




Dynamics of internal displacement and conflict in Somalia

Christopher W. Blair


To cite this article: Christopher W. Blair (09 Feb 2026): Dynamics of internal displacement and conflict in Somalia, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, DOI: [10.1080/1369183X.2025.2595818](https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2595818)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2595818>

 View supplementary material 

 Published online: 09 Feb 2026.

 Submit your article to this journal 

 View related articles 

 View Crossmark data 



Dynamics of internal displacement and conflict in Somalia

Christopher W. Blair

Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

ABSTRACT

Internal displacement is an important tactic of eliminationist politics. Somalia is arguably the country most affected — internally displaced people (IDPs) comprise 22% of the Somali population, totaling more than 3.5 million. In this paper I explore the dynamics of IDP-hosting in Somalia, using comprehensive data on migrant flows and newly-released conflict microdata. Using a two-part research design that balances description and inference, I study patterns of IDP movement and the consequences of internal displacement for conflict in IDP-hosting communities. In the first part of the analysis I find that common factors shape patterns of conflict-induced and climate-induced displacement. Consistent with choice-based, utility-maximising models, IDPs flow from violent, poor, and climate-vulnerable areas to safer, wealthier, and more climate-resilient areas. Turning to the consequences of IDP inflows, I develop and test an argument linking displacement and information-centric theories of violence. In response to inflows of IDPs about whom they lack detailed knowledge, insurgents escalate information-gathering efforts to discern IDPs' identities and engage in intimidation to dissuade collaboration with counterinsurgents. I also find that IDP inflows are linked with worsening communal conflict. Together, these results illuminate the dynamics of internal displacement and contribute to scholarship on displacement as a tactic of eliminationist politics.


KEYWORDS

Internal displacement; IDPs; conflict; Somalia

Introduction

By the end of 2023, more than 117 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2023).¹ Internally displaced people (IDPs) – individuals who flee their homes due to armed conflicts, generalised violence, repression, or climate-related disasters and who remain within their origin country – comprise the largest displaced population. As [Figure 1](#) reveals, while nearly 48 million refugees are forcibly displaced across international borders, there are almost 65 million IDPs. These IDPs often face multidimensional political and socioeconomic crises related to war, repression, food insecurity, and climate change. Many IDPs are targeted by eliminationist policies specifically because of their ethnic, religious, or other identities (Garrity and Mylonas 2024, 2026).

CONTACT Christopher W. Blair  chris.blair@princeton.edu

 Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2595818>.

© 2026 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group




Figure 1. Internal Displacement is Surging Worldwide.

Note: The solid black line shows the global stock of internally displaced people (IDPs) by year. The dashed grey line shows the global stock of refugees and asylum-seekers by year. All data come from the UNHCR Refugee Data Finder.

In this paper, I study the dynamics of forced migration in Somalia – a country where internal displacement affects more than 3.5 million people and costs over \$1 billion – roughly 22% of GDP – per year.² I explore prominent theoretical accounts of migrant decisionmaking and conflict using a two-part research design that balances description and inference. First, I examine patterns of internal displacement flows between districts over time in Somalia. Results from a series of gravity models comport with canonical, choice-based utility maximising models of migrant decisionmaking. I document discrete categories of conflict-induced and climate-induced migrants, but find broadly similar patterns of displacement across these IDP groups. All types of IDPs gravitate toward nearer, safer, and wealthier destinations. Then, turning to the consequences of IDP hosting, I build a theory to understand how combatants respond to arrivals of displaced people. I argue that insurgents in IDP-receiving communities confront imperatives of identification and control. When IDPs arrive from distant origin communities, insurgents must engage in efforts to discern the identities and sympathies of displaced people, and to control IDPs in order to dissuade collaboration with the government. This argument extends information-centric theories of conflict, and builds on recent studies on combatant responses to internal displacement (Balcells 2018; Lichtenheld and Schon 2021; Steele 2018; Weber 2025). I also consider communal conflict in IDP hosting communities, and highlight key reasons IDP inflows risk exacerbating social strife.

To test these arguments, I combine granular data on IDP flows and previously-unreleased combat microdata from Somalia. The data on internal displacement come from a unique monitoring network funded by the Somalia office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These data cover millions of IDP flows, and

offer detailed information on the timing, location, and causes of displacement. The combat records I draw on are sourced from a restricted-access US government platform, and offer the most detailed portrait of violence in Somalia available to-date. To bolster the empirical strategy and understand causal effects of IDP inflows on conflict in migrant-hosting communities, I employ a shift-share instrumental variables design. I specifically exploit geographic variation in historical migrant settlement patterns to predict exposure to inflows of IDPs across districts over time. In tandem with the detailed, new microdata I exploit, this design allows me to establish an important quantitative microfoundation for evaluating the consequences of internal displacement in destination communities.

Overall, this paper makes three primary contributions to the literature on forced displacement and eliminationist politics. First, I offer a new, detailed explanation for variation in the ways armed groups respond to inflows of displaced people in the areas they operate. I argue that the arrival of outsider IDPs – individuals originating from outside the host community, and about whom combatants have less *ex ante* information – drives dual imperatives of information-gathering and intimidation. This argument integrates insights from classical research on counterinsurgency and displacement (Balcells and Steele 2016; Kalyvas 2006; Lichtenheld and Schon 2021), and underscores how eliminationist policies, which often spur internal displacement in the first place, can beget further expulsion and victimisation in host communities. Second, this project makes important progress in understanding differences and similarities between conflict-driven and climate-driven displacement. Using novel data in a context cross-pressured by a protracted civil war and severe climate change allows me to probe whether unique dynamics underpin conflict-induced versus climate-induced displacement. Making progress on understanding the nexus between mixed migration drivers is key for understanding the trajectory of eliminationist policies in a climate-vulnerable world. Finally, the design and data in this paper mark one of the first efforts to build robust evidence on the question of internal displacement. Specifically, my empirical strategy extends a small, growing literature in economics and political science, which has sought to use causal inference techniques to examine the sociopolitical and economic consequences of displacement on migrant-hosting communities (e.g. Morales 2018; Roza and Winkler 2021). Given the growing magnitude of internal displacement worldwide, evidence is desperately needed on this question. My findings suggest a number of actionable policies that could be applied to support displaced people, host community members, and others in settings like Somalia.

Existing research on internal displacement

Relative to its practical policy importance, the issue of internal displacement has received insufficient academic attention. Growing bodies of literature study related topics, including: mass attitudes toward immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) and climate-induced displacement (Arias and Blair 2022, 2024); the politics of migrant integration (Adida 2014; Peters 2017) and refugee-hosting (Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein 2022a, 2022b); the strategic logic of expulsion (Garrity 2023; Lichtenheld 2020; Mylonas 2012); and the effects of immigration on conflict (Ghosn, Braithwaite, and Chu 2019; Zhou and Shaver 2021) and economic welfare (Betts et al. 2016; Taylor et al. 2016). Nevertheless, although the global population of IDPs exceeds the global

population of refugees and asylum-seekers by nearly 20 million, there has been 159% more scholarship on international forced migration (i.e. refugees and asylum-seekers) than on internal displacement in the past three decades (Figure A-1).

Reasons for this gap are two-fold. First, there is a prevailing tendency to assume that similar dynamics drive all types of forced displacement, and hence that insights developed in scholarship on refugees should generalise to IDPs (Cantor and Apollo 2020; Echevarria-Coco and Gardeazabal 2021; Hagen-Zanker, Rubio, and Erdal 2024). Second, while large-n cross-national data (e.g. Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein 2022a; Shaver et al. 2025) and subnational microdata (e.g. Blair and Wright 2024; Zhou and Shaver 2021) on refugees and asylum-seekers have improved significantly, in parallel with academic and policy interest in the topic, the quality of data on internal displacement has generally lagged, and remains highly uneven and variable across contexts (Cardona-Fox 2020; Caterina and Rodríguez 2020; Pham and Luengo-Oroz 2023). Notwithstanding notable and important efforts by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2024) to improve IDP data, few contexts lack suitable time-series microdata needed for detailed analyses of the causes and consequences of internal displacement. This paper makes progress on both fronts, highlighting explicit areas of overlap and difference between internal displacement and refugee-flows, offering a nuanced comparison of conflict- versus climate-induced internal displacement, and extending recent literature on IDPs to understand the consequences of internal displacement for violence.

Consequences of displacement

How does internal displacement shape security and economic conditions in migrant-hosting communities? