

**Supplementary Materials for
Restitution or Retribution? Detainee Payments and Insurgent
Violence**


Christopher W. Blair

January 26, 2022

Detainee Stocks and Spending on Detention Facilities


US forces increased spending on detention infrastructure in Iraq just prior to the troop surge. This strategy was intended to ensure that there were ample facilities to house detainees, numbers of which US officials rightly expected to increase as the surge began and more counterinsurgent operations were conducted.

Figure A.1: US Spending on Detention Facilities and the Stock of Detainees



Note: Gray bars show total monthly spending on the construction and renovation of prisons in Iraq over time from the IRMS. The black line shows the total stock of detainees held by US forces in Iraq over time (Willardson 2016). The dashed line marks the start of the US troop surge.

Figure A.2: Detainee Release Spending/1000 Pop. by District Over Time



Variable Definitions and Sources

Indicators for districts with TIFs, and months of major holidays/Islamic events (Ramadan, Eid al-Adha, Ashura, Hajj) were self-coded.

Table A.3: Variable Definitions and Sources

Variable	Definition	Source
Dependent Variables		
SIGACTs	$\frac{(\text{Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs})}{(100\text{k District Population})}$	ESOC
Direct Fire Incidents	$\frac{(\text{Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs via Direct Fire})}{(100\text{k District Population})}$	ESOC
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Attacks	$\frac{(\text{Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs via IED})}{(100\text{k District Population})}$	ESOC
Indirect Fire Incidents	$\frac{(\text{Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs via Indirect Fire})}{(100\text{k District Population})}$	ESOC
Suicide Incidents	$\frac{(\text{Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs via Suicide Bombing})}{(100\text{k District Population})}$	ESOC
Lethal Insurgent Violence	$\frac{(\text{Incidents of Insurgent Violence Resulting in Civilian Fatalities})}{(100\text{k District Population})}$	IBC
Lethal Sectarian Violence	$\frac{(\text{Incidents of Sectarian Violence Resulting in Civilian Fatalities})}{(100\text{k District Population})}$	IBC
Insurgent Civilian Victimization	$\frac{(\text{Incidents of Insurgent Violence Against Civilians})}{(100\text{k District Population})}$	WITS
Independent Variables		
Detainee Release Payments	$\frac{(\text{Spending on Former Detainee Payments})}{(1000\text{s District Population})}$	ESOC
Control Variables		
Coalition-Caused Civilian Fatalities	Incidents of Coalition-caused civilian fatalities	IBC
Insurgent-Caused Civilian Fatalities	Incidents of insurgent-caused civilian fatalities	WITS
Coalition Maneuver Battalions	Number of Coalition maneuver battalions in a district	ESOC
Provincial Reconstruction Team	US Provincial Reconstruction Team in a district	ESOC
Small CERP Spending	$\frac{(\text{Spending on non-detainee release CERP Projects} < \$50,000)}{(1000\text{s District Population})}$	ESOC
Community Action Program Spending	$\frac{(\text{Spending on non-CERP USAID Projects})}{(1000\text{s District Population})}$	ESOC
Urban Population	% of district population in urban areas	WFP
Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rate in a district	Iraq Living Conditions Survey
Population	District Population	CIA
Civil Military Operations Center	Civil Military Operations Center in a district	Silverman (2020)
Sons of Iraq	Any spending on Sons of Iraq in a district	ESOC

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis can be found here.

Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics


	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent Variables:					
Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs Per 100k Pop.	6335	11.7942	28.0995	0	465.9534
Direct Fire Attacks Per 100k Pop.	6335	4.406953	12.13386	0	269.973
Indirect Fire Attacks Per 100k Pop.	6335	.4258274	1.411183	0	32.56749
IEDs Per 100k Pop.	6335	6.905307	16.42377	0	325.8145
Suicide Bombings Per 100k Pop.	6335	.0561077	.2511165	0	6.894887
Insurgent CIVCAS Incidents Per 100k Pop. (IBC)	6855	.2080415	.654005	0	23.9976
Sectarian CIVCAS Incidents Per 100k Pop. (IBC)	6855	.7815763	1.858368	0	41.09998
Unknown CIVCAS Incidents Per 100k Pop. (IBC)	6855	.060588	.2931754	0	7.887876
Insurgent CIVCAS Incidents Per 100k Pop. (WITS)	7479	1.973417	6.371344	0	77.21815
Independent Variables (and Related):					
Spending on Detainee Release Per 1000 Pop.	7479	.6129631	4.432539	0	104.3876
Spending on Detainee Release (=1)	7479	.1136644	.3174244	0	1
Detainees in Coalition Custody	5816	14306.92	6387.156	5089	25463
Control Variables:					
Coalition CIVCAS Incidents Per 100k Pop. (IBC)	6855	.0978247	.3780649	0	9.262004
Insurgent CIVCAS Incidents Per 100k Pop. (WITS)	7479	1.973417	6.371344	0	77.21815
Coalition Maneuver Battalions	6231	1.505154	2.187355	0	14.5
US Provincial Reconstruction Team	6231	.2416203	.4280997	0	1
Small CERP Spending Per 1000 Pop.	7479	195.7411	581.4793	0	21305.05
Urban Population	7119	.6596103	.2498392	.0880273	1
Unemployment Rate	7479	.0934806	.0682604	0	.5090103
Civil Military Operations Center	6439	.3501193	.4770441	0	1
Sons of Iraq	7479	.2235762	.4166691	0	1
Provincial Iraqi Control	7479	.2930327	.4551837	0	1
TIF	7479	.1272902	.33332	0	1
Ramadan	7479	.1664942	.3725486	0	1
Eid al-Adha	7479	.0966745	.2955338	0	1
Ashura	7479	.0835464	.2767248	0	1
Hajj	7479	.1245233	.3301996	0	1

Note: Means are weighted by district population.

Violence Trends Do Not Affect Project Timelines

Using project-level records, I observe the forecasted and actual project start and finish times for detainee release spending projects. These data permit a unique test. Specifically, the data allow me to study whether violence affects project implementation timelines. I find no evidence that violence affected project implementation.

Figure A.5: Violence Trends and Project Timelines



Note: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are from a series of regressions of project timelines on violence measures, with district and year-specific month fixed effects. Results reflect the coefficient on the violence measure described on the y-axis. Black markers denote the estimated effect of violence on the difference between actual and forecasted project start times. White markers denote the estimated effect of violence on the difference between actual and forecasted project completion times.

Full Model Results for Table 3

Table A.6: Detainee Release Spending and Insurgent Violence

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.1028** (0.0387)	-0.1013*** (0.0368)	-0.0962*** (0.0352)	-0.1640*** (0.0549)	-0.1638*** (0.0550)	-0.1638*** (0.0547)	-0.1765** (0.0694)	-0.1745** (0.0664)
Insurgent Collateral Damage	-0.1822*** (0.0408)	-0.2057*** (0.0518)	-0.3256*** (0.0658)	-0.0781 (0.0911)	-0.0781 (0.0910)	-0.0778 (0.0907)	-0.0876 (0.0867)	-0.0811 (0.0950)
Coalition Collateral Damage	-1.5387 (1.9945)	-2.3081 (1.8546)	-2.1889 (1.6480)	-1.4612 (1.5402)	-1.4592 (1.5374)	-1.4508 (1.5349)	-1.4474 (1.5714)	-1.3062 (1.5390)
Coalition Maneuver Battalions	0.3154 (0.1947)	0.2462 (0.1719)	0.1127 (0.2047)	0.1719 (0.2191)	0.1674 (0.2188)	0.1677 (0.2192)	0.2017 (0.2083)	0.2722 (0.2158)
Community Action Program	-0.0001 (0.0005)	-0.0003 (0.0005)	-0.0002 (0.0006)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0000 (0.0008)	-0.0000 (0.0008)
Non-Detainee Small CERP Projects	-0.0015* (0.0008)	-0.0014 (0.0010)	-0.0017* (0.0009)	-0.0018** (0.0008)	-0.0018** (0.0009)	-0.0018** (0.0008)	-0.0017** (0.0008)	-0.0019** (0.0008)
% Urban Population	-3.7733 (6.0128)	-2.2942 (5.8335)	-4.1846 (5.7710)	-3.3248 (4.3138)	-3.2503 (4.2977)	-3.2819 (4.2961)	-3.3501 (4.5398)	-6.0336 (6.5281)
Unemployment Rate	11.0034 (9.8094)	10.2331 (8.2426)	10.5754 (6.5364)	12.4803** (6.1237)	12.1102** (6.0447)	12.1620** (6.0451)	13.2755** (6.4266)	17.8662* (10.6670)
Theater Internment Facility	1.0786*** (0.3337)	0.7157** (0.3177)	0.3111 (0.4052)	0.3050 (0.4875)	0.2990 (0.4808)	0.2986 (0.4799)	0.9663** (0.4170)	2.0100** (0.8835)
Sons of Iraq	-1.6881** (0.7310)	-0.9301* (0.5377)	-0.4243 (0.4188)	-0.4408 (0.4848)	-0.4365 (0.4839)	-0.4355 (0.4830)	-0.7604 (0.7265)	-1.0177 (0.8927)
US Provincial Reconstruction Team	-0.0165 (0.5002)	0.0444 (0.2785)	-0.1667 (0.2793)	-0.1755 (0.3241)	-0.1726 (0.3238)	-0.1719 (0.3236)	-0.6157 (0.4696)	-0.6027 (0.5120)
Civil Military Operations Center	-1.9372 (1.6682)	-1.6394 (1.8145)	-1.3704 (1.8578)	-1.5160 (2.0616)	-1.4865 (2.0495)	-1.4761 (2.0399)	-1.8441 (2.3345)	-1.9356 (2.3443)
Lagged DV				-0.2311*** (0.0305)	-0.2348*** (0.0294)	-0.2346*** (0.0293)	-0.2407*** (0.0346)	-0.2396*** (0.0334)
Spatial Lag of DV					2.4640 (3.1286)	2.4737 (3.1250)	2.2266 (3.3632)	1.9949 (3.6711)
IED Clearance Rate						-0.6097 (0.4392)	-0.6016 (0.4468)	-0.7487 (0.5205)
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	0.8788* (0.4965)	0.6505 (0.5510)	0.5827 (0.5513)	0.6347 (0.6166)	0.6226 (0.6115)	0.6210 (0.6081)	0.8248 (0.7982)	0.8885 (0.8030)
Observations	3,521	3,521	3,521	3,458	3,458	3,458	3,458	2,468
R ²	0.120	0.219	0.283	0.318	0.318	0.318	0.326	0.345
AIC	24481	24062	23759	23224	23226	23227	23187	17007
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Models are estimated in first-differences, and scaled using population weights. MND-SE covered districts in the following provinces: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, Thi-Qar. The unit of analysis is the district-month. Spending and violence covariates are per capitized.

