

Online Appendix for The Two Faces of Opposition to Chemical Weapons: Sincere Versus Insincere Norm-Holders

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Pre-Registration

While Study 1 was exploratory, we pre-registered Study 2 with Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP). Our pre-registration plan (EGAP #20190722AA) is available [here](#). The following hypotheses were pre-registered:

*H*₁: Individuals are more likely to report support for [nuclear/chemical] weapons use when asked indirectly than directly.

*H*₂: Individuals that receive the peer or elite cue are more likely to report support for [nuclear/chemical] weapons use than those that receive no cue.

*H*₃: The gap in support for [nuclear/chemical] weapons use between the indirect and direct question will decrease when individuals receive the peer or elite cue rather than no cue.

*H*₄: Individuals that are more susceptible to peer influence will be less likely to support [nuclear/chemical] weapons use when asked directly than individuals that are less susceptible to peer influence.


*H*₅: Older individuals are more likely to support [nuclear/chemical] weapons use than younger individuals.

*H*₆: Republicans are more likely to support [nuclear/chemical] weapons use than non-Republicans.

Experimental Design: Study 1

Study 1 was conducted on a nationally representative Qualtrics sample of 1,050 U.S. subjects in March 2016. It is a simple three factor between-subjects design, where respondents are assigned with equal probability to receive either a sensitive list of policies (including chemical weapons use), a non-sensitive list of policies (not including chemical weapons use), or a direct question about chemical weapons use. The experimental conditions for Study 1 are summarized in Figure A.1.

Figure A.1: Summary of Experimental Conditions for Study 1



a) Outcome Variable

Questionnaire: Study 1

1. What is your age?

Numerical Entry

2. What is your gender?

Male

Female

3. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

Less than high school diploma

High school diploma / GED

Some college (no degree)

2-year college degree

4-year college degree

Graduate degree

4. What is your race?

White/Caucasian

African American

Hispanic

Native American

Asian

Pacific Islander

Other

Text Entry

5. What is your combined household income?

\$0 – \$24,999	<input type="radio"/>
\$25,000 – \$49,999	<input type="radio"/>
\$50,000 – \$74,999	<input type="radio"/>
\$75,000 – \$99,999	<input type="radio"/>
\$100,000 – \$149,999	<input type="radio"/>
\$150,000 – \$199,999	<input type="radio"/>
\$200,000+	<input type="radio"/>

6. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?

Republican	<input type="radio"/>
Democrat	<input type="radio"/>
Independent	<input type="radio"/>
Other	<input type="text" value="Text Entry"/>

Attention Check:

7. Below is a list of colors. Please select your favorite color from the options listed below. This is actually an attention check. You must select the colors red and grey to continue the survey.

- Red
- Blue
- Green
- Orange
- Grey
- Yellow
- Purple

List Experiment:

8. Below are [three/four] potential foreign policies. How many of them do you think the U.S. government should adopt? [Red item only shown to treatment group.]

- Cut down on military spending.
- Close down Guantanamo Bay prison.
- Send undocumented immigrants back to their country.
- **Be willing to use chemical weapons against other countries during war.**

-
- None of them (0)
- One of them (1)
- Two of them (2)
- Three of them (3)
- All four of them (4)**

Direct Question:

9. Do you believe the U.S. should adopt the following foreign policy?

No Not Sure Yes


Policy: “Be willing to use chemical weapons against other countries during war.”

Robustness: Study 1

Heterogeneous Effects: Study 1

Figure A.2 illustrates the estimated proportion of respondents supporting chemical weapons use indirectly in the list. Results are based on Blair and Imai's (2012) multivariate estimator of list support, which uses an expectation-maximization algorithm to calculate the proportion of respondents supporting the sensitive item. The sample size of Study 1 is smaller than that of Study 2, so power is limited, but we do observe a number of important findings. Consistent with hypothesis 5 in our pre-registered plan, age is positively associated with greater support for chemical weapons use. We find no support for hypothesis 6, which holds that Republicans are more likely to support chemical weapons use than Democrats.

Figure A.2: Estimated Proportion of Respondents Supporting Chemical Weapons Use Indirectly in Study 1



Note: Black circles are point estimates and bars are 95% confidence intervals.

