turkey (TKEP) — (1989)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	—	—

ASALA was founded by Hagop Hagopian in Beirut in 1975, and TKEP was founded in 1980 by Teslim Töre. Throughout the early 1980s, ASALA provided TKEP with training, territorial haven, and operational support. After Hagopian was assassinated by a hit-squad in Athens, Greece on April 28, 1988, ties between ASALA and TKEP were severed. The main cause of termination was the fact that ASALA had little to provide TKEP after Hagopian's death. Specifically, after 1988, ASALA operatives largely moved to Armenia and Greece, ceasing riskier operations in and around Turkey. ASALA had little to provide TKEP after Hagopian's death (Kurz and Merari 1985, 44).

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Turkish Worker's and Peasant's Liberation Army (TIKKO) — (1989)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	2	—	—

TIKKO had many high-ranking Armenian Turkish members who were sympathetic to the ASALA cause, and the groups were allied fairly closely in the early 1980s. By virtue of these co-ethnic ties, the absence of personal connections between the post-Hagopian ASALA and TIKKO was not a severe problem. The Armenians in TIKKO maintained a pro-ASALA orientation after 1988. However, the decapitation of ASALA and corresponding counterterror pressure caused severe problems within ASALA that inhibited it from providing TIKKO what it once did, including training, haven, and operational support. Secondarily, internal fractures in ASALA after Hagopian's death led to a TIKKO decision to pull out of cooperation, as it was unclear who would succeed Hagopian, especially since the large Melkonian faction pulled away. TIKKO feared operational security lapses in the wake of the split in ASALA factions (Hamdan 2009, 15).

Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) and the Red Brigades — (1989)

ETA was founded to pursue the cause of Basque nationalism and socialism in 1959 by Julen Madariaga. The Red Brigades were a far-left Italian militant group formed in 1970. Contact between ETA and the Red Brigades was established in the late 1970s when Mario Moretti led the

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	1	2	—

Red Brigades. However, cooperation was always fairly informal, and "relations were reduced for political reasons... [because] Patricio Peci has reported that contacts with the IRA and the Basque group ETA came to very little because the two groups were primarily nationalistic and therefore interlocutors of scant value to the theoretically inclined brigatisti" (Meade 1990, 219). In other words, the Red Brigades viewed themselves as more ideologically pure leftists while ETA were more nationalistic.

ETA leader Madariaga was arrested in France in June 1988 for supporting Basque terrorism. In the wake of this arrest, ETA briefly pursued two ceasefires. Above all, these ceasefires and French counterinsurgent attention sparked fear within the Red Brigades for its members based in France, who received support and shelter from ETA. The breakdown of the ceasefires spurred Madariaga to disassociate with ETA. Madariaga in particular sought a political and less violent resolution to the conflict. Madariaga's defection stoked further fears about cohesion and operational security within ETA. Secondarily, the defection meant reduced personal ties between the groups, which operated mostly on the basis of connections between Madariaga and Moretti (Whitfield 2014, xvii).

Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) and the Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party (BR-PCC) — (1989)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	1	2	—

ETA was founded to pursue the cause of Basque nationalism and socialism in 1959 by Julen Madariaga. The Red Brigades were a far-left Italian militant group formed in 1970. Contact between ETA and the Red Brigades was established in the late 1970s when Mario Moretti led the Red Brigades. However, cooperation was always fairly informal, and "relations were reduced for political reasons... [because] Patricio Peci has reported that contacts with the IRA and the Basque group ETA came to very little because the two groups were primarily nationalistic and therefore interlocutors of scant value to the theoretically inclined brigatisti" (Meade 1990, 219). In other words, the Red Brigades viewed themselves as more ideologically pure leftists while ETA were more nationalistic.

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Cinchoneros and the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC) — (1984)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	2	—	—

Cinchoneros as a Honduran leftist militant group led by José María Reyes Mata. The group was a part of the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC), a transnational coordinating committee of leftist insurgent movements in Central America. Reyes Mata led both the Cinchoneros and the Honduran branch of the PRTC. Both groups were based in Nicaragua and received support from Fidel Castro and the Sandinistas. Reyes Mata was killed in September 1983 while leading a cross-border raid from Nicaragua to Honduras. His death, along with the death of leftist leader Father Carney (an American), at the hands of a U.S.-supported Honduran special forces squad, sparked a CIA investigation into summary executions by Honduran forces (Gunson, Chamberlain, and Thompson 2016, 163).

After Reyes Mata's death, the PRTC withdrew from Honduras to join the FMLN in Nicaragua, while the Cinchoneros moved from Nicaragua to concentrate on armed struggle in Honduras. In response to the Cinchoneros raid, "the Honduran military under Gen. Gustavo Alvarez Martinez launched a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. About 120 people disappeared and are presumed dead. When Alvarez, whose January [1984] assassination was claimed by the Cinchoneros, was ousted by fellow officers in March, 1984, the revolutionary movement was in tatters" (Ring 1989b). Cinchoneros attempted to rebuild after the March 1984 Honduran coup, but focused on winning popular support rather than on military operations because the group's operational capacity was decimated without Reyes Mata. Subsequent leaders of Cinchoneros stated that there were "no plans for sustained 'military operations' because of the group's lack of infrastructure and their need to rebuild their strength" (Ring 1989a).

In short, the primary cause of termination was the fact that the operational capacities of Cinchoneros were decimated after Reyes Mata was killed. Cinchoneros could not carry out military operations that made it a valuable partner to the PRTC. Secondarily, some members of Cinchoneros grew suspicious of the PRTC after Reyes Mata's death. In particular, the PRTC was closer to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua than was Cinchoneros, which wanted greater independence. These tensions would later lead some Cinchoneros cadres to believe that the PRTC and Sandinistas had betrayed the Cinchoneros return expedition that led to Reyes Mata's death (Wagner 1988, 241; Miranda and Ratliff 1994, 149).

Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and Al-Badr — (2005)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	2	3

Abu Bakir Bashir was a co-founder of Jemaah Islamiyah, and took over the group in 1999, following the death of previous leader Abdullah Sungkar. Bashir had been in exile from Indonesia until 1999, and fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the 1990s, where he established contact with senior commanders in Al-Badr, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Al Qaeda, though allegedly not Bin Laden himself (Counter Extremism Project 2020). Al-Badr, for its part, was based in Pakistan near the frontier with Afghanistan. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Bashir and Hambali oversaw the establishment of a JI madrassa network in Pakistan to facilitate the transit of JI operatives to Pakistan and Afghanistan for training. Proximity made alliance ties with Al-Badr easy to sustain. After Bashir's arrest, however, JI sought southeast Asian training camps and bases in Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia, which were cheaper to access given counterinsurgent pressure (Conboy 2006, 79-89, 104-105).

The primary cause of alliance termination was the fact that JI was unable to entrench itself in Pakistan after Bashir's targeting. State pressure reduced JI's capabilities and prompted it to diversify its logistical bases, preferring less distant locales. In turn, JI found it more difficult to physically transact its relationship with the Pakistan-based Al-Badr after decapitation. Disintegration of personal ties between groups and preference divergence were secondary factors. In terms of personal ties, Bashir, the targeted JI leader, held close ties with Al-Badr's leadership from his time together with them in Al-Qaeda's Afghan training camps. Though AQ intercessaries between Al-Badr and JI attempted to sustain the relationship, ties between JI's other leaders, al-Qaeda and Al-Badr were "far less intimate" (Conboy 2006, 104-105). Preference divergence also emerged with JI becoming more focused on striking exclusively American targets after Bashir's capture. As JI leaders noted of al-Qaeda and Al-Badr, "tactics and calculations may sometimes be wrong... I don't agree with all of [their] actions. Osama believes in total war. This concept I don't agree with. If this occurs in an Islamic country, the fitnah [discord] will be felt by Muslims. But to attack them in their country [America] is fine" (Atran 2006). Al-Badr's greater willingness to pursue total war versus JI's focus on the far enemy after Bashir's capture was a third source of tension.

Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) and Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) — (2002)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	1	—

KMM was founded in 1995 by Malaysian veterans of the Afghan training camps, while GMIP was founded in 1995 by Thai veterans of the Afghan training camps. In particular, KMM

was founded by Zainon Ismail and Nik Adli Nik Aziz, while GMIP was founded by Wae-Hama Wae-Yuso, Nasori Saeseng (aka Awae Kaelae), Jehku Mae Kuteh (aka Doromae Kuteh), and Nasae Saning. GMIP specialized in arms smuggling for Southeast Asian terror cells, and cooperated in this manner with KMM, which provided GMIP with territorial havens near southern Thailand. As Hammond (2011, 22) notes, "Nik Adli Nik Aziz, another former leader of the KMM, trained with Nasori Saeseng in Afghanistan, and the two became close friends. ... The GMIP maintained a close relationship with the members of the KMM. Many of the terrorists [were] able to seek sanctuary where the KMM [had] influence with local government officials who were sympathetic."

After KMM suffered leadership decapitation, the bonds of trust forged by personal connections between leaders of KMM and GMIP dissolved (Nguyen 2008, 94). The alliance was based mostly on leader-level friendships forged in Afghan training camps, and there were few other bases to sustain partnership when the leadership of KMM was decimated by Malaysian police action. Termination resulted chiefly from the disintegration of personal ties.

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Apo's Youth Revenge Brigades — (2000)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	2	—	—	1

Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was captured on February 15, 1999 in Kenya. After Öcalan's capture, the PKK leadership pushed for an end to the armed struggle and declared a unilateral ceasefire with Turkey. Specifically, the new leadership under Murat Karayilan sought a political transformation of the PKK (Bilgin and Sarihan 2013, 85-86). Apo's Youth Revenge Brigades and a number of other PKK cells were predominantly loyal to Öcalan and conducted a series of attacks in 1999 in defiance of the ceasefire. Above all, these groups opposed transitioning from an armed struggle (Mincheva and Gurr 2013, 55). Thus, preference divergence over negotiation and conciliation was the main cause of alliance breakdown. Secondarily, Apo's Revenge Hawks rejected the post-capture PKK as too operationally constrained. Without Öcalan, who had been instrumental in operational planning, Apo's Revenge Hawks felt the PKK would no longer be willing or able to fulfill its material alliance commitments, such as providing arms or attack plans.

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Kurdistan National Liberation Front (ERNK) — (2000)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	1	—	—

Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was captured on February 15, 1999 in Kenya. After Ocalan's capture in 1999, the ERNK was forced to distance itself from the PKK for fear of Turkish

repression. Specifically, the ERNK feared abductions by Turkey and the possibility that Turkey would incite the European states like Germany and the Netherlands, where the ERNK operated, to crack down on the group's activities. The relationship was formally severed and informally sustained. The distinction between the militant group and political affiliates had to be made stark as possible in order to avoid alienating European states on one hand and radical Kurd supporters on the other. Indeed, "the party understood that the ambiguity of its relationship with the PKK maintained its credibility in the eyes of more radical Kurds. The party drew in the support of the middle classes which had been hesitant to engage with the clandestine struggle" especially after Öcalan's capture (O'Connor 2017).

The ERNK agreed with the political transition strategy and ceasefire the PKK ordered after Ocalan's capture. Instead, operational security fears, and especially fears about drawing increased Turkish repressive attention, sparked fear among the ERNK. The Turkish abduction and torture of Cevat Soysal, an ERNK operative from Moldova, led to the decision to throw distance between the ERNK and the PKK after the 1999 crackdown because it suggested that even the operatives in Europe were not safe (Human Rights Watch 2004).

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams — (2000)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	2	—	—	1

Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was captured on February 15, 1999 in Kenya. After Öcalan's capture, the PKK leadership pushed for an end to the armed struggle and declared a unilateral ceasefire with Turkey. Specifically, the new leadership under Murat Karayilan sought a political transformation of the PKK (Bilgin and Sarihan 2013, 85-86). The Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams and a number of other PKK cells were predominantly loyal to Öcalan and conducted a series of attacks in 1999 in defiance of the ceasefire. Above all, these groups opposed transitioning from an armed struggle (Mincheva and Gurr 2013, 55). Thus, preference divergence over negotiation and conciliation was the main cause of alliance breakdown. Secondarily, the Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams rejected the post-capture PKK as too operationally constrained. Without Öcalan, who had been instrumental in operational planning, the Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams felt the PKK would no longer be willing or able to fulfill its material alliance commitments, such as providing arms or attack plans.

Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary Front (LZRF) and the Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH) — (1984)

The LZRF was a Honduran Marxist militant group opposed to U.S. imperialism and Latin American right-wing governments. The group was founded in 1978, and carried out several attacks through 1980-81. Similarly, the FMLH was a Honduran, Nicarauga-backed Marxist group. In 1983, LZRF leader Efrain Duarte Salgado "was arrested and turned informer against his own group." In turn, "[LZRF] activities fell off with the loss of this leader..." (Anderson and Sloan

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	2	1	—	—

2009, 401).

Operational security fears on the part of the FMLH were the primary cause of alliance termination in this case. Spepcifically, after Duarte's abduction and defection, FMLH cadres felt they could no longer trust the integrity of the alliance with LZRF. According to the testimony of Florencio Caballero, a U.S.-trained Honduran death squad leader in Pedro San Sula:

> Efrain Duarte Salgado, a Honduran, was seized May 1, 1983... by a squad led by Flores Murillo and including Banegas, 'Rolando de Cid,' Lopez Correa, 'Mauricio Zelaya,' 'Nelson Colindres,' 'Marco Antonio Hernandez,' and Caballero. Before seizing Duarte, officials seized his comrade Marco Antonio Flores near the border with Nicaragua. Flores was later taken to 'Las Tapias' where he was tortured and executed. Armed with the information Flores gave them, the death squad operatives picked up Efrain Duarte around 5:00pm the same day. ... [The squad picked him up off the street near his house.] He was also taken to Las Tapias where he quickly indicated he would do anything they asked as long as they let him live. A North American called Mike, who Caballero believed to be the CIA station chief in Tegucigalpa, interceded at this point, asking that Duarte be sent to Guatemala to give a press conference and claim to be a leader of the 'Lorenzo Zelaya' guerrilla front. Before the press conference, officials set up a practice conference and coached him on how to respond to reporters' questions..." (Americas Watch 1987, 137-138)

Indeed, Duarte's defection press conference at the Hotel Dorado in Guatemala in May 1983 triggered the FMLH to cut off contacts with the LZRF. A secondary cause of termination was the fact that LZRF's capabilities were severely degraded by the capture of Duarte. As U.S. official noted, the capture left the LZRF "crushed" in 1983 (Office of the The Vice President, 1988, 88).

Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary Front (LZRF) and the United Revolutionary Coordinating Board — (1984)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	2	1	—	—

The LZRF was a Honduran Marxist militant group opposed to U.S. imperialism and Latin American right-wing governments. The group was founded in 1978, and carried out several attacks through 1980-81. Similarly, the United Revolutionary Coordinating Board was a Honduran, Nicarauga-backed Marxist coordinating body. In 1983, LZRF leader Efrain Duarte Salgado "was arrested and turned informer against his own group." In turn, "[LZRF] activities fell off with the

loss of this leader..." (Anderson and Sloan 2009, 401).

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Marxist-Leninst Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) — (1981)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	—	—

MLAPU was a Marxist, pro-Soviet group established in Paris in the early 1970s, and at its height it operated with German, Italian, French, Armenian, and Palestinian leftists. MLAPU was a faction of the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C). It attacked American and Israeli targets in Turkey (Schmid and Jongman 2005, 675). MLAPU leader Zeki Yurmutaci was tortured and killed by Turkish military and police forces in September 1980 (Berberoglu 1982, 130).

The 1980 Turkish coup and subsequent declaration of martial law significantly inhibited the ability of MLAPU to fulfill its alliance obligations or survive at all. According to the Department of State (1982), "Since imposition of martial law in September 1980, the Turkish military government has killed or arrested a number of MLAPU members, raided safehouses, and executed convicted MLAPU members already in captivity. Although the group suffered setbacks during the year ... On

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6 April, the MLAPU claimed credit for an attack on a US military vehicle. Although the vehicle was hit by machinegun fire a number of times, no one was seriously injured. The terrorists who carried out this attack were arrested in a raid on a safehouse the following day." In total, Turkish repression in 1980 and 1981 left MLAPU "largely quiescent" (Central Intelligence Agency 1984c).

Overall, MLAPU was severely degraded by leadership targeting and found itself unable to fulfill its alliance obligations to ASALA. In particular, MLAPU's international connections were destroyed because martial law and the Turkish military crackdown prevented the group from reaching safehouses outside of Turkey, where members coordinated with allies.

Marxist-Leninst Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU) and the Baader-Meinhof Group — (1981)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	—	—

MLAPU was a Marxist, pro-Soviet group established in Paris in the early 1970s, and at its height it operated with German, Italian, French, Armenian, and Palestinian leftists. MLAPU was a faction of the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C). It attacked American and Israeli targets in Turkey (Schmid and Jongman 2005, 675). MLAPU leader Zeki Yurmutaci was tortured and killed by Turkish military and police forces in September 1980 (Berberoglu 1982, 130).

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Overall, MLAPU was severely degraded by leadership targeting and found itself unable to fulfill its alliance obligations to the Baader-Meinhof Group. In particular, MLAPU's international connections were destroyed because martial law and the Turkish military crackdown prevented the group from reaching safehouses outside of Turkey, where members coordinated with allies.

Marxist-Leninst Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU) and the People's Liberation Army (Turkey) — (1981)

MLAPU was a Marxist, pro-Soviet group established in Paris in the early 1970s, and at its height it operated with German, Italian, French, Armenian, and Palestinian leftists. MLAPU was a faction of the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C). It attacked American and Israeli targets in Turkey (Schmid and Jongman 2005, 675). MLAPU leader Zeki Yurmutaci was

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	2	—	—

tortured and killed by Turkish military and police forces in September 1980 (Berberoglu 1982, 130).

The 1980 Turkish coup and subsequent declaration of martial law significantly inhibited the ability of MLAPU to fulfill its alliance obligations or survive at all. According to the Department of State (1982), "Since imposition of martial law in September 1980, the Turkish military government has killed or arrested a number of MLAPU members, raided safehouses, and executed convicted MLAPU members already in captivity. Although the group suffered setbacks during the year ... On 6 April, the MLAPU claimed credit for an attack on a US military vehicle. Although the vehicle was hit by machinegun fire a number of times, no one was seriously injured. The terrorists who carried out this attack were arrested in a raid on a safehouse the following day." In total, Turkish repression in 1980 and 1981 left MLAPU "largely quiescent" (Central Intelligence Agency 1984c).

Overall, MLAPU was severely degraded by leadership targeting and found itself unable to fulfill its alliance obligations to the People's Liberation Army (THKO). In particular, MLAPU's international connections were destroyed because martial law and the Turkish military crackdown prevented the group from reaching safehouses both inside and outside of Turkey, where members coordinated with allies. Operational security fears are a secondary temination mechanism. In particular, THKO operatives feared that captured MLAPU cadres would reveal locations of remaining THKO safehouses to Turkish intelligence. THKO and MLAPU both moved to prioritize secrecy and compartmentalize information after the Turkish crackdown, hindering cooperation (Kenville 2000, 52, 56).

Marxist-Leninst Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU) and the Red Brigades — (1981)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	—	—

MLAPU was a Marxist, pro-Soviet group established in Paris in the early 1970s, and at its height it operated with German, Italian, French, Armenian, and Palestinian leftists. MLAPU was a faction of the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C). It attacked American and Israeli targets in Turkey (Schmid and Jongman 2005, 675). MLAPU leader Zeki Yurmutaci was tortured and killed by Turkish military and police forces in September 1980 (Berberoglu 1982, 130).

The 1980 Turkish coup and subsequent declaration of martial law significantly inhibited the ability of MLAPU to fulfill its alliance obligations or survive at all. According to the Department of State (1982), "Since imposition of martial law in September 1980, the Turkish military government has killed or arrested a number of MLAPU members, raided safehouses, and executed convicted

MLAPU members already in captivity. Although the group suffered setbacks during the year ... On 6 April, the MLAPU claimed credit for an attack on a US military vehicle. Although the vehicle was hit by machinegun fire a number of times, no one was seriously injured. The terrorists who carried out this attack were arrested in a raid on a safehouse the following day." In total, Turkish repression in 1980 and 1981 left MLAPU "largely quiescent" (Central Intelligence Agency 1984c).

Overall, MLAPU was severely degraded by leadership targeting and found itself unable to fulfill its alliance obligations to the Red Brigades. In particular, MLAPU's international connections were destroyed because martial law and the Turkish military crackdown prevented the group from reaching safehouses outside of Turkey, where members coordinated with allies.

Marxist-Leninst Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU) and the Turkish People's Liberation Front (THKP-C) — (1981)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	2	—	—

MLAPU was a Marxist, pro-Soviet group established in Paris in the early 1970s, and at its height it operated with German, Italian, French, Armenian, and Palestinian leftists. MLAPU was a faction of the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C). It attacked American and Israeli targets in Turkey (Schmid and Jongman 2005, 675). MLAPU leader Zeki Yurmutaci was tortured and killed by Turkish military and police forces in September 1980 (Berberoglu 1982, 130).

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Overall, MLAPU was severely degraded by leadership targeting and found itself unable to fulfill its alliance obligations to THKP-C. In particular, MLAPU's international connections were destroyed because martial law and the Turkish military crackdown prevented the group from reaching safehouses both inside and outside of Turkey, where members coordinated with allies. Operational security fears are a secondary temination mechanism. In particular, THKP-C operatives feared that captured MLAPU cadres would reveal locations of remaining THKP-C safehouses to Turkish intelligence. THKP-C and MLAPU both moved to prioritize secrecy and compartmentalize information after the Turkish crackdown, hindering cooperation (Kenville 2000, 52, 56).

Montoneros and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) — (1980)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	2	1	—	—

Montoneros was an Argentine leftist group formed in 1969, while the FSLN was a leftist group formed in 1960 and based in Nicaragua. Cooperation between the organizations developed in 1974, following an Argentine military crackdown on Montoneros. At this time, units of Montoneros, the Special Infantry Troops, found refuge among the FSLN, who were waging insurgency against Nicaragua's Somoza regime. In return for sanctuary, Montoneros provided logistical support to the FSLN. In particular, Montoneros leader Horacio Mendizabal oversaw the training of Sandinista frogmen, while his troops funneled arms from Cuba and El Salvador to Sandinistas in Nicaragua (Spencer 1996, 133-134). Montoneros teams also fought alongside the FSLN in Nicaragua, while Argentine intelligence agents embedded with Somoza's National Guard hunted Montoneros militants in the FSLN ranks (Dickey 1987, 54-55).

After the FSLN toppled the Somoza regime in 1979, Montoneros planned a return to Argentina, and dispatched cadres from the exiled cells to organize unrest. Mendizabal's units were tasked with attacks on infrastructure and junta officials. In September 1979, Mendizabal and his forces entered Argentina, but were intercepted and met heavy resistance. Mendizabal was killed in battle with Argentine forces on September 19, 1979 (Central Intelligence Agency 1979). Following his death, the remaining Montoneros cadres desperately sought refuge. However, the FSLN, which now controlled Nicaragua, refused to uphold the previous alliance arrangement. In particular, the FSLN feared that sustaining the alliance with Montoneros after Mendizabal's death would cause the Argentine junta to escalate support for the Contras, a right-wing group aided by Argentine intelligence to counter the FSLN after Somoza was toppled (Armony 1997). As the Argentine military hunted the remaining Montoneros forces in Argentina, the threat of increased Argentine aid to the Contras cemented the termination of the Montoneros-FSLN alliance. The incapacitation of Montoneros was a secondary factor.

Red Brigades (BR) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) — (1982)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	—	2

The Red Brigades were an urban Marxist group based in Italy, with a structure that emphasized decentralized cells. In April 1981, BR leader Mario Moretti, the mastermind of the murder of Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, was arrested. Moretti was the group's last founder and "the most dangerous." With his arrest in Milan, BR "were thought to have been dealt a significant tactical defeat" (Alexander and Meyers 2015, 43). Although the group carried out one more major

attack, the December 1981 kidnapping of U.S./NATO General James Dozier, it was significantly degraded by police action – at least 340 members were arrested in 1981-82. The group split in 1982, with one faction the BR-PCC retaining the traditional structure and command, and leading the armed struggle, while other factions advocated more political engagement to prepare the populous.

The primary cause of alliance termination was the incapacitation of BR after Moretti's arrest. The Italian police crackdown significantly degraded the group's usefulness as a partner to ASALA, which developed other bases in Europe, such as in France. Secondarily, preference divergence was also relevant. BR pursued more conciliation and wanted to focus on the Italian struggle, while ASALA began to diversify away from attacks in Italy. Indeed, ASALA tacitly agreed with Italy not to conduct attacks there except on Turkish targets, provided Italy close emigration centers sending Armenians back to the Soviet Union (Central Intelligence Agency 1984d).

Red Hand Defenders and the Protestant Volunteer Force — (2000)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	3	1	—	2

The Red Hand Defenders/Orange Volunteers were an Ulster loyalist, dissident paramilitary group formed by elements of the Combined Loyalist Military Command (Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Defense Association) who were dissatisfied with moves by the Loyalist groups to enter the peace process. The CLMC first declared a ceasefire in 1994, and despite minor setbacks, maintained the ceasefire through the July 1996 Drumcree siege, which saw a major police action during the Orange Order march and subsequent protests. Billy Wright's Mid-Ulster Brigade of the Ulster Volunteer Force were expelled from the UVF for murdering a Catholic taxi driver and planning other attacks during the siege, in contravention of the ceasefire. Wright's gang would become the Loyalist Volunteer Force, which broke away from the larger UVF (Streeter 1996) The Protestant Volunteer Force are a front for the UVF, and hold somewhat more violent preferences than the remainder of the UVF, which generally abided by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, part of which stipulated a permanent ceasefire by the Loyalists (British Broadcasting Corporation 2002).

In 1999, Clifford Peeples, the leader of the Red Hand Defenders/Orange Volunteers was captured and arrested for paramilitary offenses after he was caught with a pipe bomb and two grenades in his car. Following his arrest, his home and a number of other dissident Loyalist safehouses were raided (McDonald 1999). The materiel losses inhibited the group's ability to conduct subsequent attacks, though some lower-level beatings and bombings were carried out. Peeples was accused of organizing "black propaganda" against the Red Hand Defenders/Orange Volunteers from prison after his arrest. The new leadership said, "The Orange Volunteers believe Peeples is deliberately seeding dissent within loyalism... He has received three or four warnings to stop orchestrating a campaign of misinformation against the Orange Volunteer leadership from within Maghaberry prison. ... He chose to ignore those warnings. That is the reason behind the death sentences" (Harper 2000). Peeples was believed by some to have cooperated with police, raising fears of betrayal. More broadly, his continued activism on behalf of anti-Agreement factions raised fears among the mainstream that he would subvert the peace ("The Need for a New and Acceptable Policy in Northern Ireland" 1999).

Turkish People's Liberation Front (THKP-C) and Dev Genc — (1973)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	—	2

The THKP-C was founded by Mahir Cayan and student militant elements of Dev Genc in 1970. Dev-Genc, or Turkey's Revolutionary Youth Federation, was established by Turkish students in the late 1960s, and supported the coordination and training of radical leftist Turkish youth. Dev Genc was highly factionalized, and a large split emerged between cells that supported taking over the Turkish Labor Party in preparation for a leftist coup versus those who sought revolutionary armed action. Cayan rejected the political option, preferring instead to immediately mobilize the urban proletariat through a "Politicized Military War Strategy." Cayan and his group kidnapped three British radar technicians in Fatsa Province in January 1972, and brought them to Kizildere in hopes of ransoming them for the release of fellow militant Deniz Gezmis, who had been captured by Turkish police. On March 30, 1972, the Turkish army descended on the village and killed Cayan in a gunfight (Yilmaz 2014, 30-31).

Dev Genc was factionalized "in part for ideological and even sociological reasons but also as a result of personal rivalries, minor disagreements, distrust and leadership battles which in time were legitimized by differences in tactics and strategy." The dispute over cooperation with leftist elements of the army was key. Cayan accused some elements of Dev Genc of right deviation and being petty-bourgeois and Kemalists for supporting a left junta over militant action (Ulus 2011).

In sum, the primary cause of alliance termination after Cayan's death was the incapacitation of THKP-C. As Kenville (2000, 34-38) notes, "During this operation, Turkish security killed ten THKP-C members. Following the Kizildere operation, the government had technically crushed THKP-C and most of the remaining members, including Cayan's spouse Gulten, left the country. It would be several years before the revolutionary left would return to Turkey to wage their armed struggle." A secondary cause of termination was preference divergence. THKP-C preferred a more militant course than the politically-oriented Dev Genc.

Section A.24: CPO for Non-Decapitation Leader Exits

Our main causal process observation (CPO) inductively studies termination mechanisms for all 30 cases of decapitation-driven alliance breakdown in our data. In this section we also trace breakdown mechanisms in brief case narratives for all 6 cases of non-decapitation leader removal-driven alliance breakdown in our data. As in Table 5 of the main text, a ranking of the mechanisms in each case is outlined in Table A.24 below.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) — (2002)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking			2	1

Hassan Hattab formed Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), known until 2007 as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), in 1998. Hattab's GSPC was a splinter from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a prominent anti-government force in the Algerian civil war. In 1997 and 1998, GIA's popularity declined due to the group's extreme violence against both the Algerian government and civilians, along with the group's flagging effort to topple the Algerian regime (Boudali 2007). Amidst internal splits over civilian victimization within GIA, and perhaps with Osama Bin Laden's encouragement, Hattab and a number of other GIA commanders formed AQIM/GSPC. From the start, GSPC publicly criticized GIA over counterproductive civilian victimization, and rejected an Algerian government amnesty, which some factions of GIA were keen to accept (Kohlmann 2007). Still, GSPC retained operational ties via its leadership, comprised of former GIA commanders, to a number of remaining GIA factions. While the Algerian government cracked down on militancy between 1999 and 2001, GSPC and GIA tacitly cooperated, sharing territorial havens and operational support in attacks on Algerian military targets and Westerners in Algeria.

In 2001, at a meeting of GSPC leaders convened after the September 11th attacks, Hassan Hattab was expelled from AQIM/GSPC. Hattab's expulsion stemmed from his resistance to other GSPC fighters' growing propensity to target moderate Algerian civilians, as well perceptions that we was too moderate himself, and fears that Hattab would lead the GSPC toward reconciliation under the Algerian government's amnesty program (Kohlmann 2007). As Kohlmann (2007) describes, "Hattab's mujahideen colleagues increasingly saw him as 'weak' and ineffectual. The deputy director of the GSPC media wing would later complain that due to 'treachery' and a lack of public support, 'the operations of our fighters were limited [during this phase] to preparing ambushes and executing several attacks on the bases of the apostates.' ... [while] rival commanders within the GSPC complained that Hattab had begun displaying 'signs of surrender' and was wavering in his commitment to jihad in Algeria." After Hattab's expulsion from the GSPC, relations between AQIM/GSPC and GIA broke down in 2002. The primary cause of this alliance termination was preference divergence—surviving GIA factions in Algeria supported Hattab's more moderate position in the face of intense counterinsurgent pressure, and opposed GSPC's more radical turn under Hattab's successors. Disintegration of personal ties were a secondary cause of termination.

Hattab was a former GIA commander who helped maintain GSPC's links with surviving GIA elements. After Hattab's ouster, GIA had fewer important ties to the GSPC leadership.

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) — (1984)

The FMLN was formed in 1980 in El Salvador through the union of five leftist rebel groups. While each of the five constituent groups under the FMLN umbrella retained its own command structure, leaders of the five groups jointly formed the overall FMLN leadership council (Krauss 1985). Within the FMLN, perhaps the most important leader, Cayetano Carpio, headed the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL). The ETA was a Basque separatist and leftist group aiming to create an independent, socialist Basque homeland in Spain. Carpio carried a reputation as the "Ho Chi Minh of Latin America," and his revolutionary stature drew the FMLN/FPL attention from a range of international leftist militant organizations, including ETA.

Attracted to Carpio's stature and seeking to expand ties in Latin America, the ETA made contact with constituent units of the FMLN, including the Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the FPL in 1979, and by 1980 ETA was providing training, finances, and personnel for FMLN operations in El Salvador. In 1982 and 1983, the FMLN and ETA carried out two abortive assassination attempts against Salvadoran Defense Minister Jose Guillermo Garcia. (Department of State 1984). These brazen attempts prompted a U.S.-backed Salvadoran counterinsurgent crackdown, which put pressure on FMLN cohesion. In particular, the crackdown prompted a struggle between Carpio and Ana María, an FPL lieutenant who supported moderation. On April 6, 1983, Ana María was murdered by pro-Carpio cadres, and FMLN factions blamed Carpio for her death. One week later, facing accusations over Ana María's assassination, Carpio committed suicide (Central Intelligence Agency 1985). In the wake of the influential Carpio's death, a number of states supporting the FMLN, including Cuba and Nicaragua, paused aid to the group, mostly to avoid drawing the ire of U.S. forces assisting the Salvadoran government. For similar reasons, and also partly because pressure on the FMLN reduced its value as a partner, the ETA ceased cooperating with the FMLN in 1984 (Central Intelligence Agency 1984). The main cause of the breakdown was ETA's fear about FMLN operational security in the wake of Carpio's death. Incapacitation of the FMLN, and particularly the diminution of its state support, was a secondary cause of termination.

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and Movement of April 19 (M-19) — (1984)

The FMLN was formed in 1980 in El Salvador through the union of five leftist rebel groups. While each of the five constituent groups under the FMLN umbrella retained its own command structure, leaders of the five groups jointly formed the overall FMLN leadership council (Krauss 1985). Within the FMLN, perhaps the most important leader, Cayetano Carpio, headed the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL). M-19 was a Colombian Marxist group led by Jaime Bateman Cayón. Carpio carried a reputation as the "Ho Chi Minh of Latin America," and his revolutionary stature drew the FMLN/FPL attention from a range of international leftist militant organizations, including M-19.

Cayón and M-19 first made contact with constituent units of the FMLN, including the Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the FPL in 1981, and the groups first allied in 1983, with Cayon and prominent FMLN leaders like Carpio and Joaquin Villalobos meeting several times to discuss negotiating strategies—for the FMLN with the Salvadoran government and for M-19 with

Table A.24: Results of the CPO for Non-Decapitation Leader Exits

Targeted Group	Allied Group	Year	Exit Type	Incapacitation	Increased Fears	Personal Connections	Preference Divergence
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	2002	Thrownout/Expelled			2	1
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	1984	Death by Natural Causes	2	1		
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	Movement of April 19 (M-19)	1984	Death by Natural Causes				1
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	Sendero Luminoso	1984	Death by Natural Causes		1		
Movement of April 19 (M-19)	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	1984	Death by Natural Causes				1
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)	29th November National Liberation Movement (MLN-29)	1999	Death by Natural Causes	1			2

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	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	2	1	—	—

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	—	1

the Colombian government (Oñate 2011). Records recovered by the Colombian military from M-19 camps in 1984 suggested that M-19 received technical and tactical advice from the FMLN, and some M-19 operatives trained in El Salvador proper with FMLN advisors (Spencer 1996, 140). However, two abortive assassination attempts by the FMLN against Salvadoran Defense Minister Jose Guillermo Garcia in 1982 and 1983 put pressure on FMLN cohesion (Department of State 1984). These brazen attempts prompted a U.S.-backed Salvadoran counterinsurgent crackdown, which prompted a struggle between Carpio and Ana María, an FPL lieutenant who supported moderation. On April 6, 1983, Ana María was murdered by pro-Carpio cadres, and FMLN factions blamed Carpio for her death. One week later, facing accusations over Ana María's assassination, Carpio committed suicide (Central Intelligence Agency 1985). Just 11 deaths after Carpio's death, M-19 commander Jaime Bateman Cayón was killed in a plane crash in Panama. While both the FMLN and M-19 reeled from the loss of leaders and increasing counterinsurgent pressure, the main cause of alliance termination between the FMLN and M-19 in 1984 was preference divergence. Factions that rose to power in the FMLN after Carpio's death supported continuation of the armed struggle, and rejected greater moderation and conciliation as anti-Marxist. By contrast, factions that came to power behind Cayon in M-19 supported greater moderation and agreed to a truce with Colombian president Belisario Betancur (Crenshaw 2015). The M-19 truce broke down in 1985, but not before the FMLN had split ties.

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and Sendero Luminoso — (1984)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	1	—	—

The FMLN was formed in 1980 in El Salvador through the union of five leftist rebel groups. While each of the five constituent groups under the FMLN umbrella retained its own command structure, leaders of the five groups jointly formed the overall FMLN leadership council (Krauss 1985). Within the FMLN, perhaps the most important leader, Cayetano Carpio, headed the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL). Sendero Luminoso (SL) is a Peruvian Maoist group led by Abimael Guzmán. Carpio carried a reputation as the "Ho Chi Minh of Latin America," and his

revolutionary stature drew the FMLN/FPL attention from a range of international leftist militant organizations, including Sendero Luminoso.

Sendero Luminoso and the FMLN first allied in April 1983 at a meeting in Colombia attended by by leaders from a host of Latin American militant groups, including the FMLN, Sendero Luminoso, the ELN, and the Venezuelan PBR. In particular, the FMLN and Sendero Luminoso agreed to share facilities and territories for drug smuggling operations (Radu 1984). Cooperation, however, was short-lived. After two abortive assassination attempts by the FMLN against Salvadoran Defense Minister Jose Guillermo Garcia in 1982 and 1983, a counterterror crackdown put pressure on FMLN cohesion (Department of State 1984). A struggle emerged in the FMLN between Carpio and Ana María, an FPL lieutenant who supported moderation, and on April 6, 1983, Ana María was murdered by pro-Carpio cadres. FMLN factions blamed Carpio for her death, and one week later, facing accusations over Ana María's assassination, Carpio committed suicide (Central Intelligence Agency 1985). In the wake of Carpio's death, Sendero Luminoso's fears over operational security within the FMLN spurred alliance termination. Fragmentation in the FMLN raised the specter of security leaks, and Sendero Luminoso, which long prioritized secrecy, was unwilling to risk information on their operations slipping out from FMLN cadres. Weakened Cuban control over the FMLN after Carpio's death also exacerbated SL's fears, since the Cubans had helped broker the FMLN-SL alliance in the first place (Radu 1984).

Movement of April 19 (M-19) and Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) — (1984)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	—	1

The FMLN was formed in 1980 in El Salvador through the union of five leftist rebel groups. While each of the five constituent groups under the FMLN umbrella retained its own command structure, leaders of the five groups jointly formed the overall FMLN leadership council (Krauss 1985). Within the FMLN, perhaps the most important leader, Cayetano Carpio, headed the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL). M-19 was a Colombian Marxist group led by Jaime Bateman Cayón. Carpio carried a reputation as the "Ho Chi Minh of Latin America," and his revolutionary stature drew the FMLN/FPL attention from a range of international leftist militant organizations, including M-19.

Cayón and M-19 first made contact with constituent units of the FMLN, including the Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the FPL in 1981, and the groups first allied in 1983, with Cayon and prominent FMLN leaders like Carpio and Joaquin Villalobos meeting several times to discuss negotiating strategies—for the FMLN with the Salvadoran government and for M-19 with the Colombian government (Oñate 2011). Records recovered by the Colombian military from M-19 camps in 1984 suggested that M-19 received technical and tactical advice from the FMLN, and some M-19 operatives trained in El Salvador proper with FMLN advisors (Spencer 1996, 140). However, two abortive assassination attempts by the FMLN against Salvadoran Defense Minister Jose Guillermo Garcia in 1982 and 1983 put pressure on FMLN cohesion (Department of State 1984). These brazen attempts prompted a U.S.-backed Salvadoran counterinsurgent crackdown,

which prompted a struggle between Carpio and Ana María, an FPL lieutenant who supported moderation. On April 6, 1983, Ana María was murdered by pro-Carpio cadres, and FMLN factions blamed Carpio for her death. One week later, facing accusations over Ana María's assassination, Carpio committed suicide (Central Intelligence Agency 1985). Just 11 deaths after Carpio's death, M-19 commander Jaime Bateman Cayón was killed in a plane crash in Panama. While both the FMLN and M-19 reeled from the loss of leaders and increasing counterinsurgent pressure, the main cause of alliance termination between the FMLN and M-19 in 1984 was preference divergence. Factions that rose to power in the FMLN after Carpio's death supported continuation of the armed struggle, and rejected greater moderation and conciliation as anti-Marxist. By contrast, factions that came to power behind Cayon in M-19 supported greater moderation and agreed to a truce with Colombian president Belisario Betancur (Crenshaw 2015). The M-19 truce broke down in 1985, but not before the FMLN had split ties.

National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) and 29th November National Liberation Movement (MLN-29) — (1999)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	—	2

Colombia's National Liberation Army (ELN) was founded in 1964 as a student-led Marxist group inspired by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. In 1969, Spanish priest Manuel Pérez left FARC and joined the ELN, becoming its leader in 1973, alongside Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista ('Gabino'). Under Perez, the ELN grew more extreme, and developed new, profitable sources of income including oil smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping (Crenshaw 2019). MLN-29 was a Panamanian Marxist group founded in 1970 and devoted to establishing a communist state in Panama. Despite their close geographic proximity, the ELN and MLN-29 were only rhetorically allied, exchanging occasional statements of support throughout 1998 (CEDEMA 1998). The absence of material relations ties between the ELN and MLN-29 chiefly reflects the deep weakness of MLN-29 exposed by its near collapse under the Noriega regime. By the 1990s, only a few diehard cadres remained with the group.

Manuel Pérez died of Hepatitis B in 1998, and in the wake of his death, the rhetorical alliance between the ELN and MLN-29 dissolved. While the latter group offered condolences to the ELN and urged continuation of the militant struggle after Pérez's death in 1998 (CEDEMA 1998), by 1999, practical struggles facing the ELN forced them to severe ties with MLN-29. In particular, in 1999, following Pérez's death, the ELN began losing its territorial sanctuaries along the northwestern border between Colombia and Panama. This increasing pressure on the group owed both to an offensive by right-wing paramilitaries under the AUC and to increased competition from FARC over control of over-land smuggling routes into Latin America (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). In response, the ELN shifted operations eastward toward the Colombia-Venezuela border. A secondary cause of the split between the ELN and MLN-29 stemmed from increasing pressure on the ELN leadership from some factions to negotiate with the Colombian government and pursue conciliation (Insight Crime 2020). The MLN-29, by contrast, maintained that "[after] the loss of a revolutionary fighter of the stature of Commander Manuel Pérez Martínez ... the best tribute is to continue the fight..." (CEDEMA 1998).

Section A.25: CPO for Co-Leadership, Decapitation, and Alliance Non-Breakdown

Our main causal process observation (CPO) inductively studies termination mechanisms for all 30 cases of decapitation-driven alliance breakdown in our data. In this section we also trace mechanisms in brief case narratives for 15 randomly-selected cases in our data in which a targeted group had co-leadership structures, experienced leadership decapitation, and did not suffer alliance breakdown. In Table A.25 below we indicate whether there is evidence that co-leadership structures eased alliance relations in the wake of leadership targeting, and rank which breakdown mechanisms co-leadership specifically helped assuage.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al Qaeda — (2004)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	1	2

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), known as Al Qaeda in Yemen/Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia before 2009, is a long-time affiliate of the core Al Qaeda organization. An official Al Qaeda affiliate in Saudi Arabia was initially established in 2002 and 2003, when, with Al Qaeda's loss of Kandahar in Afghanistan in 2002, Osama Bin Laden dispatched "several hundred Saudi members of Al Qaeda" from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia to work "with sleeper cells that had been operating there for several years at bin Laden's direction" (Riedel and Saab 2008, 34). Al Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia had an extensive network of safehouses and operatives, and a virtually infinite supply of weapons and explosives owing to the extensive ties Bin Laden had cultivated with prominent Saudi clerics and officials.

In 2004, Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia was led by Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, also known as Abu Hajr, an Al Qaeda veteran of conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Algeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Yemen (Joffe 2004). The group was organized in isolated cells operating across different regions of Saudi Arabia. Cells were individually led by Saudi Al Qaeda veterans from Afghanistan, and Muqrin ruled with a council of these commanders. Muqrin was killed on June 18, 2004 in a shootout with Saudi commandos (Joffe 2004), but the relationship between Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Al Qaeda core continued. Evidence suggests that the co-leadership structure in place within AQAP helped ease potential tensions between AQAP and Al Qaeda after Muqrin's death. In particular, because AQAP was led by a council of Saudi veterans of the war in Afghanistan, a number of influential commanders with direct ties to Al Qaeda's leaders, Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, from their time in Afghanistan, retained command of the organization. Continuation of leadership by individuals with direct relationships with Bin Laden helped sustain the relationship. Secondarily, because AQAP was led by a council of individuals with personal experience fighting alongside Bin Laden, the co-leadership structure in place also helped smooth over preference divergence between AQAP operatives and Al Qaeda core. The AQAP leadership council continued receiving and following guidance from Bin Laden after Muqrin's death (Riedel and Saab 2008).

Table A.25: Results of the CPO for Co-Leadership, Decapitation, and Alliance Non-Breakdown

Targeted Group	Allied Group	Year	Co-Leadership Helped?	Incapacitation	Increased Fears	Personal Connections	Preference Divergence
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Al Qaeda	2004	Yes			1	2
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Al Qaeda	2005	Yes			1	2
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1988	Yes	2	1		
Hizballah	Ansar Allah	1992	Yes		1		2
Hizballah	Hamas	1992	Yes		1		2
Hizballah	Mahdi Army	2008	Yes			1	
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	Al Qaeda	2001	Yes	2		1	
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	Al Qaeda	2007	Yes	3		1	2
Movement of April 19 (M-19)	Sendero Luminoso	1985	Yes	1	2	1	
Montoneros	Peronist Armed Forces (FAP)	1970	Yes			2	1
Montoneros	Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)	1970	Yes			2	1
Montoneros	Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)	1971	Yes			1	
Red Brigades (BR)	Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP)	1976	Yes	1			2
Red Brigades (BR)	Red Barbagia	1981	Yes	1			
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)	Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)	1989	Yes	2		1	

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al Qaeda — (2005)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	1	2

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), known as Al Qaeda in Yemen/Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia before 2009, is a long-time affiliate of the core Al Qaeda organization. An official Al Qaeda affiliate in Saudi Arabia was initially established in 2002 and 2003, when, with Al Qaeda's loss of Kandahar in Afghanistan in 2002, Osama Bin Laden dispatched "several hundred Saudi members of Al Qaeda" from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia to work "with sleeper cells that had been operating there for several years at bin Laden's direction" (Riedel and Saab 2008, 34). Al Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia had an extensive network of safehouses and operatives, and a virtually infinite supply of weapons and explosives owing to the extensive ties Bin Laden had cultivated with prominent Saudi clerics and officials. Over the course of 2004, numerous AQAP leaders including Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, an Al Qaeda veteran of conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Algeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Yemen, were killed.

On April 3, 2005, following a three-day battle with Saudi security forces in Ar Rass, Saudi Arabia, AQAP lost another leader, Saud bin-Hammoud al-Otaibi. al-Otaibi was an Al Qaeda veteran of the conflict in Afghanistan, and was known for his talent as a smuggler, helping AQAP expand its base in Yemen as well as in Saudi Arabia (ABC News 2006). Although al-Otaibi's death marked another in a string of high-profile Saudi successes against AQAP, the organization remained active and virulent, and retained its alliance with Al Qaeda (Cordeman and Obaid 2005). AQAP was organized in isolated cells operating across different regions of Saudi Arabia. Cells were individually led by Saudi Al Qaeda veterans from Afghanistan, and al-Otaibi ruled with a council of these commanders, some of whom had expanded into Yemen. Evidence suggests that the co-leadership structure in place within AQAP helped ease potential tensions between AQAP and Al Qaeda after al-Otaibi's death. In particular, because AQAP was led by a council of Saudi veterans of the war in Afghanistan, a number of influential commanders with direct ties to Al Qaeda's leaders, Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, from their time in Afghanistan, retained command of the organization. Continuation of leadership by individuals with direct relationships with Bin Laden helped sustain the relationship. Secondarily, because AQAP was led by a council of individuals with personal experience fighting alongside Bin Laden, the co-leadership structure in place also helped smooth over preference divergence between AQAP operatives and Al Qaeda core. The AQAP leadership council continued receiving and following guidance from Bin Laden after al-Otaibi's death (Riedel and Saab 2008).

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) — (1988)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	2	1	—	—

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was anti-Turkish leftist group founded by Hagop Hagopian in Beirut in 1975. Hagopian had resided in Lebanon since 1967, and was active in the Palestinian resistance, joining the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1967 (Hyland 1991, 25-26). Similarly, the PKK was an anti-Turkish, Kurdish leftist group founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978. After Hagopian formed ASALA in 1975, his group was a natural ally of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which was also operating and training in Lebanon and opposed to Turkey. Ties between ASALA and the PKK deepened further in 1982, when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon forced both groups from Beirut. In exchange for financing, training, and sanctuary in the Bekaa Valley and northern Iraq, ASALA provided the PKK safehouses in Greece and Western Europe, along with training and operational support (Manaz 2015).

While Hagopian was ASALA's most prominent and charismatic leader, the organization was jointly commanded by a number of other prominent figures in the Armenian diaspora, including Kevork Ajemian and Monte Melkonian. Throughout the 1980s, ASALA was increasingly riven by internal schisms, and factionalized, with some units following Hagopian and others more under allegiance to Melkonian and Ajemian. The PKK retained relations with the Hagopian and Melkonian factions of ASALA, though material cooperation subsided somewhat between 1983 and 1986, after ASALA's high-profile Orly attack drew French and Turkish counterterror attention. In 1987, ASALA and PKK relations were reinvigorated after a meeting saw the groups agree to renew training cooperation. Specifically, ASALA agreed to pay the PKK $500 per ASALA militant trained in PKK camps in northern Iraq, and ASALA agreeing to take part in small-scale PKK operations (Manaz 2015). Hagopian was assassinated by a hit-squad in Athens, Greece on April 28, 1988, but ties between ASALA and the PKK were retained because the surviving ASALA leaders, including Melkonian and Ajemian, helped reassure the PKK over existing training arrangements. ASALA was modestly incapacitated after Hagopian's death, moving into Armenia and Greece to focus on the Armenian struggle, but shuttering vulnerable safehouses in Turkey, the Middle East, and Western Europe. ASALA's surviving leaders Melkonian and Ajemian, however, ensured that this incapacitation did not impact relations with the PKK, which did not rely on ASALA safehouses (Manaz 2015). Indeed, Melkonian helped facilitate a PKK expansion into Armenia to capitalize on ASALA's relocation after Hagopian's death.

Hizballah and Ansar Allah — (1992)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	1	—	2

Hizballah is a Lebanon-based Shia paramilitary organization formed in 1983 and led by Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General, along with 6 other officials who comprise the Majlis al-Shura, a consultative council. Nasrallah has served as Secretary-General since 1992, when he succeeded Abbas al-Mussawi, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike (Addis and Blanchard 2011). Hizballah has become a well-run fighting force and an official political party in Lebanon, known for receiving extensive Iranian support and for supporting Shia extremist groups in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, among others. One of the groups Hizballah has long supported is Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis. Ansar Allah are a Yemen-based, Shia group that emerged in Sa'dah, northwestern Yemen in the early 1990s.

In the early 1990s, the predecessor movement to Ansar Allah, known as Believing Youth, developed relations with Hizballah. Believing Youth received propaganda and other religious materials from Hizballah, and often rhetorically supported the movement (Khoury 2015). In 1991 and 1992, Ansar Allah/Believing Youth also began a summer camp for religious instruction of Yemeni children based on the Hezbollah model. While ties between Hizballah and Believing Youth developed, Mussawi, the Hizballah Secretary-General, was killed in an Israeli strike on February 16, 1992. After Mussawi's death, the Hizballah leadership council, with Iranian support, immediately announced Hassan Nasrallah as Hizballah's new Secretary-General. In turn, the group and its Iranian sponsors also covertly reassured Shia proxies, including Ansar Allah, both that Hizballah's support and ideological message would continue, and that the group was a stable partner (Bergman 2019, 399). Retaining operational security was a particular concern for Ansar Allah, which faced increasing pressure from the Yemeni government in the 1990s as the government became aware of its presence (Khoury 2015).

Hizballah and Hamas — (1992)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	1	—	2

Hizballah is a Lebanon-based Shia paramilitary organization formed in 1983 and led by Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General, along with 6 other officials who comprise the Majlis al-Shura, a consultative council. Nasrallah has served as Secretary-General since 1992, when he succeeded Abbas al-Mussawi, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike (Addis and Blanchard 2011). Hizballah has become a well-run fighting force and an official political party in Lebanon, known for receiving extensive Iranian support and for supporting Shia extremist groups in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, among others. One of the groups Hizballah has long supported is Hamas, also known as

the Islamic Resistance Movement. Hamas are a Palestinian Sunni group that formed in 1987, and have been based in Lebanon and Gaza since 1989-1990.

Hizballah and Hamas began cooperating in 1987, and deepened their links to include training, financial, and territorial support from 1989-1990, when the deportation of Hamas supporters from Israel to Lebanon placed Hamas and Hizballah in close proximity in southern Lebanon (Rabasa et. al. 2002, 16). With Iranian intercession, Hamas and Hizballah even shared training camps and operational plans (Ghaddar 2013). While ties between Hizballah and Hamas developed, Mussawi, the Hizballah Secretary-General, was killed in an Israeli strike on February 16, 1992. After Mussawi's death, the Hizballah leadership council, with Iranian support, immediately announced Hassan Nasrallah as Hizballah's new Secretary-General. In turn, the group and its Iranian sponsors also covertly reassured proxies, including Hamas, both that Hizballah's support and ideological message would continue, and that the group was a stable partner (Bergman 2019, 399). Retaining operational security was a particular concern for Hamas, which faced increasing pressure from the Israeli government in the 1990s.

Hizballah and the Mahdi Army — (2008)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	1	—

Hizballah is a Lebanon-based Shia paramilitary organization formed in 1983 and led by Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General, along with 6 other officials who comprise the Majlis al-Shura, a consultative council. Nasrallah has served as Secretary-General since 1992, when he succeeded Abbas al-Mussawi, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike (Addis and Blanchard 2011). Hizballah has become a well-run fighting force and an official political party in Lebanon, known for receiving extensive Iranian support and for supporting Shia extremist groups in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, among others. One of the groups Hizballah has long supported is the Mahdi Army. The Mahdi Army is an Iraqi Shia group formed in response to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, and active in Iraq's sectarian conflict.

Hizballah and the Mahdi Army began cooperating in 2003 to resist the U.S. occupation, with Hizballah providing training, arms, and finances with the support of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operatives. The Hizballah relationship with the Mahdi Army was directed through Imad Mughniyah, Hizballah's military liason with the IRGC (Baer 2008). While ties between Hizballah and the Mahdi Army developed, Mughniyah, the Hizballah operations chief, was killed in a joint American-Israeli assassination operation in Damascus, Syria on February 12, 2008 (Goldman and Nakashima 2015). After Mughniyah's death, the Hizballah leadership council, with Iranian support sought to covertly reassure proxies, including the Mahdi Army, that Hizballah's support would continue unabated (Cochrane 2008). The biggest risk of rupture between Hizballah and the Mahdi Army after Mughniyah's death stemmed from the fact that Mughniyah had closely, personally coordinated the alliance with IRGC sponsorship. However, the fact that the Hizballah leadership council retained close links to the IRGC after Mughniyah's death helped ease Mahdi concerns about Hizballah's future reliability.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Al Qaeda — (2001)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	2	—	1	—

The IMU was established in 1998 in northern Afghanistan with the help of operatives from Al-Qaeda. Its primary purpose was to overthrow Islam Karimov's 'un-Islamic' regime in Uzbekistan and replace it with an Islamic state. The IMU was founded by Juma Namangani, a Soviet veteran of the Afghan war who defected to the Afghan Mujahideen in the late 1980s and subsequently served with Islamist factions in conflicts in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in the 1990s. As a veteran, Namangani became the military leader of the IMU upon its creation, while his childhood friend Tohir Yo'ldosh served as the spiritual and religious leader of the IMU (Rashid 2002). Leveraging contacts with Saudi and other Arab mujahideen they had met while fighting in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Namangani and Yo'ldosh met with Osama Bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Kandahar, Afghanistan several times between 1999 and 2002. In exchange for battlefield support in Afghanistan and sanctuary in Uzbekistan, the IMU received millions of dollars in cash, arms, and training as well as sanctuary in Pakistan from the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Rashid 2002; Siddique 2010)

In November 2001 as the IMU, Taliban, and Al Qaeda battled forces from the Northern Alliance and U.S. special operators, Juma Namangani was killed in an American airstrike in northern Afghanistan. A series of subsequent U.S. airstrikes and clashes decimated the ranks of the IMU. However, in late 2001 and early 2002, Yo'ldosh, the co-leader of the IMU, gathered the remnants of the IMU and fled to the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan near the Afghan border, where the IMU sheltered with Al Qaeda and Taliban cells (Pannier 2010). Despite losing a substantial portion of its active fighters, the IMU survived and regenerated under the leadership of Yo'ldosh. Throughout the period after Namangani's death, cooperation between the IMU, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda remained critical, with Al Qaeda providing safehouses and financing in exchange for IMU operational support. The presence of a co-leader, Yo'ldosh, proved critical for the IMU to retain its alliance with Al Qaeda after Namangani's death. Above all, the fact that Bin Laden had a personal relationship with Yo'ldosh helped reassure Al Qaeda core that the IMU would remain a useful partner after Namangani's death. The immense sacrifices the IMU made under Yo'ldosh while supporting Al Qaeda's flight from Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion also helped reassure Al Qaeda that the IMU would remain a useful battlefield asset despite losing its military commander in Namangani.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al Qaeda — (2007)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	3	—	1	2

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is an Indonesian Salafist militant group founded in 1987 and with cells throughout southeast Asia. The group was founded by Abu Bakir Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar. Both leaders had fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the 1990s, where they established contact with senior commanders in Al-Badr, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Al Qaeda, among other regional groups (Counter Extremism Project 2020). In the 1990s and early 2000s, Bashir and Hambali oversaw the establishment of a JI madrassa network in Pakistan to facilitate the transit of JI operatives to Pakistan and Afghanistan for training in Al Qaeda camps. Proximity made alliance ties with Al Qaeda easier to sustain. At the same time, Al Qaeda used JI bases and safehouses in southeast Asia to plan attacks and share operational knowledge (Horowitz and Potter 2014).

In July 2007, JI leader Zarkasih, also known as Nuaim, Mbah, and Abu Irsyad, was arrested by Indonesian forces in a raid in Yogyakarta, Indonesia (British Broadcasting Corporation 2008). Despite the set back, JI and Al Qaeda remained allied, with JI receiving important material support from Al Qaeda as the former planned regional operations (Crenshaw 2018). Evidence points to the importance of sustained personal ties between JI and Al Qaeda in the wake of Zarkasih's capture. Specifically, though Zarkasih was the overall JI commander, the group also had a regional Shura council comprised of cell leaders in Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (Council on Foreign Relations 2009). Among the surviving members of the JI shura council after Zarkasih's arrest were Noorudin Top and Sanusi, both of whom had either met personally with Al Qaeda representatives at meetings in southeast Asia or who had studied at JI's, Al Qaeda-linked madrassas in Pakistan. Secondarily, JI co-leaders moved to clarify the group's position on conciliation and the breadth of their global aims. In so doing, the shura council sought to reassure Al Qaeda that JI remained committed to a transnational militant struggle in the Al Qaeda model (Vaughn et. al. 2009). Finally, the surviving JI shura council members helped reassure Al Qaeda that the group remained a viable partner despite setbacks. In particular, Nooridin Top's JI cell shared details of plans for the 2009 Marriott/Ritz Carlton suicide bombing with Al Qaeda in 2008, undoubtedly in an effort to signal continued group capacity (Vaughn et. al. 2009).

Movement of April 19 (M-19) and Sendero Luminoso — (1985)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	2	—	—

The Movement of April 19 (M-19) was a Colombian leftist group formed in 1974 by Jaime Bateman Cayón, Ivan Marino Ospina, Álvaro Fayad Delgado, Antonio Navarro Wolff, Carlos Toledo Plata, and Carlos Pizarro Leongómez. In the late 1970s, M-19 kidnapped drug traffickers for ransom to fund its activities, including Medellin Cartel kingpin Pablo Escobar (Crenshaw 2015). Colombian cartel leaders created a group in response, known as "Death to Kidnappers" (MAS) in 1982, prompting a war between M-19 and narcotraffickers in Colombia. Escalating violence prompted M-19 leaders to pursue a non-aggression pact with MAS. As part of the truce between M-19 and MAS, M-19 expanded its role in coca smuggling from Colombia into Central America. In 1983, in turn, M-19 allied with Sendero Luminoso. SL relied on M-19 for assistance in trafficking coca from its facilities in Peru through Colombia, and the two group shared territorial havens (Quijano 1985, 5). The expansion of M-19 in narco-activities was led by Ivan Marino

Ospina.

As the M-19 alliance with Sendero Luminoso developed, M-19 experienced a series of set-backs, losing a sequence of co-founders—Cayón in 1983 and Plata in 1984—to accidents or Colombian police operations. In August 1985, Ospina, who had led M-19's move into narco-trafficking, was killed by the Colombian military (Quijano 1985, 5). Nevertheless, the M-19 alliance with Sendero Luminoso endured, as surviving M-19 leaders Delgado, Wolff, and Leongómez smoothed potential alliance tensions. Following Ospina's death, the remaining M-19 leaders helped reassure SL commanders, namely Abimael Guzmán, that M-19 remained a capable, secure, and trustworthy partner. Guzmán and SL were known for paranoia and extreme caution in relations with partners, but the presence of survivng M-19 leaders helped reassure SL that M-19 would remain involved in militancy and drug smuggling, and that the group would not openly fracture, exposing SL to targeting if information leaked. The influence of Carlos Pizarro Leongómez, who organized M-19's "America Battalion" in the Colombia-Peru frontier was particularly important for reassuring Sendero Luminoso about the alliance (Osterling 2019).

Montoneros and the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP) — (1970)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	2	1

The Montoneros were formed in 1969 as an Argentine, Marxist-Peronist militant organization, including Peronists, radical Catholics, and leftist nationalists. Primarily composed of young men and women of the middle class, the Montoneros were dedicated to the overthrow of the military government in Argentina. The group was led by a supreme body known as the National Command, under which provincial commands and cells were organized. Leaders comprising the National Command included Luis Fernando Abal Medina, Carlos Gustavo Ramus, and Mario Eduardo Firmenich (Central Intelligence Agency 1977). Like Montoneros, the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP) were an Argentina-based Peronist armed group. Montoneros and FAP began cooperating in 1970, and were natural allies with a large overlapping membership, as well as shared training and operational advice (Kohut, Vilella, and Julian 2003, 104-105).

The same year the Montoneros were formally established, Luis Fernando Abal Medina was killed by the police at a bar where he was due to meet with representatives of other Peronist groups. To honor his death, the Montoneros National Command published a summary of Fernando Abal Medina's political thought, asserting that they would continue to abide by Medina's political convictions and plans, including: to take responsibility for the people's war, adopt the armed struggle as the methodology that makes this people's war viable, integrate the people's struggles and have confidence in the revolutionary potential of the Peronist working class (CEDEMA 2006). By re-asserting a commitment to Medina's vision, the Montoneros National Command helped reassure their new Peronist allies that Montoneros would not diverge from their ideological course (Moyano 1995). A secondary factor relevant for preserving the Montoneros-FAP alliance after Medina's death was the personal connection between FAP and Montoneros leaders. Multiple leaders of the Montoneros and the FAP received military and ideological training in Cuba in the mid-to-late 1960s, during which time the leaders of each group developed personal ties (Goebel 2007). After

Medina's death, these ties were retained because Medina was not the only Montoneros leader with personal links to FAP leaders.

Montoneros and the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) — (1970)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	2	1

The Montoneros were formed in 1969 as an Argentine, Marxist-Peronist militant organization, including Peronists, radical Catholics, and leftist nationalists. Primarily composed of young men and women of the middle class, the Montoneros were dedicated to the overthrow of the military government in Argentina. The group was led by a supreme body known as the National Command, under which provincial commands and cells were organized. Leaders comprising the National Command included Luis Fernando Abal Medina, Carlos Gustavo Ramus, and Mario Eduardo Firmenich (Central Intelligence Agency 1977). Like Montoneros, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) were an Argentina-based Peronist armed group. Montoneros and FAR began cooperating in 1970, and were natural allies with a large overlapping membership, as well as shared training and operational advice (Kohut, Vilella, and Julian 2003, 104-105).

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Montoneros and the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) — (1971)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	—	—	1	—

The Montoneros were formed in 1969 as an Argentine, Marxist-Peronist militant organization, including Peronists, radical Catholics, and leftist nationalists. Primarily composed of young men and women of the middle class, the Montoneros were dedicated to the overthrow of the military government in Argentina. The group was led by a supreme body known as the National Command, under which provincial commands and cells were organized. Leaders comprising the National Command included Luis Fernando Abal Medina, Carlos Gustavo Ramus, Sabino Jose Navarro, and Mario Eduardo Firmenich (Central Intelligence Agency 1977). Like Montoneros, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) were an Argentina-based Peronist armed group. Montoneros and FAR began cooperating in 1970, and were natural allies with a large overlapping membership, as well as shared training and operational advice (Kohut, Vilella, and Julian 2003, 104-105).

In 1971, Sabino Jose Navarro was killed in an Argentine military operation. The main factor relevant for preserving the Montoneros-FAP alliance after Navarro's death was the personal connection between FAR and Montoneros leaders. Multiple leaders of the Montoneros and the FAR received military and ideological training in Cuba in the mid-to-late 1960s, during which time the leaders of each group developed personal ties (Goebel 2007). After Navarro's death, these ties were retained because Navarro was not the only Montoneros leader with personal links to FAR leaders. In particular, Firmenich, who became the leader of Montoneros after Navarro, had also trained alongside FAR commanders in Cuba in the late 1960s (Marchak 1999, 96-97).

Red Brigades (BR) and Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) — (1976)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	—	2

The Red Brigades (BR) was a far-left Italian group formed in 1970 and led by a Strategic Directorate comprised of several leaders, including Renato Curcio, Margherita Cagol, Alberto Franceschini, and Mario Moretti (Sundquist 2010). Through the Strategic Directorate, BR cultivated a collective leadership style. NAP emerged in Naples, Italy in 1973, and was devoted to the far-left cause, with a particular focus on the abolition of prisons. NAP and BR first allied in 1976, launching a series of joint attacks in Pisa, Rome, Naples, and Florence ("Terrorism and Security: the Italian Experience" 1984, 14). Cooperation between the groups was substantive—NAP provided BR motivated fighters and an operational base in southern Italy in return for access to the BR's supply network and tactical expertise.

BR leader Renato Curcio was arrested and imprisoned by Italian police in January 1976, but despite his capture, the BR-NAP alliance survived, and the groups carried out a number of joint operations in the year after Curcio's arrest (Jenkins 2019). Above all, the collective leadership style of BR helped preserve the alliance with NAP because surviving BR leaders helped assure NAP, which was under increasing police pressure, that BR remained a useful partner. NAP relied on the BR heavily for arms and operational guidance, and after Curcio's capture, Moretti worked to reassure the group that they would continue receiving agreed upon support ("Terrorism and Security: the Italian Experience" 1984). A secondary way BR's co-leadership style helped avert alliance tensions with NAP concerns preference divergence. Despite some NAP cadres fears that Curcio was the most militant of BR's leaders, and that BR would turn conciliatory after his capture,

Moretti's daring operational plans after Curcio's death helped signal to NAP that BR remained committed to the militant struggle (Jenkins 2019).

Red Brigades (BR) and Red Barbagia — (1981)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	1	—	—	—

The Red Brigades (BR) was a far-left Italian group formed in 1970 and led by a Strategic Directorate comprised of several leaders, including Renato Curcio, Margherita Cagol, Alberto Franceschini, and Mario Moretti (Sundquist 2010). Through the Strategic Directorate, BR cultivated a collective leadership style. Red Barbagia emerged in Sardinia in 1978, and was devoted to the far-left cause with a focus on Sardinian autonomy. BR and Red Barbagia first allied in 1979, with BR providing arms and tactical guidance to Red Barbagia in exchange for operatives and logistical support (Archivio 900 2020; D'Amato 2018). The alliance began shortly after BR pulled off the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro, which prompted intense police pressure on BR.

On March 4, 1981, BR leader Mario Moretti was arrested after a Carabinieri infiltrator, Renato Longo, identified his hideout. With most of the BR Strategic Directorate dead or imprisoned, the group was under intense pressure, struggling to maintain caches and safehouses. Nevertheless, Moretti, Curcio, and other imprisoned BR leaders retained important influence in militant leftist circles, and their historic leadership gave them weight required to continue orchestrating BR activities from behind bars (Central Intelligence Agency 1982). The co-leadership structure of BR helped facilitate continuation of the BR alliance with Red Barbagia after Moretti's arrest. The main concern for Red Barbagia after Moretti's capture was whether BR could continue to supply arms. However, at-large BR leaders orchestrated the transfer of a large BR arms cache to Sardinia with Red Barbagia's assistance in 1982 (Archivio 900 2020). The arms transfer helped assure Red Barbagia that BR could remain a viable partner.

Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) — (1989)

	Targeted Group Incapacitation	Operational Security Fears	Disintegration of Personal Ties	Preference Divergence
Mechanism Ranking	2	—	1	—

The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) was a Peruvian Marxist guerrilla organization founded in 1983 by a group of Marxist radicals with the aim of ridding Peru of foregin "imperialists," overthrowing the government, and establishing a Marxist regime (Martin 2020). From the beginning, MRTA advocated a combination of rural and urban warfare in addition to participating in electoral politics. Like MRTA, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)

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was a Marxist group devoted to leftist militancy. MIR, though based in Chile, established ties with MRTA in 1986, and the two groups shared safehouses and territorial havens. The MRTA alliance with MIR was chiefly a product of personal ties between MRTA leader Victor Polay Campos and MIR officer Jaime Castillo Petruzzi. Polay Campos and Petruzzi met while studying sociology in Paris in the early 1970s, and allegedly became friends. Their personal relationship was also bolstered when both trained together in Cuba in the late 1970s (de la Cova 1997).

On February 3, 1989, the leader and co-founder of MRTA, Victor Polay Campos, was arrested at a hotel in the town of Huancayo, Peru. He was found with possession of firearms and grenades (de la Cova 1997). Despite Polay Campos's arrest, the MRTA-MIR alliance survived, largely because Polay Campos's co-leader Néstor Cerpa Cartolini, also known as Comrade Evaristo, remained at-large, and also had contact with the MIR leadership. Although personalistic alliances are often subject to termination after a leader is captured, the MRTA-MIR alliance was bolstered further still because just a year after Polay Campos's capture, he escaped from jail and returned to the MRTA command. Specifically, on July 9, 1990, MRTA cadres staged a highly publicized and daring operation, breaking 48 members including Polay Campos from the high-security prison of Miguel Castro Castron (de la Cova 1997). The fact that Polay Campos had a co-leader who shared personal connections to MIR officials, and the fact that he was imprisoned for such a short period of time—and freed in such a daring operation—helped the MRTA-MIR alliance survive.

Section A.26: Data Appendix

In the following pages we provide additional details about the MGAR coding effort and how we merged MGAR data with Price's (2012; 2018) data for the main analyses. The full MGAR dataset is introduced in Blair et. al. (2020), and we encourage interested readers to see there for additional details. The codebook is available here.

Militant Group Alliances and Relationships (MGAR)

The MGAR dataset gathers new, time series data on all known militant relationships from 1950 through 2016. Here we provide additional details on the coding effort and protocols. The overall MGAR coding effort has been an 8-year project funded by the Defense Department's Minerva Initiative and involving hundreds of RAs and research supervisors.

To avoid thorny definitional issues, MGAR focuses broadly on all independent, violent, non-state organizations. This includes terrorist, civil war, and rebel groups from around the world, which we broadly call militant groups. As such, these data provide an important extension to existing data that focus on terrorist or rebel groups in isolation. The data are time-series at the directed dyad-year, which allows for fine-grained models of evolving relationships among actors, including change and termination. Compared to cross-sectional dyads, the directed dyad-year allows researchers to understand the dynamics of a given relationship over time rather than assuming a static, unchanging connection. In this way, it facilitates analyses of the evolution of nonstate actor relationships.

We began by creating a comprehensive list of militant organizations from existing datasets and then mapping on the militant relationships identified in other data, including the Terrorist Organizational Profiles (TOPS) database, the UCDP Actor dataset, and the Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) dataset. From there, we investigated the identified alliances and either confirmed or discarded them, while adding a time series component and characterizations of the nature of the alliance to those we confirmed. With exiting data verified, we turned to the task of identifying previously unknown relationships. To do so, we assigned teams of researchers with relevant language skills to countries and provided them with a list of all known militant groups ever active in that country. Teams were comprised of undergraduate and graduate researchers. The researchers were trained in Boolean search techniques, databases (e.g. Factiva, Lexis-Nexis, Newsbank, Google Scholar, Google, JSTOR, Ebsco, and ISI World of Science), and also their library web portals. By casting a broad net, coders utilized a diverse array of sources to identify as much information as possible. Researchers also had to pass several rounds of coder training exercises to ensure that they were consistently identifying and recording data. The teams coded relationships and also added organizations that they uncovered that were missing from existing datasets. This process of documenting these relationships builds on, rather than competes with, the substantial efforts of prior research. We supplement and link together related data from GTD, MIPT TKB, UCDP, MAROB, Crenshaw, Asal and Rethemeyer, and many others to identify the set of organizations covered in MGAR. We have maintained identifiers from these data and matched our work with the TORG crosswalk identifiers to allow researchers to link our data with broader research in the field. The goal is not to have the final word or supplant what already exists, but rather contribute to an aggregation of knowledge about militant conflict and cooperation that is open-source, adaptable, and broadly available.

The resulting MGAR dataset consists of 14,804,406 directed dyad-year observations, in-

cluding over 2,637,638 unique dyads and 2,613 unique militant organizations. The dataset includes 14,818 directed dyad-years in which a relationship exists between groups, of which 11,836 are co-operative and 2,982 are hostile. Though not employed in this analysis, the full dataset is even larger because it also includes alliances between militant groups and states, diaspora communities, political parties, and nonviolent organizations. The sheer number of ties identified in our data belie the notion that militant organizations primarily operate in isolation to preserve secrecy and security—there is a dense web of relationships.

The data code not just the presence of a relationship, but also when it began, when it ended, and what it entailed. This ordinal categorization ranges from allies (the strongest form of coop-eration) to associates, supporters, fans (verbal but not material support), hosts (primarily states), rivals, and lastly, competitors (the strongest form of conflict). These distinctions in the data al-low us to isolate material cooperation from purely rhetorical relationships. Material cooperation is more common accounting for about 86% of all alliance-years in the data. Within the MGAR data we specifically code for alliance content, including whether groups exchanged operational (e.g. shared membership, joint operations, tactical advising), material (i.e. arms transfers), territorial (e.g. shared bases), training, and financial support (i.e. cash transfers).

We plot alliances in MGAR over time in Figure A.26 and present descriptive statistics from the MGAR database in Table A.27.

Figure A.26: MGAR Alliances Over Time

Note: Plots depict material and rhetorical alliances over time from MGAR.

Table A.27: MGAR Summary Statistics

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Repression	12,136,592	6.308	1.886	0	8
Shared Ideology Dyad	14,804,406	0.595	0.491	0	1
Nationalist/Separatist Dyad	14,804,406	0.372	0.483	0	1
Leftist/Communist Dyad	14,804,406	0.137	0.343	0	1
Rightist Dyad	14,804,406	0.124	0.343	0	1
Environmentalist Dyad	14,804,406	0.0002	0.013	0	1
Co-Religionist Dyad	14,804,406	0.063	0.244	0	1
Sunni/Salafist Dyad	14,804,406	0.060	0.237	0	1
Shia Dyad	14,804,406	0.0004	0.020	0	1
Other Muslim Dyad	14,804,406	0.001	0.035	0	1
Christian Dyad	14,804,406	0.001	0.033	0	1
Jewish Dyad	14,804,406	0.00006	0.008	0	1
Alliance	14,804,406	0.0008	0.028	0	1
Operational Support	14,803,164	0.0005	0.023	0	1
Material Support	14,803,276	0.0005	0.021	0	1
Territorial Support	14,803,548	0.0004	0.020	0	1
Training Support	14,803,142	0.0005	0.022	0	1
Financial Support	14,802,810	0.0003	0.018	0	1
Age Difference	14,804,406	14.728	15.152	0	150
Intercapital Distance (km)	14,378,782	6283.178	4301.692	0	19865.11
Capability Ratio	4,208,384	0.633	0.166	0.5	0.999
Alliance Breakdown	12,166,422	0.00008	0.009	0	1

Linking MGAR and Data from Price (2012; 2018)

For the main analyses used in this paper we link data from MGAR and Price (2012; 2018). Price codes data on leadership turnover for 207 militant groups from 1970 to 2008. Price's data cover a sample of militant groups from the set of organizations in the GTD, MIPT TKB, or on the terrorism designation lists of the U.S. and the U.K. For groups in GTD and MIPT TKB, Price requires that the organization conducted at least 4 attacks. As such, Price's data cover more capable groups. The 207 groups in the data are based in 60 countries across Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and South America.

Linking data from Price with MGAR was straightforward because Price's data cover high-profile groups in GTD and MIPT TKB. As noted above, we began with the full list of militant organizations covered in these databases when coding relationships in MGAR. As such, every group in Price is also found in MGAR, and so merging the data is simple using identifiers from TORG as well as the unique group IDs we created in MGAR. The merge is one-to-one using group identifiers and years.

To understand the character of groups and countries included in the Price data, in Table A.28 we plot summary statistics and the results of two-sample difference-in-means tests comparing data from the Price sample used in the main analysis and data from the full MGAR sample. Overall, groups in the Price sample conduct more attacks on average using more tactics on average than groups in the full MGAR universe. Relative to the MGAR universe, the Price sample also over-represents countries engaged in civil wars, countries with more troops, more repressive countries, and countries in Europe and Asia. Countries in Africa, Oceania, and North America are somewhat under-represented in the Price data compared to the MGAR universe.

Table A.28: Price vs. MGAR Samples

VARIABLE	Mean (MGAR)	SD (MGAR)	Mean (Price)	SD (Price)	Difference
Attacks	4.975381	37.88194	22.5968	58.91422	**
Tactics	.6515867	1.30852	2.1698	2.112217	**
Civil War	.556621	.4967839	.6567079	.4748532	**
Military Personnel (in 1000s)	446.6938	665.5389	467.2613	522.6566	*
Repression (CIRI)	5.209473	2.398076	5.56348	2.321518	**
Africa	.2006549	.4004905	.0476909	.2131314	**
Europe	.1269702	.3329397	.1745523	.3796195	**
Asia	.5320277	.4989733	.6327992	.4820873	**
Oceania	.0789812	.2697095	0	0	**
North America	.1163185	.3206066	.0580584	.233876	**
South America	.0875131	.2825855	.0868992	.2817138	

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