Section A.7: Oster Bounds

To probe potential omitted variable bias, such as from failing to control for the total number of detainees released in a district-month, I estimate coefficients of proportionality (δ) for the model reported in column 5 of Table 3 using the method described in Oster (2019). Conceptually, δ represents the degree of selection on unobservables relative to observables required to explain away an estimated effect. Per Oster's (2019) recommendation, I base the calculation of δ on a maximum R^2 of $1.3 \times R_{Full}^2$, where R_{Full}^2 equals the R^2 from the full model with controls reported in column 8 of Table 3 in the main text. Imposing progressively higher thresholds (e.g. maximum R^2 of 2 or $2.6 \times R_{Full}^2$) does not affect the overall result. Based on a maximum R^2 of $1.3 \times R_{Full}^2$, $\delta = -6.260$. Negative values of δ across the detainee release spending per capita term indicate that controlling for observables strengthens the estimated negative effect of detainee release spending on insurgent violence relative to a model without controls. Negative δ s are uninformative about the size of potential bias, but they do suggest that results are unlikely to be driven by omitted variables.

Controlling for the Estimated Number of Detainees in Non-Theater Internment

FOIA requests to CENTCOM for data on detentions and detainee releases at the district-month level have so far not been successful. In lieu of these data, I use other declassified documents provided by CENTCOM to estimate the total number of detainees in non-theater internment (i.e. the number of detainees eligible for release and compensation) in each MNF-I command-month.

Table A.8: The Effect of Detainee Release Spending Holds While Controlling for the Estimated Number of Detainees in Non-Theater Internment

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.103** (0.039)	-0.102*** (0.037)	-0.097*** (0.036)	-0.165*** (0.055)	-0.165*** (0.055)	-0.165*** (0.055)	-0.178** (0.070)	-0.176** (0.067)
Estimated # of Detainees in Non-Theater Internment	-0.0011 (0.0010)	-0.0006 (0.0011)	-0.0006 (0.0011)	-0.0002 (0.0008)	-0.0003 (0.0008)	-0.0003 (0.0008)	-0.0005 (0.0007)	-0.0004 (0.0008)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	0.977 (0.645)	0.756 (0.713)	0.715 (0.715)	0.778 (0.781)	0.765 (0.776)	0.771 (0.777)	0.934 (0.930)	1.039 (0.941)
Observations	3,269	3,269	3,269	3,269	3,269	3,269	3,269	2,301
R ²	0.120	0.212	0.284	0.318	0.318	0.318	0.326	0.345
AIC	22921	22526	22246	22089	22091	22092	22054	15971
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Subsetting to Months Around Islamic Holidays

Nationwide, detainee release accelerated during Islamic holidays as a gesture of goodwill. Results hold when we subset to months coinciding with Islamic holidays (Eid al-Adha, Ramadan, Ashura, the Hajj).

Table A.9: Detainee Release Spending During Islamic Holidays

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.169** (0.080)	-0.186** (0.086)	-0.203** (0.089)	-0.229*** (0.079)	-0.218*** (0.071)	-0.218*** (0.071)	-0.237** (0.113)	-0.229** (0.090)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	0.852* (0.490)	0.182 (0.478)	0.106 (0.525)	-0.283 (0.634)	-0.205 (0.639)	-0.204 (0.642)	0.333 (0.801)	-0.955 (0.636)
Observations	1,194	1,194	1,194	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131	801
R ²	0.152	0.233	0.282	0.341	0.345	0.345	0.354	0.373
AIC	8366	8247	8168	7702	7698	7700	7684	5605
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Extensive Margin of Spending

Results largely hold when we replace the core measure with an indicator for any detainee release spending. Estimates are modestly less precise in columns 4-8, but p is always ≤ 0.150 .

Table A.10: Extensive Margin of Detainee Release Spending


	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending (=1)	-3.322* (1.737)	-3.035* (1.675)	-2.510* (1.477)	-2.600 (1.712)	-2.612 (1.702)	-2.619 (1.710)	-2.756 (1.699)	-2.581 (1.772)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	0.787* (0.447)	0.573 (0.500)	0.517 (0.505)	0.560 (0.565)	0.545 (0.560)	0.544 (0.557)	0.741 (0.732)	0.880 (0.752)
Observations	3,521	3,521	3,521	3,458	3,458	3,458	3,458	2,468
R ²	0.121	0.219	0.283	0.313	0.313	0.313	0.320	0.339
AIC	24480	24063	23762	23251	23252	23253	23219	17030
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Sectarian Heterogeneity

In Table 4 of the main text I examine heterogeneous effects by the sectarian composition of districts. In the main text I define district sectarian composition using provincial party vote shares from the 2005 Iraqi election (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011). To probe the robustness of the results to this manner of defining district sectarian composition, here I show that substantively identical results emerge if separate models are estimated for areas of different armed groups' influence. I define armed group influence at the province level using qualitative reporting from declassified CENTCOM documents. AQI chiefly operated in mixed and Sunni areas of Iraq. Sunni Rejectionist insurgent groups operated mainly in Sunni areas, and to a lesser extent in mixed areas. Finally, JaM operated in Shia districts. Consistent with results presented in the main text, Figure A.11 shows that the negative effect of detainee release spending is greatest in mixed and Sunni (AQI and Rejectionist areas), while there is virtually no effect in Shia (JaM areas).

Figure A.11: Heterogeneous Effects by Areas of Armed Group Influence



Note: Bars are 95% confidence intervals. Model parameters follow those of column 1 in Table 4 in the main text. AQI areas are districts in the following provinces: Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Tameem, and Wassit. Rejectionist areas are districts in the following provinces: Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Tameem, and Wassit. JaM areas are districts in the following provinces: Baghdad, Basrah, Kerbala, Missan, Najaf, Qadissiya, Thi-Qar, Wassit.

Null Effects in Shia Areas

To explore why effects are null in Shia areas, I re-estimate the effects in Shia districts while exploiting analytic weights for the total number of Shia detainees in Coalition custody (columns 2 and 5) and for the ratio if Shia to Sunni detainees (columns 3 and 6).

Table A.12: Detainee Release Spending in Shia Areas


VARIABLES	Shia Areas (By Vote Shares)			Shia Areas (By JaM Presence)		
	(1) SIGACTS/100k Pop.	(2) SIGACTS/100k Pop.	(3) SIGACTS/100k Pop.	(4) SIGACTS/100k Pop.	(5) SIGACTS/100k Pop.	(6) SIGACTS/100k Pop.
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.034*** (0.009)	-0.030** (0.011)	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.020 (0.020)	-0.109 (0.076)	-0.135 (0.089)
Analytic Weights:	Population	# Shia Detainees	Ratio Shia to Sunni Detainees	Population	# Shia Detainees	Ratio Shia to Sunni Detainees
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	0.052 (0.032)	0.039 (0.045)	0.015 (0.045)	0.359 (0.686)	-0.593 (0.991)	-0.146 (0.838)
Observations	1,263	1,048	1,048	1,498	1,246	1,246
R ²	0.464	0.472	0.446	0.274	0.307	0.288
AIC	4998	4417	4455	9595	9033	8956
Sample:	Shia Areas	Shia Areas	Shia Areas	Shia Areas	Shia Areas	Shia Areas

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters match those of column 5 in Table 4.

Probing the Effects of the Surge

Comparing the effect of detainee release spending pre and post-surge reveals spending had a greater negative effect on IEDs after the surge.

Figure A.13: Heterogeneous Effects of the Surge By Tactic



Note: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Model parameters follow those of column 8 in Table 3. Black circles denote pre- and white circles denote post-surge estimates.

Future Spending Does Not Predict Current Violence

Changes in the three-month forward moving average of detainee release spending per 1000 residents do not predict current changes in insurgent violence, except weakly in column 3 ($p = 0.077$). In results available upon request, I also find no effect of changes in the lead of the extensive margin of detainee release spending on current insurgent violence.

Table A.14: Temporal Placebo Check

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop. (3-Month Forward Avg.)	-0.056 (0.080)	-0.093 (0.076)	-0.120* (0.067)	-0.014 (0.126)	0.006 (0.129)	0.006 (0.129)	-0.002 (0.123)	-0.009 (0.126)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	5.698*** (0.802)	6.213*** (0.658)	5.887*** (0.546)	7.455*** (0.716)	7.531*** (0.739)	7.786*** (0.730)	7.090*** (0.980)	7.409*** (1.091)
Observations	2,396	2,396	2,396	2,361	2,361	2,361	2,361	1,857
R ²	0.296	0.396	0.443	0.500	0.500	0.502	0.513	0.535
AIC	23199	22830	22637	22061	22062	22056	22004	17280
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Future Violence Does Not Predict Current Spending

The lead of changes in insurgent violence does not predict current changes in detainee release spending, except weakly in columns 7 ($p = 0.099$) and 8 ($p = 0.088$).

Table A.15: Test for Anticipation Bias

	Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.	0.102 (0.077)	0.109 (0.079)	0.100 (0.067)	0.100 (0.062)	0.100 (0.062)	0.100 (0.062)	0.097* (0.058)	0.096* (0.055)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	-0.054 (0.112)	-0.029 (0.117)	-0.016 (0.116)	0.016 (0.096)	0.023 (0.100)	0.023 (0.100)	0.047 (0.173)	-0.121 (0.245)
Observations	3,521	3,521	3,521	3,458	3,458	3,458	3,458	2,468
R ²	0.071	0.114	0.218	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.253	0.296
AIC	21127	20958	20522	20085	20086	20088	20064	14776
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Intensity Weights

The main analyses are scaled using population weights. These models weight by the intensity of insurgent violence. Results are nearly distinguishable in column 1 ($p = 0.132$).

Table A.16: Results With Intensity (Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs per 100k Pop.) Weights

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.106 (0.070)	-0.105* (0.063)	-0.100* (0.058)	-0.214*** (0.066)	-0.210*** (0.070)	-0.199*** (0.070)	-0.193** (0.090)	-0.209*** (0.076)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	5.698*** (0.802)	6.213*** (0.658)	5.887*** (0.546)	7.455*** (0.716)	7.531*** (0.739)	7.786*** (0.730)	7.090*** (0.980)	7.409*** (1.091)
Observations	2,396	2,396	2,396	2,361	2,361	2,361	2,361	1,857
R ²	0.296	0.396	0.443	0.500	0.500	0.502	0.513	0.535
AIC	23199	22830	22637	22061	22062	22056	22004	17280
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Lagged Moving Average Intensity Weights

The main analyses are scaled using population weights. These models weight by the six-month lagged moving average of the intensity of insurgent violence.

Table A.17: Results With Six-Month Lagged Moving Average Intensity Weights

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.119*** (0.036)	-0.130*** (0.033)	-0.144*** (0.026)	-0.256*** (0.040)	-0.251*** (0.041)	-0.249*** (0.040)	-0.259*** (0.053)	-0.264*** (0.052)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	1.478 (1.209)	1.213 (0.858)	1.105 (1.062)	1.671 (1.249)	1.596 (1.256)	1.659 (1.254)	2.424 (1.883)	2.632 (1.991)
Observations	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,103
R ²	0.181	0.229	0.312	0.374	0.375	0.377	0.383	0.389
AIC	25161	24986	24660	24390	24389	24382	24354	17902
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Forward Moving Average Intensity Weights

The main analyses are scaled using population weights. These models weight by the six-month forward moving average of the intensity of insurgent violence. Results are nearly significant in column 1 ($p = 0.154$).

Table A.18: Results With Six-Month Forward Moving Average Intensity Weights

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.072 (0.050)	-0.074* (0.042)	-0.085* (0.043)	-0.194*** (0.046)	-0.193*** (0.046)	-0.190*** (0.045)	-0.202*** (0.059)	-0.203*** (0.059)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	3.777*** (0.752)	4.024*** (0.662)	4.005*** (0.802)	5.175*** (1.023)	5.202*** (1.023)	5.327*** (1.024)	6.690*** (1.193)	7.013*** (1.286)
Observations	3,021	3,021	3,021	2,959	2,959	2,959	2,959	2,145
R ²	0.191	0.239	0.302	0.376	0.376	0.377	0.384	0.391
AIC	26137	25950	25690	24866	24867	24865	24830	18049
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Coarsened Exact Matching

The main analyses are robust to matching on: the six-month lagged moving average of insurgent attacks and six categorical variables for trends in insurgent control in successive months. See Iacus, King, and Porro (2012) for details. The estimate is somewhat imprecise in column 3 ($p = 0.283$).

Table A.19: Results With Coarsened Exact Matching

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.090*** (0.031)	-0.094*** (0.032)	-0.057 (0.052)	-0.161*** (0.058)	-0.163*** (0.057)	-0.162*** (0.056)	-0.162*** (0.060)	-0.179** (0.071)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	1.693** (0.801)	1.421* (0.850)	1.055 (1.007)	1.307 (0.959)	1.298 (0.956)	1.366 (0.973)	1.597 (1.447)	1.751 (1.784)
Observations	1,408	1,408	1,408	1,408	1,408	1,408	1,408	1,201
R ²	0.187	0.236	0.276	0.355	0.356	0.357	0.362	0.376
AIC	11862	11776	11699	11539	11540	11538	11528	9922
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Omitting Population Weights

The main analyses are scaled using population weights. As Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge (2015) note, this may harm the precision of the estimates. The decision to scale estimates using population weights is not consequential for the results.

Table A.20: Results Without Population Weights

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.087** (0.037)	-0.088** (0.040)	-0.081** (0.033)	-0.142** (0.055)	-0.142** (0.055)	-0.142** (0.055)	-0.144** (0.057)	-0.145** (0.056)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	0.636*** (0.212)	0.397* (0.200)	0.317 (0.207)	0.366 (0.262)	0.362 (0.262)	0.364 (0.261)	0.246 (0.280)	0.399 (0.365)
Observations	3,521	3,521	3,521	3,458	3,458	3,458	3,458	2,468
R ²	0.077	0.187	0.225	0.266	0.267	0.267	0.275	0.286
AIC	26590	26144	25978	25382	25384	25385	25346	18832
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Time-Varying Population Weights

The main analyses are scaled using time-invariant population weights. These weights identify the population average effect but not heterogeneous effects by district population. Substantively identical results are obtained using time-varying population weights.

Table A.21: Results With Time-Varying Population Weights

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.069* (0.041)	-0.071* (0.040)	-0.075* (0.038)	-0.120** (0.057)	-0.120** (0.057)	-0.120** (0.057)	-0.121** (0.058)	-0.123** (0.057)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	1.015** (0.471)	0.832 (0.518)	0.795 (0.516)	0.904 (0.589)	0.899 (0.588)	0.899 (0.586)	0.966 (0.708)	1.012 (0.752)
Observations	3,521	3,521	3,521	3,458	3,458	3,458	3,458	2,468
R ²	0.124	0.226	0.267	0.296	0.296	0.296	0.301	0.310
AIC	23573	23135	22944	22451	22453	22454	22432	16430
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Province-Clustered Standard Errors

The main analyses use robust standard errors clustered by district. Substantively identical results emerge when I estimate models with standard errors clustered at the province level to allow for cross-district correlation within provinces.

Table A.22: Results With Province Clustering

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.103** (0.041)	-0.101** (0.040)	-0.096** (0.043)	-0.164** (0.068)	-0.164** (0.069)	-0.164** (0.068)	-0.177** (0.071)	-0.174** (0.075)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	0.879*** (0.082)	0.651*** (0.056)	0.583*** (0.062)	0.635*** (0.064)	0.623*** (0.066)	0.621*** (0.066)	0.825*** (0.144)	0.888*** (0.291)
Observations	3,521	3,521	3,521	3,458	3,458	3,458	3,458	2,468
R ²	0.120	0.219	0.283	0.318	0.318	0.318	0.326	0.345
AIC	24481	24062	23759	23224	23226	23227	23187	17007
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Province-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

MNF-I Command-Clustered Standard Errors

The main analyses use robust standard errors clustered by district. Substantively identical results emerge when I estimate models with standard errors clustered at the MNF-I division level to allow for cross-district and cross-province correlation within commands.

Table A.23: Results With MNF-I Command Clustering

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.103* (0.043)	-0.101* (0.042)	-0.096* (0.045)	-0.164* (0.073)	-0.164* (0.073)	-0.164* (0.073)	-0.177* (0.076)	-0.174* (0.081)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	0.879*** (0.086)	0.651*** (0.064)	0.583*** (0.070)	0.635*** (0.076)	0.623*** (0.077)	0.621*** (0.078)	0.825*** (0.170)	0.888* (0.361)
Observations	3,521	3,521	3,521	3,458	3,458	3,458	3,458	2,468
R ²	0.120	0.219	0.283	0.318	0.318	0.318	0.326	0.345
AIC	24481	24062	23759	23224	23226	23227	23187	17007
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MNF-I Command-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Omitting Months Before March 2006

The main analyses use all district-months from January 2004. Substantively identical results emerge when I estimate models using district-months from March 2006, the date of the first former detainee payment.

Table A.24: Results Without District-Months Before March 2006

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.105** (0.041)	-0.100** (0.038)	-0.097*** (0.036)	-0.160*** (0.055)	-0.160*** (0.055)	-0.160*** (0.055)	-0.174** (0.071)	-0.174** (0.069)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	2.096* (1.094)	1.633 (1.059)	1.452 (1.146)	1.544 (1.238)	1.536 (1.229)	1.532 (1.225)	2.142 (1.427)	2.652* (1.503)
Observations	2,009	2,009	2,009	2,009	2,009	2,009	2,009	1,525
R ²	0.090	0.137	0.210	0.243	0.243	0.243	0.254	0.279
AIC	14409	14302	14125	14041	14043	14045	14015	10863
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Omitting Districts That Never Spent on Release

The main analyses all district-months from January 2004 through December 2008. Substantively identical results emerge when I estimate models dropping all districts that never recorded a detainee release payment in that period.

Table A.25: Results Without Districts That Never Spent on Detainee Release

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.102** (0.040)	-0.101** (0.037)	-0.093*** (0.034)	-0.152** (0.056)	-0.152** (0.057)	-0.152** (0.056)	-0.184** (0.081)	-0.174** (0.077)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	2.440*** (0.590)	2.111*** (0.528)	2.004*** (0.479)	2.262*** (0.431)	2.257*** (0.431)	2.251*** (0.439)	2.988*** (0.865)	2.414*** (0.759)
Observations	1,169	1,169	1,169	1,148	1,148	1,148	1,148	1,058
R ²	0.208	0.343	0.505	0.525	0.525	0.525	0.546	0.580
AIC	8132	7914	7584	7423	7425	7426	7373	6840
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Detainee Population Weights

The main analyses are scaled using population weights. Substantively identical results are obtained using time-varying (but measured nationally, not at the district level), detainee population weights.

Table A.26: Results With Detainee Population Weights

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.097** (0.042)	-0.096** (0.045)	-0.090** (0.038)	-0.144** (0.059)	-0.144** (0.059)	-0.144** (0.059)	-0.147** (0.062)	-0.150** (0.062)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	0.741** (0.324)	0.480 (0.325)	0.448 (0.340)	0.487 (0.402)	0.486 (0.404)	0.489 (0.404)	0.324 (0.451)	0.524 (0.573)
Observations	3,395	3,395	3,395	3,332	3,332	3,332	3,332	2,342
R ²	0.073	0.170	0.209	0.239	0.239	0.239	0.248	0.261
AIC	25770	25393	25229	24669	24670	24671	24632	17965
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Including Outliers

The main analyses omit outliers. This decision is not consequential for the results.

Table A.27: Results With Outliers

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTS per 100k Pop.							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-0.086* (0.048)	-0.091** (0.041)	-0.081** (0.039)	-0.145** (0.057)	-0.145** (0.057)	-0.145** (0.057)	-0.157** (0.071)	-0.153** (0.066)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag					Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate						Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE							Y	Y
Constant	0.882* (0.497)	0.657 (0.550)	0.583 (0.552)	0.631 (0.618)	0.617 (0.614)	0.615 (0.610)	0.816 (0.798)	0.879 (0.802)
Observations	3,525	3,525	3,525	3,462	3,462	3,462	3,462	2,472
R ²	0.120	0.219	0.283	0.318	0.318	0.318	0.326	0.344
AIC	24511	24090	23786	23253	23254	23255	23217	17036
Sample:	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	All of Iraq	Excluding MND-SE Pre-2008

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

Dropping Individual Provinces and Districts

Below I test whether any provinces and districts where spending occurred are influential for results. Results are generally robust, though Diyala province, and specifically Al-Muqdadia district, is influential. Al-Muqdadia (and Diyala more broadly) was a hotbed of AQI activity, especially after the Anbar Awakening, and saw substantial counterinsurgent raiding, meaning many detainees were held there.

Figure A.28: Dropping Individual Provinces That Spent on Detainee Release





Figure A.29: Dropping Individual Districts That Spent on Detainee Release




Note: Estimates reflect the coefficient on detainee release spending per 1000 of district population. Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Model parameters follow those of column 8 in Table 3. The dropped district or province is listed along the x-axis.

Omitting Potentially Influential District-Months

Very large changes in detainee release spending are recorded in nine district-months. These are: Al-Muqdadia in November 2006 and April and June 2007; Al-Mahawil in July, September, and October 2007; and Balad in March and April 2007. I test whether these are influential on the overall relationship between detainee spending per capita and insurgent violence. To verify that none of these individual district-months is influential for the overall results, in Figure A.10 I repeat the preferred specification from column 8 of Table 3 while iteratively dropping each district-month.

Figure A.30: Iteratively Dropping Influential District-Months



Note: Estimates reflect the coefficient on detainee release spending per 1000 of district population. Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Model parameters follow those of column 8 in Table 3. The dropped district-month is listed along the x-axis.

To contextualize these results, I summarize politico-military dynamics in each of the nine district-months. Al-Muqdadia, in Diyala Province, was proximate to Baghdad, and linked into arms and foreign fighter networks. Al-Muqdadia was insurgent controlled throughout 2006 and early 2007, and contested thereafter. In September 2006, the Iraqi government halted fuel and food shipments to the district, and the district government collapsed completely in November. Through autumn 2006 and spring 2007, Coalition and Iraqi forces began to contest AQI in the district, carrying out numerous raids and arresting thousands of Sunni civilians (Kagan 2007a: 3-5). In the spring and summer of 2007, US forces engaged in shaping operations in Al-Muqdadia, prioritizing freedom of movement along the roads. Dozens of arms caches were discovered in this period, thanks largely to local civilian informing. US population-centric efforts, such as compensated detainee release, partly drove counterinsurgent successes. By autumn 2007, SOI were stood up in Al-Muqdadia, enhancing the discrimination of US arrests, and driving AQI north from Diyala (Kagan 2007b). Balad is a mixed sectarian area in Salah al-Din Province. In early 2007, US forces detected large movements of foreign fighters from Mosul into Balad. Numerous raids and arrests were carried out, targeting AQI facilitators in Balad in February and March 2007. At the same time, US forces engaged in more population-centric programming, like detainee release. In turn, US raids in February were precipitated by local informing (Kagan 2007a: 13). Al-Mahawil, in Babil Province, was the site of a forward operating base, Camp Kalsu, used as a non-theater internment facility. On September 29, 2007, \$50,000 in release pay was disbursed to individuals freed from detention at Camp Kalsu. This large, single day release was anomalous, and was explicitly tied to political considerations

surrounding the relationship between Coalition forces and two Shia paramilitaries: Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JaM) and Hadi al-Amiri’s Badr Organization. Most detainees released from Camp Kalsu in September 2007 were held following the Battle of Karbala. Occurring from August 27-29, 2007, the Battle of Karbala saw JaM fighters attack Badr Organization-affiliated Iraqi police. Polish Coalition troops were relieved by American forces during clashes with JaM. Thereafter, in the first two weeks of September 2007, US forces in southern Iraq began aggressively targeting suspected JaM members. At the same time, Sadr declared a unilateral JaM ceasefire; however, Sadr aides warned that the ceasefire would be called off if US troops continued detaining Shia (Yates 2007). Under pressure from the Iraqi government to maintain the JaM ceasefire, US forces released Shia suspects from Camp Kalsu on September 29, 2007, disbursing \$50,000 in release payments.

Subsetting to Individual Provinces

The core results use a full sample of district-months. In a series of regressions, I repeat the core specification while subsetting to different provinces where detainee release spending is observed. I find a distinguishable negative relationship between detainee release spending and insurgent violence in 6 of 11 provinces.

Table A.31: Results When Subsetting to Individual Provinces

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs per 100k Pop.										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Detainee Release Spending per 1000 Pop.	-1.351* (0.651)	-0.024** (0.007)	-0.023 (0.026)	-22.270*** (5.947)	-0.348*** (0.033)	-0.022 (0.054)	0.220 (2.051)	-0.028* (0.011)	0.696 (0.464)	-0.078* (0.031)	1.685 (1.439)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Sunni FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Specific Month x Shia FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lagged DV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spatial Lag	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
IED Clearance Rate	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Province x DCGDO FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	1.112 (1.536)	0.114 (0.136)	-0.096 (0.623)	-0.598*** (0.061)	5.483 (3.106)	0.188 (0.142)	-1.840 (1.181)	0.023 (0.072)	0.688 (0.959)	-0.553 (0.467)	-0.488 (0.275)
Observations	384	218	493	70	275	165	513	220	396	228	60
R ²	0.474	0.632	0.273	0.859	0.594	0.717	0.430	0.693	0.358	0.589	0.583
AIC	3007	983.5	3434	197.5	2180	400	3835	711.8	3732	1160	149.4
Sample:	Anbar	Babylon	Baghdad	Basrah	Diyala	Kerbala	Ninewa	Qadissiya	Salah al-Din	Tameem	Thi-Qar

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District-clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses. Parameters follow those in Table 3.

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