Pre-Analysis Plan
Could a Woman Have Gone to China?
Evidence of a Gendered Peace Premium*

Christopher W. Blair† and Joshua A. Schwartz‡

October 9, 2020

Contents

---

†PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, cwblair@sas.upenn.edu

‡PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, josha@sas.upenn.edu

1 Introduction

> "Sec. Clinton was very reluctant to move on [reconciliation with the Taliban]...If you want to be the first woman president you cannot leave any hint or doubt that you're not the toughest person on national security."
>
> — Barnett Rubin, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Many scholars argue that women are more inclined toward peace than men due to social norms and/or evolutionary biology, and thus a world with more female leaders should be more peaceful (Fukuyama 1998; Caprioli 2000; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; McDermott et al. 2007; Pinker 2011; Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017; Best, Shair-Rosenfield, and Wood 2019). This view is also shared by many prominent policymakers, like President Barack Obama (Chappell 2019). However, the above quote, from the former special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, suggests a more complicated dynamic (Whitlock 2019). Past research has shown that foreign policy doves face greater domestic political barriers than hawks—like Richard Nixon—to pursuing peace with foreign enemies (Nincic 1988; Cowen and Sutter 1998; Cukierman and Tommasi 1998; Schultz 2005; Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz 2018; Saunders 2018; Mattes and Weeks 2019). Is it similarly more difficult for female leaders to pursue peace than male leaders? For example, would it have been harder for a female U.S. president to pursue reconciliation with China, as Nixon did in 1972? If elected president, would Hillary Clinton have faced gender-related blowback if she sought peace with the Taliban? Given the growing prevalence of women in high political office around the world, outlined in Figure 1, this is an increasingly important question for both scholars and policymakers.

Building on previous work that examines the effect of a negotiator's gender on public evaluations of peace proposals (Maoz 2009; Anisman-Razin et al. 2018), we argue that conciliatory policies proposed by female leaders will be judged more harshly than proposals by male leaders. A pervasive stereotype that exists among members of the public is that women are weaker than men and thus less capable in the realm of national security (Rosenwasser and Dean 1989; Kahn 1992; Alexander and Anderson 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Lawless 2004; Dolan 2004, 2014; Falk and Kenski

Figure 1: Female Leadership is Becoming More Common Over Time

Note: This graph shows the average share of female executive officeholders worldwide by decade between 1880 and 2019, along with a fractional polynomial trend. Data on female executive officeholding come from Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) and REIGN (Bell 2020).

2006; Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister 2011). As a result, female leaders have political incentives to adopt more belligerent foreign policies in order to combat the perception that they are weak (Enloe 1990; Astin and Leland 1991; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Koch and Fulton 2011; Bauer 2017; Bashevkin 2018; Schramm and Stark 2020; Schwartz and Blair 2020) and prove their moderation to voters (Nincic 1988; Schultz 2005; Mattes and Weeks 2019). Additionally, because women are perceived as naturally predisposed to cooperation, the public will view their peace proposals as less likely to be in the national interest than the same proposal by a male leader (Cowen and Sutter 1998; Cukierman and Tommasi 1998; Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz 2018; Saunders 2018; Mattes and Weeks 2019). Essentially, by acting according to type, female leaders' conciliatory policies will be seen as less credible.

To isolate the effects of a leader's gender on public evaluations of peace proposals, we plan on conducting a survey experiment. Experiments help overcome two related issues that limit the feasibility of inference from observational data. The first issue relates to

sample size. Since female leadership and peace agreements are historically rare, there are simply not many cases to examine. The second and more important issue relates to selection effects (Reiter 2014). It is not random which women rise to high political office,[1] or which policies they choose to undertake. For example, if female leaders face greater public blowback for proposing conciliatory policies, then to avoid punishment they may do so only in cases where blowback is unlikely. By contrast, in an experimental setting we can randomly vary a leader's gender, while holding other factors—like the leader's partisan affiliation and foreign policy type—constant.

Overall, this project makes several contributions. First, we extend the literature on playing against type and whether only Nixon could go to China by applying its logic to an important empirical trend: the growing number of women in high political office around the world. This literature has examined whether hawks and/or Republicans (Trager and Vavreck 2011) have an advantage in pursing reconciliation with enemies, but has not analyzed the impact of leader gender.

Second, this study has important implications for debates about whether increasing gender equality in executive officeholding will lead to less belligerent foreign policies and more peace, or the reverse. Supporters of the "women-as-peacemakers" view, like Steven Pinker, argue, "Over the long sweep of history, women have been and will be a pacifying force. Traditional war is a man's game" (Pinker 2011: 527). Alternatively, supporters of the "iron ladies" view contend that more belligerent female leaders are selected into office (Enloe 1990), and that once in office, female executives face incentives to combat gender stereotypes by adopting hawkish policies (Koch and Fulton 2011; Bashevkin 2018; Schramm and Stark 2020; Schwartz and Blair 2020). If women do indeed face greater domestic political barriers to adopting conciliatory policies, then that would complicate the relationship between female leadership and peace. Female heads of state would have political incentives to avoid pursuing peace, in accordance with the iron ladies view and Hillary Clinton's alleged reluctance to pursue reconciliation with the Taliban. This dynamic would not make it impossible for female executives to seek and achieve peace

---

[1]For example, many female leaders come from political families or dynasties (Jalalzai 2013; Baturo and Gray 2018)

(Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz 2018), but it would make it more difficult and costly politically than the women-as-peacemakers school of thought assumes. Compared to male leaders, female leaders may have to pay a "premium" in terms of domestic political support in order to achieve peace.

2 Theory & Hypotheses

2.1 The Dove's Disadvantage

The primary difference between a foreign policy hawk and a dove is that hawks are more likely to support the use of military force to solve international conflicts. A similar distinction may also generally hold for men and women. A large volume of public polling indicates that women are less likely to support the use of force internationally than men (e.g., Holsti and Rosenau 1981; Conover and Sapiro 1993; Togeby 1994; Wilcox et al. 1996; Eichenberg 2003). This contrast, whether due to socialization processes (Enloe 1990; Caprioli 2000; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Goldstein 2001), bioevolutionary factors (Fukuyama 1998; McDermott et al. 2007; Pinker 2011), or both, is one reason why many scholars and policymakers believe a world with more female leaders would be more pacific. Since women are more likely to *want* peace, a greater number of female heads of state should translate into more peaceful outcomes.