Modeling Direct Support: Study 1

In Table A.3 we test the correlates of direct support for chemical weapons use based on Study 1. In column 1, the dependent variable equals 1 if subjects answer “Yes” to the direct question, 0 if they respond “No,” and missing if they say “Not Sure.” In column 2, the dependent variable equals 1 for “Not Sure” and 0 otherwise. In column 3, the dependent variable equals 1 for “Yes” or “Not Sure,” and 0 for “No.” Results provide no support for hypothesis 5 about age, but do support hypothesis 6 about Republicans being more likely to support chemical weapons use.

Table A.3: Direct Support for Chemical Weapons Use in Study 1

VARIABLES	(1) Direct	(2) Not Sure	(3) Direct/Not Sure
Female	0.266 (0.350)	1.236*** (0.288)	0.853*** (0.251)
Age: 30-39	0.180 (0.439)	0.926** (0.408)	0.492 (0.367)
Age: 40-49	-0.698 (0.577)	0.982** (0.433)	0.095 (0.377)
Age: 50-64	-1.282** (0.546)	0.654 (0.400)	-0.354 (0.357)
Age: 65+	-1.154** (0.554)	0.357 (0.444)	-0.543 (0.381)
College Educated	-0.284 (0.406)	-0.221 (0.333)	-0.352 (0.280)
Republican	1.163** (0.463)	-0.039 (0.339)	0.595* (0.308)
Democrat	0.217 (0.431)	0.112 (0.301)	0.190 (0.275)
Income: \$25 - 50 K	-1.669*** (0.603)	-0.260 (0.362)	-0.992*** (0.378)
Income: \$50 - 75 K	-0.668 (0.534)	-0.814* (0.418)	-0.856** (0.415)
Income: \$75 - 100 K	-1.229* (0.701)	-1.137** (0.531)	-1.324*** (0.483)
Income: \$100 - 150 K	-1.138* (0.680)	-0.690 (0.474)	-1.036** (0.477)
Income: \$150 - 200 K	-0.366 (0.753)	-0.393 (0.603)	-0.580 (0.526)
Income: > \$200 K	-1.112 (0.889)	-0.428 (0.629)	-0.773 (0.618)
White	-1.094** (0.530)	0.106 (0.420)	-0.546 (0.396)
Black	-0.462 (0.653)	-0.136 (0.531)	-0.328 (0.489)
Constant	0.381 (0.972)	-3.016*** (0.791)	-0.252 (0.687)
Observations	248	355	355

Robust standard errors in parentheses


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Experimental Design: Study 2

Study 2 was conducted on an Amazon mTurk sample of 3,069 U.S. subjects in September and October 2019. It is a fully crossed 2 x 3 x 2 between-subjects design. The first factor varies whether respondents receive questions about chemical or nuclear weapons; the second factor varies whether subjects receive no cue, a peer cue supporting WMD use, or an elite cue supporting WMD use; and the third factor varies whether respondents receive the sensitive list of policies or the non-sensitive list of policies and direct question. To enhance power, in this study we opt for a quasi-combined list-direct design, where respondents that receive the non-sensitive list also subsequently receive the direct question (Blair and Imai 2012; Aronow, Coppock, Crawford, and Green 2015; Eady 2017). We also block on respondent party identification (Republican, Democrat, Independent) and age (over or under 31) in order to reduce variation on these factors. The experimental conditions for Study 2 are summarized in Figure A.4.

Besides a standard battery of demographic questions, we also include four items from the Resistance to Peer Influence scale (Steinberg and Monahan 2007). People that are disposed to care more about what their peers think are more likely to conform to social norms—at least in public—in order to avoid social punishment (Steinberg and Monahan 2007). We thus expected, per our pre-analysis plan, that individuals who are more susceptible to peer influence would be less likely to support nuclear or chemical weapons use when asked directly due to fear of the social costs associated with openly supporting taboo behavior.

Figure A.4: Summary of Experimental Conditions for Study 2



Questionnaire: Study 2

1. What is your age?

Numerical Entry

2. What is your gender?

Male

Female

Other

3. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

Less than high school diploma

High school diploma / GED

Some college (no degree)

2-year college degree

4-year college degree

Graduate degree

4. What is your race?

White/Caucasian

Black/African American

Latino/Latina

American Indian/Alaska Native

Asian

Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander

Other

Text Entry

5. What is your combined annual household income?

Less than \$20,000

\$20,001-\$45,000

\$45,001-\$70,000

\$70,001-\$100,000

\$100,001-\$200,000

\$200,001 or more

6. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?

Republican

Democrat

Independent

Other

Text Entry

[**Note:** Questions 7 through 14 are in 2 question pairs. The second question in each pair branches from the first. The order of pairs will be randomized.]

7. Please select the statement that best describes you:

Describes Me Better

Some people would do something that they knew was wrong
just to stay on their friends' good side.

BUT

Other people would not do something they knew was wrong
just to stay on their friends' good side.

8. How much does the statement describe you?

Somewhat True of Me Very True of Me

[Last selection]

9. Please select the statement that best describes you:

Describes Me Better

Some people hide their true opinion from their friends if they think their friends will make fun of them because of it.

BUT

Other people will say their true opinion in front of their friends, even if they know their friends will make fun of them because of it.

10. How much does the statement describe you?

Somewhat True of Me Very True of Me

[Last selection]

11. Please select the statement that best describes you:

Describes Me Better

Some people say things they don't really believe because they think it will make their friends respect them more.

BUT

Other people would not say things they didn't really believe just to get their friends to respect them more.

12. How much does the statement describe you?

Somewhat True of Me Very True of Me

[Last selection]

13. Please select the statement that best describes you:

Describes Me Better

Some people think it's more important to be an individual than to fit in with the crowd.

BUT

Other people think it's more important to fit in with the crowd than to stand out as an individual.

14. How much does the statement describe you?

Somewhat True of Me Very True of Me

[Last selection]

Social Prime:

15. Below is some information about international politics. You may have heard of some but not others, or none of them at all. Select the ones you've heard of before. [Order of list items randomized.]

- Myanmar (Burma) was once a British colony.
- NATO has 29 member states, which include the US, Canada, and several European countries.
- No Cue/Peer Cue/Elite Cue.
 - No Cue: The US government does not have an embassy in the country Bhutan.
 - Peer Cue: Many American citizens from both political parties believe that the US should be willing to use [nuclear/chemical] weapons during war.
 - Elite Cue: Many American government officials from both political parties believe that the US should be willing to use [nuclear/chemical] weapons during war.

List Experiment:

16. Below are [three/four] policies that the US government could adopt. HOW MANY of them do you support? You do not need to specify which ones, just HOW MANY. [Order of list items randomized; red item only shown to treatment group.]

- Cut down on military spending.
- Close down Guantanamo Bay prison.
- Send undocumented immigrants back to their country.
- **Be willing to use [nuclear/chemical] weapons during war.**

None of them (0)

One of them (1)

Two of them (2)

Three of them (3)

Four of them (4)

Attention Check:

17. The previous question contained a list of statements. Which of the following subjects was a part of that list?

- The power of labor unions.
- Gay marriage.
- Guantanamo Bay.
- Don't know.

Direct Question:

18. Do you think the US government should adopt the following policy? [Only shown to those receiving the non-sensitive list.]

No Not Sure Yes

Policy: "Be willing to use [nuclear/chemical] weapons during war."

Open-Ended Question I:

19. Please write a sentence or two about your response to the previous question about [nuclear/chemical] weapons. [Only shown to those that received the direct question.]

Text Entry

Behavioroid:

20. Would you be willing to put your name down on a public petition asking the US government to be willing to use [nuclear/chemical] weapons during war? [Only for respondents answering “Yes” to the direct question.]

- Yes.
 No.

Open-Ended Question II:

21. How do you think your friends and/or family would react to the following policy position: “The US should be willing to use [nuclear/chemical] weapons during war.” [Shown to all respondents.]

Text Entry

Robustness: Study 2

We examine the robustness of our findings in Study 2, which is not nationally representative, several ways. First, we drop subjects that failed the attention check. Second, we analyze the data without weights. Table A.5 shows how our results for chemical weapons vary with these changes. For both robustness checks, list support remains greater than direct support. Although the difference between list and direct support decreases without weights, this is to be expected given that mTurk under-represents certain demographics like older Americans and Republicans, which we would generally expect to be more likely to support hawkish policies like chemical weapons use. Table A.6 demonstrates that our null result for nuclear weapons remains even when dropping respondents that failed the attention check or analyzing the data without weights.

Table A.5: Chemical Weapons Robustness Checks

	List Support	Direct Support	Difference (Percentage Points)
Drop Attn. Check Failures	27.5%***	6.3%***	21.3***
Unweighted	14.8%***	10.7%***	4.1

Note: Results depict percentage support for chemical weapons use calculated from 5,000 bootstraps. * = $p < 0.10$, ** = $p < 0.05$, and *** = $p < 0.01$, where p-values indicate whether support for chemical weapons use is statistically greater than 0. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.

Table A.6: Nuclear Weapons Robustness Checks

	List Support	Direct Support	Difference (Percentage Points)
Full Weighted Sample	21.1%***	22.2%***	-1.1
Drop Attn. Check Failures	19.2%**	21.1%***	-1.8
Unweighted	21.6%***	22.2%***	-0.6


Note: Results depict percentage support for nuclear weapons use calculated from 5,000 bootstraps. * = $p < 0.10$, ** = $p < 0.05$, and *** = $p < 0.01$, where p-values indicate whether support for nuclear weapons use is statistically greater than 0. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.

Heterogeneous Effects: Study 2

Figure A.7 illustrates the estimated proportion of respondents supporting chemical weapons use indirectly in the list. Figure A.8 illustrates the estimated proportion of respondents supporting nuclear weapons use indirectly in the list. Results are based on Blair and Imai's (2012) multivariate estimator of list support, which uses an expectation-maximization algorithm to calculate the proportion of respondents supporting the sensitive item. Results offer support for a number of our hypotheses. First, looking at the top of Figure A.7, the elite cue induces respondents to support chemical weapons use. This finding represents modest support for hypothesis 2. On the other hand, cues have no significant effect on indirect support for nuclear weapons use (Figure A.8). We believe this null effect of cues for nuclear weapons is due to the fact that ordinary people are much better informed about nuclear than chemical weapons use, so cues are relatively less informative. Results in Figure A.7 also provide support for hypotheses 5 and 6. Older and more Republican respondents are more supportive of chemical weapons use.


Results pertinent to our hypotheses are somewhat different with respect to the nuclear weapons use results in Figure A.8. Apart from the non-effect of cues on support for nuclear weapons use, support for hypotheses 5 and 6 are weaker in Figure A.8. The effect of age is insignificant and only weakly positive (hypothesis 5), while we find that Republicans are actually somewhat less supportive of nuclear weapons use than Democrats. Here, however, it is important to keep in mind that our multivariate estimates measure support on the list. Looking at direct support for nuclear weapons use, Republicans are significantly more likely than Democrats to express support for nuclear use when asked directly. While about 45% of Republicans (95% CI: 38%-52%) expressed direct support for using nuclear weapons, just 13% of Democrats (95% CI: 9%-17%) expressed direct support for using nuclear weapons. This fact suggests that the nuclear taboo is substantially weaker for Republicans than Democrats.

Figure A.7: Estimated Proportion of Respondents Supporting Chemical Weapons Use in Study 2



Note: Black circles are point estimates and bars are 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.8: Estimated Proportion of Respondents Supporting Nuclear Weapons Use in Study 2



Note: Black circles are point estimates and bars are 95% confidence intervals.

Cues and Chemical Weapons Support: Study 2

Table A.10 displays the effect of cues on support for chemical weapons use. Neither cue has a significant effect on direct support, and only the elite cue has a statistically significant effect on list support (p-value = 0.029).

Table A.10: The Effect of Cues on Support for Chemical Weapons Use

	<u>No Cue</u>	<u>Peer Cue</u>	<u>Elite Cue</u>
Direct Support:	7.5%***	10.2%***	7.1%***
List Support:	14.4%	18.3%	54.4%***

Note: Results depict percentage support for chemical weapons use calculated from 5,000 bootstraps. * = $p < 0.10$, ** = $p < 0.05$, and *** = $p < 0.01$, where p-values indicate whether support for chemical weapons use is statistically greater than 0.

Modeling Direct Support: Study 2

In Table [A.11](#) we model direct support for WMD use. We find little support for hypothesis 5 about age, as no statistically significant differences are detected. We do, however, find statistically significant support for hypothesis 6, as Republicans are more likely to support chemical and nuclear weapons use than Independents and Democrats.

Table A.11: Direct Support for WMD Use in Study 2

VARIABLES	Study 2: Chemical Weapons			Study 2: Nuclear Weapons		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Direct	Not Sure	Direct/Not Sure	Direct	Not Sure	Direct/Not Sure
Female	-0.37 (0.37)	0.66* (0.37)	0.32 (0.31)	-0.92*** (0.34)	1.07*** (0.28)	0.15 (0.29)
Age: 30 - 39	0.67 (0.57)	0.33 (0.45)	0.52 (0.41)	0.24 (0.46)	0.35 (0.40)	0.29 (0.37)
Age: 40 - 49	0.36 (0.66)	0.67 (0.52)	0.53 (0.45)	0.73 (0.59)	0.26 (0.42)	0.43 (0.42)
Age: 50 - 64	0.002 (0.78)	0.35 (0.55)	0.18 (0.46)	0.36 (0.63)	0.33 (0.40)	0.39 (0.44)
Age: 65+	-0.62 (1.12)	-0.44 (0.85)	-0.56 (0.75)	0.61 (0.81)	-0.72 (0.61)	-0.15 (0.60)
College Educated	0.46 (0.44)	-0.73* (0.42)	-0.40 (0.35)	-0.29 (0.37)	0.13 (0.29)	-0.05 (0.30)
Republican	1.78*** (0.54)	-0.06 (0.42)	0.47 (0.40)	2.07*** (0.41)	-0.25 (0.32)	1.49*** (0.36)
Democrat	0.69 (0.59)	-1.45*** (0.44)	-0.90** (0.39)	0.28 (0.40)	-0.35 (0.36)	-0.04 (0.31)
Income \$20 - 45k	1.24** (0.61)	0.54 (0.57)	0.70 (0.48)	-0.50 (0.58)	0.47 (0.46)	-0.09 (0.45)
Income \$45 - 70k	0.82 (0.66)	-0.77 (0.59)	-0.28 (0.51)	-0.39 (0.54)	1.66*** (0.47)	0.93** (0.47)
Income \$70 - 100k	-0.23 (0.69)	0.25 (0.76)	0.06 (0.71)	-0.03 (0.52)	0.88* (0.48)	0.48 (0.45)
Income \$100 - 200k	0.62 (0.63)	-0.07 (0.65)	0.12 (0.54)	-0.37 (0.62)	-0.37 (0.52)	-0.50 (0.50)
Income > \$200k	2.06** (0.89)	0.99 (0.93)	1.64** (0.77)	-17.57*** (0.83)	0.24 (0.92)	-1.61 (0.98)
White	0.78 (0.60)	0.08 (0.42)	0.46 (0.37)	-0.13 (0.50)	0.65* (0.36)	0.28 (0.34)
Black	1.21* (0.70)	0.31 (0.60)	0.83 (0.51)	0.62 (0.55)	0.70 (0.46)	0.81* (0.42)
High RPI	-1.94*** (0.41)	0.64* (0.39)	-0.26 (0.31)	-0.43 (0.43)	0.33 (0.28)	0.04 (0.32)
Constant	-4.29*** (0.80)	-2.14*** (0.66)	-1.70*** (0.57)	-1.40** (0.69)	-3.34*** (0.59)	-1.40** (0.55)
Observations	767	767	767	769	769	769

Robust standard errors in parentheses


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Testing for Design Effects


We find no evidence of design effects in any of our studies. The test recommended by Blair and Imai (2012) and reported in Table A.12 shows estimated population proportions for each experimental cell. Histograms presented in Figures A.13 through A.16 suggest that few respondents are at the floor or ceiling.

Table A.12: Estimated Population Proportions By Experimental Cell


	<u>Study 1</u>	<u>Study 2 (Chemical Weapons)</u>	<u>Study 2 (Nuclear Weapons)</u>
<hr/> Estimated Population Proportions <hr/>			
Control Count = 0, Sensitive Count = 0	0.1043 (0.0169)	0.0817 (0.0099)	0.0630 (0.0088)
Control Count = 0, Sensitive Count = 1	0.0258 (0.0244)	0.0161 (0.0146)	0.0332 (0.0138)
Control Count = 1, Sensitive Count = 0	0.3055 (0.0326)	0.2939 (0.0206)	0.2620 (0.0204)
Control Count = 1, Sensitive Count = 1	0.1146 (0.0377)	0.0816 (0.0252)	0.1320 (0.0250)
Control Count = 2, Sensitive Count = 0	0.2566 (0.0339)	0.4035 (0.0216)	0.3811 (0.0217)
Control Count = 2, Sensitive Count = 1	0.0550 (0.0283)	0.0333 (0.0157)	0.0363 (0.0160)
Control Count = 3, Sensitive Count = 0	0.0615 (0.0232)	0.0731 (0.0113)	0.0766 (0.0114)
Control Count = 3, Sensitive Count = 1	0.0767 (0.0147)	0.0169 (0.0046)	0.0157 (0.0045)
<hr/>			
Bonferroni-corrected p-value	1	1	1
<hr/>			



(A.13) List Responses in Study 1



(A.14) List Responses in Study 2: Chemical Weapons




(A.15) List Responses in Study 2: Nuclear Weapons

Note: Gray bars mark the distribution of responses on the non-sensitive list. Hollow bars mark the distribution of responses on the sensitive list.

Experimental Design: Study 3

Study 3 was conducted on a nationally representative Lucid sample of 1,204 U.S. subjects in March 2020. It is a simple two factor between-subjects design, where respondents are assigned with equal probability to receive either a sensitive list of policies (including the use of nuclear weapons during war), or a non-sensitive list policies plus a direct question on the use of nuclear weapons during war. Therefore, like Study 2, this study utilized a quasi-combined list-direct design in order to enhance power (Blair and Imai 2012; Aronow, Coppock, Crawford, and Green 2015; Eady 2017). We also block on respondent party identification in order to ensure an approximately equal number of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents in each experimental condition. The experimental conditions for Study 3 are summarized in Figure A.16.

Figure A.16: Summary of Experimental Conditions for Study 3



a) Outcome Variable

Questionnaire: Study 3

Note: Lucid collects basic demographic data on respondents.

1. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?

Republican

Democrat

Independent

2. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?

Very liberal

Liberal

Slightly liberal

Moderate, middle of the road

Slightly conservative

Conservative

Very conservative

3. Did you vote in the last presidential election in 2016?

Yes

No, but I usually vote

No, I usually don't vote

4. Has a close friend or family member served in the military?

Yes

No

5. This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.

Strongly agree

Agree

Lean towards agreeing

Lean towards disagreeing

Disagree

Strongly disagree

6. Please select the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:

	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Nor Disagree	Agree Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
The best way to ensure world peace is through American military strength.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Going to war is unfortunate, but sometimes the only solution to international problems.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The use of military force only makes problems worse.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

List Experiment:

7. Below are [three/four] policies that the US government could adopt. HOW MANY of them do you support? You do not need to specify which ones, just HOW MANY. [Red item only shown to treatment group.]

- Cut down on military spending.
- Close down Guantanamo Bay prison.
- Send undocumented immigrants back to their country.
- Be willing to use nuclear weapons during war against countries that do *not* have nuclear weapons.

None of them (0)

One of them (1)

Two of them (2)

Three of them (3)

Four of them (4)

Attention Check:

8. The previous question contained a list of statements. Which of the following subjects was a part of that list?

The power of labor unions.

Gay marriage.

Guantanamo Bay.

Don't know.

Direct Question:

9. Do you believe the U.S. should adopt the following foreign policy?

Policy: "Be willing to use nuclear weapons during war against countries that do *not* have nuclear weapons."

Yes

No

Not Sure

Robustness: Study 3

We examine the robustness of our findings in Study 3, which is nationally representative, several ways. First, we drop subjects that failed the attention check. Second, we analyze the data with weights. Table A.17 shows that our null result with respect to the difference between list and direct support remains for these robustness checks.

Table A.17: Study 3 Robustness Checks

	<u>List Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Difference (Percentage Points)</u>
Unweighted	16.7%***	19.6%***	-2.9
Drop Attn. Check Failures	16.2%***	13.2%***	3.0
Full Weighted Sample	12.7%**	18.3%***	-5.7

Note: Results depict percentage support for nuclear weapons use calculated from 5,000 bootstraps. * = $p < 0.10$, ** = $p < 0.05$, and *** = $p < 0.01$, where p-values indicate whether support for nuclear weapons use is statistically greater than 0. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.

References for Supplementary Materials

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