Counter to this intuition, past research indicates that those that want peace the most—or are perceived as wanting it the most—face the greatest domestic political barriers to achieving it (Nincic 1988; Cowen and Sutter 1998; Cukierman and Tommasi 1998; Schultz 2005; Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz 2018; Saunders 2018; Mattes and Weeks 2019). Specifically, two causal mechanisms explain why it is more difficult for doves to pursue reconciliation with foreign enemies than hawks: moderation and policy credibility (Mattes and Weeks 2019). With respect to moderation, politicians have incentives to prove to their constituents that they do not have extreme foreign policy preferences (Nincic 1988; Russett 1990; Schultz 2005). Consequently, hawks can demonstrate moderation and elicit public approval by making peace with enemies. Doves that pursue peace,

on the other hand, may be perceived as extremists and lose support. For example, one reason Barack Obama—a relative dove, especially with respect to the Iraq War—decided to surge troops in Afghanistan in 2009 was to maintain the military's support (Woodward 2010). As a dove, public criticism from the military would be particularly harmful to Obama's standing among the general public (Saunders 2018).

With respect to policy credibility, the idea that "only Nixon could go to China" rests on the fact that Nixon was a hawk and thus not ideologically predisposed to reconciliation. If even someone as hawkish as Nixon was willing to buck their natural instinct and attempt rapprochement with China, then it must be in the national interest (Cowen and Sutter 1998; Cukierman and Tommasi 1998). Alternatively, if a dove—like Hubert Humphrey—had pursued the same policy, then the public would be uncertain whether they were doing so for purely ideological reasons or because the policy was truly in the national interest. The opposite is also true: an aggressive policy advocated by doves will be seen as more credibly in the national interest. For example, Colin Powell's hawkish speech to the United Nations regarding Iraq in 2003 was credible precisely because he was a relative dove on Iraq (Saunders 2018).

2.2   Female Leaders' Disadvantage

As a result of the same two mechanisms—moderation and policy credibility—we argue that female leaders also face greater domestic political barriers to pursuing peace.[2] As we explain in more detail below, the fact that female leaders are perceived as weaker than male leaders and naturally predisposed to cooperation[3] suggests that female executives who propose conciliatory policies will be perceived as more extreme and their proposals will be viewed as less credibly in the national interest.

Of course, a second possibility exists, which is that a leader's gender will not have

———————————————————

[2] While recognizing the spectrum of gender identity, we presume a gender dichotomy for the purposes of this article for analytical simplicity.

[3] The gender gap on support for the use of military force provides some evidence that women may generally be predisposed towards peace, but we are indifferent about whether women are actually inclined toward cooperation or just perceived to be. For the purposes of public opinion and our study, perception is more important than reality.

an independent effect from their foreign policy type (hawk or dove). Mattes and Weeks (2019) find a leader's partisan identification (Republican or Democrat) does not have an independent effect from their foreign policy type, and thus the same may be true for gender. Similarly, in conjoint experiments on the Israeli and American publics, Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo (2020) find that the electoral impact of a leader's foreign policy type is much greater than their gender. On balance, however, we expect a leader's gender to have an independent effect because gender stereotypes may hold irrespective of a leader's foreign policy type. For example, we would expect a relatively hawkish female leader—like Hillary Clinton—to be perceived as weaker than a similarly hawkish male leader—like John Kerry or Jon Tester.[4] Consequently, this discussion suggests the following hypothesis:[5]

> H_1 **(Female Disadvantage): Female leaders will face a greater penalty/lower reward than male leaders for pursuing a conciliatory policy toward a distrusted adversary.**

Second, we hypothesize that there may be an additive effect between a leader's gender and their foreign policy type. Specifically, dovish female leaders may face especially large barriers to pursuing peace, and hawkish male leaders may face especially low barriers. This logic is summarized in the following hypotheses and in Table 1:

> H_2 **(Dovish Female Disadvantage): Dovish female leaders will face the greatest penalty/lowest reward for pursuing a conciliatory policy toward a distrusted adversary.**

> H_3 **(Hawkish Male Advantage): Hawkish male leaders will face the lowest penalty/highest reward for pursuing a conciliatory policy toward a distrusted adversary.**

---

[4]Bendix and Jeong (2019) calculate foreign policy scores for each member of Congress from 1993 to 2016, with higher scores indicating greater hawkishness. Hillary Clinton's average score during her time in the Senate was -1.502, John Kerry's was -1.419, and Jon Tester's was -1.496.

[5]A third possibility is that female leaders will be penalized less for pursuing conciliatory policies, as domestic audiences may punish inconsistency and reward consistency (Chioza and Choi 2003; Tomz 2007). However, Mattes and Weeks (2019) test this hypothesis with respect to a leader's foreign policy type and find evidence for the opposite.

Table 1: Leader Gender & Foreign Policy Type

		Leader Foreign Policy Type	
		Hawk	Dove
Leader Gender	Male	Lowest Barriers to Peace	Intermediate Barriers to Peace
	Female	Intermediate Barriers to Peace	Highest Barriers to Peace

2.3   Causal Mechanisms

2.3.1   Moderation

Many studies have found that the public views female leaders as weaker than men and consequently less competent in national security affairs (Rosenwasser and Dean 1989; Kahn 1992; Alexander and Anderson 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Lawless 2004; Dolan 2004, 2014; Falk and Kenski 2006; Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister 2011). Therefore, like doves, female leaders have political incentives to adopt more belligerent foreign policies in order to combat the perception that they are weak and demonstrate their moderation to voters. Even if individuals do not personally subscribe to gender stereotypes, they may believe that other individuals and world leaders hold gender stereotypes. These second-order beliefs, or beliefs about what others believe, can also put political pressure on female leaders to adopt relatively hawkish policies (Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014; Mildenberger and Tingley 2019). For example, if U.S. citizens believe foreign leaders view a female commander-in-chief as relatively weak, then they may want female executive to pursue a belligerent foreign policy in order to prove their "toughness" to foreign leaders.

In accordance with this view, Schwartz and Blair (2020) find the public punishes female leaders less than male leaders for belligerence (i.e., threatening force against an aggressive state), and punishes them more for inconsistency (i.e., making a threat against an aggressive state and then failing to follow through).[6] Koch and Fulton (2011) find that female chief executives are more likely to engage in conflict behavior and increase defense spending than male chief executives. Schramm and Stark (2020) analyze militarized

---

[6]Though male leaders facing female opponents also pay lower belligerence costs and greater inconsistency costs compared to male leaders facing male opponents. See Kertzer and Brutger (2016) for additional information on the distinction between belligerence and inconsistency.

interstate disputes (MIDs) and find that female leaders are more likely to initiate disputes than male leaders.[7] High-ranking female bureaucrats in the Departments of Defense and State—like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Madeline Albright, Condoleezza Rice, and Hillary Clinton—also often advocate more aggressive foreign policies than their male counterparts (McGlen and Sarkees 1993; Bashevkin 2018). Even in the medieval period, married queens were more likely than kings to be aggressors in interstate conflicts (Dube and Harish forthcoming). In sum, these studies suggest that female leaders have political incentives to demonstrate toughness in order to prove to their constituents that they are capable commander-in-chiefs and that they do not have extreme foreign policy preferences (Nincic 1988; Russett 1990; Schultz 2005). This logic leads to the following hypothesis:

> H_4 (Moderation): Voters who observe a female leader carrying out a conciliatory policy are less likely to conclude that the leader is moderate than voters who observe a male leader carrying out the same policy.

2.3.2 Policy Credibility

Since first- and second-order beliefs suggest that women are perceived as naturally weak and predisposed to avoiding the use of military force, we also argue the public will view their peace proposals as less likely to be in the national interest than the same proposal by a male leader. If a female leader proposes a conciliatory policy, then the public may assume they are doing so not because it is the optimal policy, but because they are inclined toward peace. Studies by Maoz (2009) and Anisman-Razin et al. (2018) provide direct evidence for this dynamic. Maoz (2009) conducts a 2 x 2 experiment where 80 Jewish-Israeli university students are presented with a peace plan to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The factors varied were the identity of the proposer (Israeli or Palestinian) and the genders of the group of political leaders that proposed the peace plan (male or female).[8] Maoz (2009) finds that respondents view the peace plan offered

---

[7]See also Powell and Mukazhanova-Powell (2019), who find that female leaders are more likely to initiate MIDs when governing in states with low levels of status for women.

[8]In the experiment, the peace plan was proposed by a "think tank of Israeli/Palestinian male/female political leaders."

by Israeli male political leaders as more beneficial to Israel than the same plan offered by Israeli female political leaders. In other words, a peace proposal by female leaders was seen as less in the national interest than the same proposal by male leaders. Anisman-Razin et al. (2018) conduct two separate experiments and find similar results. The first study asks 100 Jewish-Israeli university students to evaluate a proposal concerning the allocation of precious water resources between the Israelis and Palestinians. The gender of the head of the Israeli negotiating team was experimentally manipulated, along with their level of military experience. Support for the water allocation proposal was found to be greater when the lead negotiator was a man rather than a woman. Furthermore, while military experience held by a male lead negotiator increased support for the proposal, the same military experience held by a female lead negotiator did not. The same results are found in the second study, which surveyed 120 Jewish-Israelis recruited in a mall, and asked respondents to evaluate the same water allocation proposal, as well as a separate plan aimed at restarting general peace negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians.[9] This discussion suggests the following hypothesis:

H_5 **(Policy Credibility): Voters are less likely to believe that a conciliatory policy is wise when it is carried out by a female rather than by a male leader.**

2.3.3 Other Relevant Mechanisms

Although we expect moderation and policy credibility, per Mattes and Weeks (2019), to be the primary mechanisms driving our central hypothesis (H_1), two other related mechanisms may be at work. First, female leaders that pursue peace may be viewed as less competent in general than male leaders that do the same. The reason being that female leaders are often viewed as weaker and less competent in the realm of national security than male leaders, and thus pursuing a conciliatory policy towards a distrusted adversary may activate these gender stereotypes. This is a very similar mecha-

---

[9]Anisman-Razin et al. (2018) also conduct a third study where members of the British public are presented with a plan for how the European Union should deal with refugees coming from war zones. This study does not find that the lead negotiator's gender has any significant effect, except among respondents that scored high in a measure sexism. However, since the scenario presented in this experiment did not relate to a peace or conciliatory proposal with an enemy, the gender dynamics may be different.

nism to policy credibility, but more general since it relates less specifically to the leader's China policy:

> H_6 **(Competence): Voters who observe a female leader carrying out a conciliatory policy are less likely to conclude that the leader is competent than voters who observe a male leader carrying out the same policy.**

Second, because female leaders are often viewed as "weaker" than men, we expect that female leaders that pursue peace will activate this stereotype and be perceived as less tough than male leaders that pursue the same policy:

> H_7 **(Toughness): Voters who observe a female leader carrying out a conciliatory policy are less likely to conclude that the leader is tough than voters who observe a male leader carrying out the same policy.**

Finally, we expect that female leaders that pursue peace may be seen as less trustworthy than male leaders that do so:

> H_8 **(Trustworthiness): Voters who observe a female leader carrying out a conciliatory policy are less likely to conclude that the leader is trustworthy than voters who observe a male leader carrying out the same policy.**

2.4   Heterogeneous Effects

We propose several additional hypotheses with respect to key attitudinal variables. First, one key factor that may moderate the effect of leader gender on public evaluations of peace proposals is sexism. Specifically, since respondents that score higher in measures of sexism are more likely to hold first-order beliefs about women's weakness in foreign affairs and lack of fit for the role of commander-in-chief, they may be more likely to punish female leaders for pursuing peace than male leaders:

> H_9 **(Fist-Order Sexist Beliefs): The female disadvantage with respect to pursuing peace should be greater among more sexist respondents.**[10]

---

[10]We will also examine whether different types of sexism—namely hostile and benevolent sexism—affect this relationship.

Despite the above logic, there are several reasons why we might expect to find no significant heterogeneous effects based on respondent sexism. Most importantly, if respondents hold second-order beliefs that others (e.g., foreign leaders) would react negatively to a peace proposal made by a female leader, then that could drive the female disadvantage with respect to pursuing peace rather than first-order sexist beliefs. This logic, for example, is consistent with the null result for the impact of sexism found by Schwartz and Blair (2020).

We also expect that hostile sexists in particular will express greater opposition to female leaders in general, no matter what strategy they pursue. This would be consistent with Winter (2018), who found that hostile sexism generates opposition to women candidates relative to male candidates no matter their personal characteristics or policies:

> H_{10} **(First-Order Hostile Sexist Beliefs): Hostile sexists will be more likely to disapprove of female leaders than male leaders, irrespective of which policy they adopt vis-à-vis China.**

Third, since second-order beliefs could also drive the female disadvantage, we expect that respondents who believe foreign leaders and/or other Americans hold sexist views will be more likely to disapprove of female leaders pursuing peace:

> H_{11} **(Second-Order Sexists Beliefs): The female disadvantage with respect to pursuing peace should be greater among respondents that hold stronger second-order sexist beliefs.**

Another important and potentially relevant attitudinal factor is an individual's level of militant assertiveness (e.g., Kertzer and Brutger 2016). After controlling for sexism, we do *not* expect that respondents high in militant assertiveness (i.e., more hawkish) will impose a greater penalty on female leaders for pursuing a conciliatory policy relative to male leaders. However, given that individuals high in militant assertiveness are less likely to support pursuing peace in general—regardless of the gender of the leader proposing it—we expect the following hypothesis to hold:

> H_{12} **(Militant Assertiveness): Individuals high in militant assertiveness are more likely to oppose leaders pursuing a conciliatory policy relative to those that maintain the status quo, regardless of leader gender.**

The same, we believe, will hold true for Republican respondents relative to Democratic respondents:

> H_{13} **(Party Identification): Republican respondents are more likely to oppose leaders pursuing a conciliatory policy relative to those that maintain the status quo, regardless of leader gender.**

3 Experimental Design

In order to test our hypotheses, we designed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment. In order to maximize comparability, the design and wording of the experiment closely follow that of the seminal experiment on hawks, doves, and peace conducted by Mattes and Weeks (2019). The factors we vary are: the U.S. president's gender (male or female); the U.S. president's partisan affiliation (Republican or Democrat); the U.S. president's foreign policy type (hawk or dove); and the U.S. president's policy choice (status quo or conciliatory). We block on respondent partisan identification and gender to ensure an approximately equal number of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, as well as men and women, in each experimental cell.

Every respondent is presented with the following introduction, which is identical to Mattes and Weeks (2019):

> We are going to describe a situation the U.S. could face in the future, in 2027. Some parts of the description may seem important to you; other parts may seem unimportant.

We have our scenario take place in the future so that subjects will be less likely to make assumptions about the identity of the president. In particular, 2027 takes place after a hypothetical second term by Donald Trump.

After the introduction, we present respondents with information about the U.S. president. Again, this information is exactly the same as presented in Mattes and Weeks (2019), *except* that we manipulate the gender of the U.S. president, while Mattes and Weeks (2019) hold it constant.[11]

_____

[11] We make one additional change, which is to say the president took office after serving in the *Congress* for

The year is 2027. The U.S. President is [Eric/Erica, Steven/Stephanie] Richards. President Richards took office in 2025 after serving in the U.S. Congress for several years. [He/She] is a lifelong member of the [Republican/Democratic] party. President Richards has a reputation for [hawk/dove].

The hawk and dove treatment corresponds to the following:

Hawk: ...favoring military solutions over diplomatic ones. [He/She] has repeatedly emphasized that military force is essential to protecting American national security. President Richards says that [he/she] will not shy away from using force where necessary. [He/She] has long said that "the only way to achieve peace is to be ready for war."

Dove: ...favoring diplomatic solutions over military ones. [He/She] has repeatedly emphasized that military force is not the answer to protecting American national security. President Richards says that [he/she] believes in diplomacy and negotiations and will use military force only as a last resort. [He/She] has long said that "the only way to achieve peace is to act peacefully."

Although we are most interested in the effects of a leader's gender, it is important to control for their partisan identification and foreign policy type. The strength of experiments is internal validity, but they are not entirely immune from confounding. One important source of confounding is a lack of information equivalence, where manipulating one factor (e.g., gender) leads respondents to update their beliefs about other relevant, but not experimentally manipulated or controlled, dimensions (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2018). For example, since women are often perceived as more liberal than men, respondents might automatically assume that female leaders are more likely to be Democrats than male leaders (McDermott 1997; Koch 2000; Lawless 2004; Hayes 2011). If this is the case, then it could be partisan identification that drives higher domestic barriers to peace for female leaders rather than gender. Similarly, if a leader's gender does not have an independent effect from their foreign policy type, then failing to control for this factor could lead to incorrect inferences. This is an important limitation of the studies by Maoz (2009) and Anisman-Razin et al. (2018), which do not control

several years rather than in the _Senate_ for _six_ years. Given the additional background information we provide on the U.S. president compared to Mattes and Weeks (2019), we were concerned that providing a specific number of years the president served in the Senate would cause respondents to make assumptions about the identity of the president. In particular, a number of prominent female Senators ran for the Democratic nomination for president in 2020: Elizabeth Warren, Amy Klobuchar, Kamala Harris, and Kirsten Gillibrand.

for party identification or foreign policy type. As a result, respondents may believe that the women referenced in their study are more likely to belong to the Israeli Labor party and be dovish, while the men are more likely to belong to the Israeli Likud Party and be hawkish. Note that Anisman-Razin et al. (2018) do control for the lead negotiator's experience, which is important because survey subjects may assume a woman has less experience than a man. We also control for a leader's experience. All U.S. presidents served "in the U.S. Congress for several years."

In order to prime gender, we experimentally manipulate the name of the U.S. president and their gender pronoun in the same manner as Schwartz and Blair (2020). The name combinations we utilize are similar, but clearly prime gender (MacNell, Driscoll, and Hunt 2015). They should not, however, prime any notable politician, as no former U.S. presidents or vice presidents share any of the names we employ. Although our experimental scenario takes place in the future, one potential concern with this design is that the U.S. has never had a female president in the past. Nevertheless, we are optimistic about the prospect that respondents will approach scenarios describing female presidents seriously. In three of the last four U.S. presidential elections, a woman has served as a major party presidential or vice presidential nominee, and in all four of the last U.S. presidential elections, female candidates have made serious primary bids.[12] Consequently, even though the U.S. has never had a female president, we think concerns that respondents did not take our prompt seriously are mitigated because of the realistic possibility of a female president.

Following Mattes and Weeks (2019), subjects are then told about conflict between the U.S. and China in the Arctic, as well as each country's relative military capabilities:

> A major security concern for the U.S. in 2027 is its very tense relationship with China. China remains a non-democracy. In 2027, the Chinese military is equally strong as the U.S. military. The U.S. and China disagree over many important foreign policy issues.

---

[12]In the 2008 election, Sarah Palin was the Republican vice presidential nominee, and Hillary Clinton was a Democratic primary candidate. In the 2012 election, Michele Bachmann was a Republican primary candidate. In the 2016 election, Hillary Clinton was the Democratic presidential nominee, and Carly Fiorina was a Republican primary candidate. In the 2020 election, Kamala Harris was the Democratic vice presidential nominee, and a historic number of women ran for the Democratic nomination.

One very tense issue is access to the Arctic. The Arctic contains up to 40 percent of the world's oil and gas resources and provides vital shipping routes between continents. In 2027, the U.S. and China both have a major military presence in the Arctic. Each country has thousands of troops in the area and holds frequent military exercises in the region.

For over a decade, the U.S. public has rated China one of America's "greatest enemies,"[13] and the Trump Administration labeled China a "competitor" and "revisionist" power in their 2017 National Security Strategy.[14] Conflict with China in 2027 is therefore quite plausible. Per Mattes and Weeks (2019), conflict in the Arctic is chosen over other alternatives like the South China Sea or Taiwan because it should not prime concerns about the abandonment of allies. Next, respondents are informed that:

In [his/her] 2027 State of the Union speech, President Richards declares that getting China to cooperate is important for achieving U.S. foreign policy goals.

Finally, we experimentally vary whether the president adopts a conciliatory policy towards China, or maintains the status quo. As described by Mattes and Weeks (2019), it is necessary to include the status quo condition in order to determine whether public disapproval for a leader is conditional on the policy chosen. Without including this factor, it would be impossible to distinguish between two possibilities: (1) female leaders are punished more than male leaders for pursuing conciliatory policies compared to more hardline policies, as we hypothesize; or (2) the public prefers male foreign policy leadership, and so support for male leaders' policies—whether conciliatory or hardline—is generally higher. This is another important limitation of the studies by Maoz (2009) and Anisman-Razin et al. (2018), which do not compare conciliatory policies by Israeli leaders to the status quo. The conciliatory and status quo policy treatments are the following:

Conciliatory: The president announces that [he/she] is sharply reducing the U.S. military presence in the Arctic. [He/She] is withdrawing a third of the U.S. forces currently in the Arctic and is calling off planned military exercises in the region.

---

[13]See https://news.gallup.com/poll/1627/china.aspx.

[14]See https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

Status Quo: The president announces that [he/she] is maintaining the current U.S. military presence in the Arctic. [He/She] will continue to keep U.S. forces in the Arctic and will carry through with planned military exercises in the region.

Our outcome measure is a 7-point Likerts scale that measures to what extent respondents "approve of how President Richards is doing [his/her] job."[15] Following Mattes and Weeks (2019), we then ask questions designed to test our hypothesized causal mechanisms. To test the moderation mechanism, we ask respondents whether they believe (a) President Richards is a "pacifist," or (b) President Richards is a "warmonger." Agreement with either statement suggests respondents believe the president is extreme. To test the policy credibility mechanism, we ask respondents to what extent they agree with the statement that "President Richards chose the best strategy for dealing with China." Stronger agreement indicates greater policy credibility.

Finally, as one last test, we control for the outcome of the conciliation attempt.[16] Specifically, after recording respondents' assessments of President Richards's performance, we inform survey subjects that the conciliation attempt was successful:

Outcome (Success): Soon after President Richards's announcement, the Chinese leader pulls Chinese military forces out of the Arctic and says that he will cooperate with the U.S. in sharing natural resources in that region. He also cancels all military exercises.

This is an important test, as one possibility is that female leaders are punished more than male leaders for *proposing* conciliatory policies, but this disparity evaporates if the conciliatory policy is successful (Clare 2014). Mattes and Weeks (2019) found that the dove disadvantage remains when accounting for outcome, casting doubt on this possibility, but perhaps the dynamics are different with gender. Respondents are then asked again about their views on President Richards.

---

[15]Mattes and Weeks (2019) utilize a 5-point scale of approval, but we choose to employ a 7-point scale (in accordance with the audience cost literature) in order to maximize variation and potentially detect smaller differences in approval (Tomz 2007).

[16]Mattes and Weeks (2019) go a step beyond this and experimentally manipulate whether the conciliatory attempt leads to success or failure. We simply control for this factor in order to maximize experimental power.

3.1   Attention and Confounding

Following standard practice, we include manipulation check questions to measure whether respondents are carefully reading their assigned scenarios and have actually received the treatment. For example, at the end of the survey we ask respondents to recall the name of the US president, the president's policy choice, and whether the president usually favors military solutions or diplomatic ones.

At the beginning of the survey, we also include an attention check question that respondents must pass to continue with the survey. The attention check question is relatively easy and comes directly from Berinsky et al. (2019). Specifically, it is embedded in our grid of questions regarding foreign policy preferences and simply instructs respondents to "please select neither agree nor disagree." Since this is a relatively easy question for subjects that are actually reading our prompts, this "screener" should simply help us identify and remove respondents paying a low amount of attention, while leaving moderate to high attention respondents in our sample (Berinsky et al. 2014; 2019). Note, however, that removing some respondents should not result in a skewed sample from a demographic perspective, as Lucid's theorem will still generate a representative sample even if some sub-groups (e.g., older and male respondents) are more likely than others to fail the attention check.[17]

In order to protect against a lack of information equivalence (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2018), we also ask respondents a placebo question at the end of the survey about what race they believe the president is. We do so because it is possible respondents will think that female presidents are more likely to be nonwhite than male presidents. If this is the case, then it could be racial stereotypes that drive the female disadvantage in pursuing peace rather than gender.

---

[17]See section four for more details on how Lucid generates representative samples.

3.2   Questionnaire

[Demographic Information Collected by Lucid]

Sexism (red = hostile; blue = benevolent; orange = second-order)[18]

1. Please select the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Feminists are making reasonable demands of men.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Women must overcome more obstacles than men to be professionally successful.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Women who complain about discrimination often cause more problems than they solve.	○	○	○	○	○	○
When women demand equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Compared to men, women tend to have a superior moral sensibility.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Men have no special obligation to provide financially for the women in their lives.	○	○	○	○	○	○
There is no need for men to cherish or protect women.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Other American citizens hold sexist views.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Foreign leaders hold sexist views.	○	○	○	○	○	○

---

[18]We randomize the question order and half of respondents received these questions pre-treatment and half post-treatment.

Foreign Policy Dispositions[19]

2. Please select the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:

	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
The best way to ensure world peace is through American military strength.	○	○	○	○	○
Going to war is unfortunate, but sometimes the only solution to international problems.	○	○	○	○	○
The use of military force only makes problems worse.	○	○	○	○	○
Please select "neither agree nor disagree."	○	○	○	○	○

Introduction

Remember to read closely and pay attention, as at the end of this study you will be asked questions to check your memory and comprehension.

We are going to describe a situation the U.S. could face in the future, in 2027. Some parts of the description may seem important to you; other parts may seem unimportant.

Background Information on the US President

The year is 2027. The U.S. President is [Eric/Erica, Steven/Stephanie] Richards. President Richards took office in 2025 after serving in the U.S. Congress for several years. [He/She] is a lifelong member of the [Republican/Democratic] party. President Richards has a reputation for [hawk/dove].

> *Hawk*: ...favoring military solutions over diplomatic ones. [He/She] has repeatedly emphasized that military force is essential to protecting American national security. President Richards says that [he/she] will not shy away from using force where necessary. [He/She] has long said that "the only way to achieve peace is to be ready for war."

> *Dove*: ...favoring diplomatic solutions over military ones. [He/She] has repeatedly emphasized that military force is not the answer to protecting American national security. President Richards says that [he/she] believes in diplomacy and negotiations and will use military force only as a last resort. [He/She] has long said that "the only way to achieve peace is to act peacefully."

---

[19]We randomzie the question order.

Background Information on the US-China Conflict

A major security concern for the U.S. in 2027 is its very tense relationship with China. China remains a non-democracy. In 2027, the Chinese military is equally strong as the U.S. military. The U.S. and China disagree over many important foreign policy issues.

One very tense issue is access to the Arctic. The Arctic contains up to 40 percent of the world's oil and gas resources and provides vital shipping routes between continents. In 2027, the U.S. and China both have a major military presence in the Arctic. Each country has thousands of troops in the area and holds frequent military exercises in the region.

President's China Policy

In [his/her] 2027 State of the Union speech, President Richards declares that getting China to cooperate is important for achieving U.S. foreign policy goals.

The president announces that [he/she] is [status quo/conciliatory]

> *Status Quo*: ...maintaining the current U.S. military presence in the Arctic. [He/She] will continue to keep U.S. forces in the Arctic and will carry through with planned military exercises in the region.

> *Conciliatory*: ...sharply reducing the U.S. military presence in the Arctic. [He/She] is withdrawing a third of the U.S. forces currently in the Arctic and is calling off planned military exercises in the region.

Dependent Variables

To summarize:

- The year is 2027. The U.S. President is [Eric/Erica, Steven/Stephanie] Richards, a [Republican/Democrat].

- President Richards [usually favors military solutions over diplomatic ones/usually favors diplomatic solutions over military ones].

- The U.S. and China disagree about many issues, including the Arctic. Relations between the two countries are very tense.

- President Richards announces that [he/she] is [maintaining the U.S. military presence in the Arctic/sharply reducing the U.S. military presence in the Arctic].

3. Based on this information, do you approve of how President Richards is doing [his/her] job?

Strongly Disapprove	Disapprove	Somewhat Disapprove	Neither Approve Nor Disapprove	Somewhat Approve	Approve	Strongly Approve
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

4. Please write down four words that you believe describe the US President in this situation.

[＿＿＿] [＿＿＿] [＿＿＿] [＿＿＿]

5. President Richards chose the best strategy for dealing with China.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

6. President Richards is a pacifist.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

7. President Richards is a warmonger.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

8. President Richards is competent.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

9. President Richards is tough.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

10. President Richards is trustworthy.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

China's Response

Here is another summary of the situation, for your reference:

- The year is 2027. The U.S. President is [Eric/Erica, Steven/Stephanie] Richards, a [Republican/Democrat].

- President Richards [usually favors military solutions over diplomatic ones/usually favors diplomatic solutions over military ones].

- The U.S. and China disagree about many issues, including the Arctic. Relations between the two countries are very tense.

- President Richards announces that [he/she] is [maintaining the U.S. military presence in the Arctic/sharply reducing the U.S. military presence in the Arctic].

Here is what happened next:

Soon after President Richards' announcement, the Chinese leader pulls Chinese military forces out of the Arctic and says that he will cooperate with the U.S. in sharing natural resources in that region. He also cancels all military exercises.

11. Based on this information, do you approve of how President Richards is doing [his/her] job?

Strongly Disapprove	Disapprove	Somewhat Disapprove	Neither Approve Nor Disapprove	Somewhat Approve	Approve	Strongly Approve
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

12. President Richards chose the best strategy for dealing with China.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
○	○	○	○	○	○	○

13. President Richards is a pacifist.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
○	○	○	○	○	○	○

14. President Richards is a warmonger.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Manipulation Check/Placebo Questions:

15. What was the name of the US President?

Eric	Erica	Steven	Stephanie	None of the Above
○	○	○	○	○

16. President Richards...

Decreased the U.S. military presence in the Arctic	Maintained the U.S. military presence in the Arctic	Not Sure
○	○	○

17. President Richards...

Usually favors diplomatic solutions over military ones	Usually favors military solutions over diplomatic ones	Not Sure
◯	◯	◯

18. What is your best guess of what race the US President is?

Caucasian/ White	African American/ Black	Asian	Hispanic/ Latinx	Other
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

4   Sample

In this study, the population of interest is all American adults aged 18 or older. We will field our survey experiment on Lucid and aim for about 1,200 respondents, which is the same size as the experiment by Mattes and Weeks (2019) and thus should give us sufficient power. Lucid generates representative samples based on age, gender, ethnicity, and region, and has been shown to perform well replicating previous studies (Coppock and McClellan 2019).

5   Estimation

5.1   Variables

In order to measure sexism, we use Winter's (2018) eight-question index of sexism based on the sexism inventory from Glick and Fiske (1996). The index includes an equal number of forward and reverse-coded items, and includes four questions designed to measure hostile sexism and four questions to measure benevolent sexism.[20] We also designed questions meant to probe respondents' second-order beliefs about gender, which has been

---

[20]We randomly assign whether respondents receive the sexism battery pre or post-treatment given the possibility of ordering effects.

done in previous research on gender (Dustan, Koutout, and Leo 2019), as well as prominent research on climate (Mildenberger and Tingley 2019). Following Herrmann, Tetlock, and Viser (1999) and Kertzer and Brutger (2016), we measure militant assertiveness with a three-question index. For analysis, we define low and high levels of first-order gender beliefs, second-order gender beliefs, and militant assertiveness using the interquartile range or the median split.

5.2 Treatment Effects

If H_1, our argument that female leaders face a disadvantage in pursuing conciliation with foreign adversaries, is correct, then the following should hold:

$$Disapproval_{(Conciliatory|Female)} - Disapproval_{(StatusQuo|Female)}$$

$$>$$

$$Disapproval_{(Conciliatory|Male)} - Disapproval_{(StatusQuo|Male)}$$

Alternatively, if foreign policy type swamps gender, then there should be no statistically significant difference between these quantities. We will examine the above inequality both unconditionally using sample means and conditionally by controlling for relevant factors like partisan identification, age, education, etc. in a regression context. As an alternative measure of our key dependent variable—disapproval—we will create an average sentiment score for the U.S. president using the four words respondents provide in question 4 above.[21]

If H_2 and H_3 are correct, then the following should hold:

$$Disapproval_{(Conciliatory|FemaleDove)} - Disapproval_{(StatusQuo|FemaleDove)}$$

$$>$$

$$Disapproval_{(Conciliatory|FemaleHawk)} - Disapproval_{(StatusQuo|FemaleHawk)}$$

or

$$Disapproval_{(Conciliatory|MaleDove)} - Disapproval_{(StatusQuo|MaleDove)}$$

$$>$$

---

[21]We will do so in the same manner as Schwartz and Blair (2020) by using the `tidytext` package in `R` and a dictionary developed by Liu (2015).

$$Disapproval_{(Conciliatory|MaleHawk)} - Disapproval_{(StatusQuo|MaleHawk)}$$

To test our hypothesized causal mechanisms, we will conduct mediation analysis in the same manner as Mattes and Weeks (2019) using the *mediation* package in STATA (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010; Hicks and Tingley 2011).

Finally, we will analyze heterogeneous effects by subsetting on relevant factors and comparing means, as well as in a regression context using interaction variables.

6   References

1. Alexander, Deborah, and Kristi Andersen. 1993. "Gender as a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership Traits." *Political Research Quarterly 46*(3), 527-545.

2. Anisman-Razin, Moran, Rami Rozen, Eran Halperin, and Tamar Saguy. 2018. "Support for Leader's Decisions in Conflict and Negotiation: Women Do Not Benefit From Relevant Expertise While Men Do." *Political Psychology 39*(3), 633-648.

3. Astin, Helen S., and Carole Leland. 1991. *Women of Influence, Women of Vision: A Cross-Generational Study of Leaders and Social Change*. San Francisco, CA.: Jossey-Brass.

4. Bashevkin, Sylvia. 2018. *Women as Foreign Policy Leaders: National Security and Gender Politics in Superpower America*. New York, NY.: Oxford University Press.

5. Baturo, Alexander, and Julia Gray. 2018. "When Do Family Ties Matter? The Duration of Female Suffrage and Women's Path to High Political Office." *Political Research Quarterly 71* (3), 695-709.

6. Bauer, Nichole M. 2017. "The Effects of Counterstereotypic Gender Strategies on Candidate Evaluations." *Political Psychology 38* (2), 279-295.

7. Bell, Curtis. 2020. "The Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance Dataset (REIGN)." Broomfield, CO: *OEF Research*.

8. Bendix, William, and Gyung-Ho Jeong. 2019. "Gender and Foreign Policy: Are Female Members of Congress More Dovish than Their Male Colleagues?" *Political Research Quarterly 73*(1), 126-140.

9. Berinsky, Adam J., Michele F. Margolis, and Michael W. Sances. 2019. "Separating the Shirkers from the Workers? Making Sure Respondents Pay Attention on Self-Administered Surveys." *American Journal of Political Science 58*(3), 739-753.

10. Berinsky, Adam J., Michele F. Margolis, Michael W. Sances, and Christopher Warshaw. 2019. "Using Screeners to Measure Respondent Attention on Self-Administered Surveys: Which Items and How Many?" *Political Science Research and Methods*.

11. Best, Rebecca H., Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, and Reed M. Wood. 2019. "Legislative Gender Diversity and the Resolution of Civil Conflict." *Political Research Quarterly 72*(1), 215-228.

12. Caprioli, Mary. 2000. "Gendered Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research 37*(1), 53-68."

13. Caprioli, Mary, and Mark A. Boyer. 2001. "Gender, Violence, and International Crisis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution 45*(4), 503-518.

14. Carlin, Ryan E., Miguel Carreras, and Gregory J. Love. 2019. "Presidents' Sex and Popularity: Baselines, Dynamics and Policy Performance." *British Journal of Political Science*, 1-21.

15. Chappell, Bill. 2019. "Barack Obama Says Women Could Solve Many Of World's Problems —— Which Men Have Caused." *NPR*, December 16, 2019.

16. Chiozza, Giacomo, and Ajin Choi. 2003. "Guess Who Did What: Political Leaders and the Management of Territorial Disputes, 1950–1990." *Journal of Conflict Resolution 47*(3), 251-278.

17. Clare, Joe. 2014. "Hawks, Doves, and International Cooperation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution 58*(7), 1311-1337.

18. Amanda Clayton, Diana Z. O'Brien, and jennifer M. Piscopo. 2019. "All Male Panels? Representation and Democratic Legitimacy." *American Journal of Political Science 63*(1), 113-129.

19. Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Virginia Sapiro. 1993. "Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War." *American Journal of Political Science 37*(4), 1079-1099.

20. Coppock, Alexander, and Oliver A. McClellan. 2019. "Validating the Demographic, Political, Psychological, and Experimental Results Obtained from a New Source of Online Survey Respondents." *Research & Politics 6*(1), 1-14.

21. Cowen, Tyler, and Daniel Sutter. 1998. "Why Only Nixon Could Go to China." *Public Choice 97*(4), 605-615.

22. Cukierman, Alex, and Mariano Tommasi. 1998. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?" *The American Economic Review 88*(1), 180-197.

23. Dafoe, Allan, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth. 2014. "Reputation and Status as Motives for War." *Annual Review of Political Science 17*(1), 371-393.

24. Dafoe, Allan, Baobao Zhang, and Devin Caughey. 2018. "Information Equivalence in Survey Experiments." *Political Analysis 26*(4), 399-416.

25. Dolan, Kathleen. 2004. *Voting for Women: How the Public Evaluates Women Candidates*. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press.

26. Dolan, Kathleen. 2014. *When Does Gender Matter?* New York, NY.: Oxford University Press.

27. Dube, Oeindrila, and S.P. Harish. Forthcoming. "Queens." *Journal of Political Economy.*

28. Dustan, Andrew, Kristine Koutout, and Greg Leo. 2019. "Second-Order Beliefs and Gender in the Lab." Unpublished Manuscript.

29. Eichenberg, Richard C. 2003. "Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force by the United States, 1990-2003." *International Security 28*(1), 110-141.

30. Enloe, Cynthia. 1990. *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics.* Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.

31. Falk, Erika, and Kate Kenski. 2006. "Issue Saliency and Gender Stereotypes: Support for Women as Presidents in Times of War and Terrorism." *Social Science Quarterly 87*(1), 1-18.

32. Fukuyama, Francis. 1998. "Women and the Evolution of World Politics." *Foreign Affairs 77*(5), 24-40.

33. Glick, Peter, and Susan T. Fiske. 1996. "The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70*(3), 491-512.

34. Goemans, Henk E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders." *Journal of Peace Research 46*(2), 269-283.

35. Goldstein, Joshua S. 2001. *War and Gender.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

36. Hayes, Danny. 2011. "When Gender and Party Collide: Stereotyping in Candidate Trait Attribution." *Politics & Gender 7*(2), 133-165.

37. Holman, Mirya R., Jennifer Merolla, and Elizabeth Zechmeister. 2011. "Sex, Stereotypes, and Security: A Study of the Effects of Terrorist Threat on Assessments of Female Leadership." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 32*(3), 173-192.

38. Herrmann, Richard K., Phillip E. Tetlock, and Penny S. Viser. 1999. "Mass Public Decisions to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework." *American Political Science Review 93*(3), 553-573.

39. Hicks, Raymond, and Dustin Tingley. 2011. "Mediation: STATA Package for Causal Mediation Analysis."

40. Holsti, Ole R., and James N. Rosenau. 1981. "The Foreign Policy Beliefs of Women in Leadership Positions." *Journal of Politics 43*(2), 326–347.

41. Huddy, Leonie, and Nayda Terkildsen. 1993. "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science 37*(1), 119-147.

42. Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, and Dustin Tingley. 2010. "A General Approach to Causal Mediation Analysis." *Psychological Methods 15*(4), 309-334.

43. Jalalzai, Farida. 2013. *Shattered, Cracked, or Firmly Intact? Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling Worldwide.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

44. Kahn, Kim Fridkin. 1992. "Does Being Male Help? An Investigation of the Effects of Candidate Gender and Campaign Coverage on Evaluations of U.S. Senate Candidates." *Journal of Politics 54*(2), 497-517.

45. Kertzer, Joshua D., and Ryan Brutger. 2016. "Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory." *American Journal of Political Science 60*(1), 234-249.

46. Koch, Jeffrey W. 2000. "Do Citizens Apply Gender Stereotypes to Infer Candidates' Ideological Orientations?" *Journal of Politics 62*(2), 414-429.

47. Koch, Michael T., and Sarah A. Fulton. 2011. "In the Defense of Women: Gender, Office Holding, and National Security Policy in Established Democracies." *Journal of Politics 73*(1), 1-16.

48. Kreps, Sarah E., Elizabeth N. Saunders, and Kenneth A. Schultz. 2018. "The Ratification Premium: Hawks, Doves, and Arms Control." *World Politics 70*(4), 479-514.

49. Lawless, Jennifer. 2004. "Women, War, and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era." *Political Research Quarterly 57*(3), 479-490.

50. Liu, Bing. 2015. *Sentiment Analysis: Mining Opinions, Sentiments, and Emotions.* Cambridge University Press.

51. MacNell, Lillian, Adam Driscoll, and Andrea N. Hunt. 2015. "What's in a Name: Exposing Gender Bias in Student Ratings of Teaching." *Innovative Higher Education 40*, 291-303.

52. Maoz, Ifat. 2009. "The Women and Peace Hypothesis? The Effect of Opponent Negotiators' Gender on the Evaluation of Compromise Solutions in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *International Negotiation 14*(3), 519-536.

53. Mattes, Michaela, and Jessica L.P. Weeks. 2019. "Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach." *American Journal of Political Science 63*(1), 53-66.

54. Mattes, Michaela, and Jessica L.P. Weeks. 2020. "Reacting to the Olive Branch: Hawks, Doves, and Public Support for Cooperation." Unpublished Manuscript.

55. McDermott, Monika L. 1997. "Voting Cues in Low-Information Elections: Candidate Gender as a Social Information Variable in Contemporary US Elections." *American Journal of Political Science 41*(1), 270-283.

56. Mildenberger, Matto, and Dustin Tingley. 2019. "Beliefs about Climate Beliefs: The Importance of Second-Order Opinions for Climate Politics." *British Journal of Political Science 49*(4), 1279-1307.

57. Nincic, Miroslav. 1998. "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites." *World Politics 40*(4), 452-474.

58. Pinker, Steven. 2011. *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined.* New York, NY: Penguin Books.

59. Powell, Jonathan, and Karina Mukazhanova-Powell. 2019. "Demonstrating Credentials? Female Executives, Women's Status, and the Use of Force." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 40*(2), 241-262.

60. Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games ." *International Organization 42*(3), 427-460.

61. Reiter, Dan. 2014. "The Positivist Study of Gender and International Relations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution 59*(7), 1301-1326.

62. Rosenwasser, Shirley Miller, and Norma G. Dean. 1989. "Gender Role and Political Office: Effects of Perceived Masculinity/Femininity of Candidate and Political Office." *Psychology of Women Quarterly 13*(1), 77-85.

63. Russett, Bruce. 1990. "Doves, Hawks, and U.S. Public Opinion." *Political Science Quarterly 105*(4), 515-538.

64. Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. "Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice." *American Journal of Political Science 46*(1), 20-34.

65. Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2018. "Leaders, Advisers, and the Political Origins of Elite Support for War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution 62*(10), 2118-2149.

66. Schramm, Madison, and Alexandra Stark. 2020. "Peacemakers or Iron Ladies? A Cross National Study of Gender and International Conflict." *Security Studies.*

67. Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?." *International Organization 591*(1), 1-38.

68. Schwartz, Joshua A., and Christopher W. Blair. 2020. "Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining." *International Organization.*

69. Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah, and Reed M. Wood. 2017. "Governing Well after War: How Improving Female Representation Prolongs Post-conflict Peace." *Journal of Politics 79*(3), 995-1009.

70. Togeby, Lise. 1994. "The Gender Gap in Foreign Policy Attitudes." *Journal of Peace Research 31*(4), 375-392.

71. Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization 61*(4), 821-840.

72. Tomz, Michael, Jessica L.P. Weeks, and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2020. "Public Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies." *International Organization 74*(1), 119-143.

73. Trager, Robert F., and Lynn Vavreck. 2011. "The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of the Party." *American Journal of Political Science 55*(3), 526-545.

74. Whitlock, Craig. 2019. "Stranded Without a Strategy." *Washington Post*, December 29, 2019.

75. Wilcox, Clyde, Lara Hewitt, and Dee Allsop. 1996. "The Gender Gap in Attitudes Toward the Gulf War: A Cross-National Perspective." *Journal of Peace Research* *33*(1), 67-82.

76. Winter, Nicholas J.G. 2018. "Ambivalent Sexism and Election 2016." Unpublished Manuscript, University of Virginia.

77. Woodward, Bob. 2010. *Obama's Wars.* New York, NY.: Simon & Schuster.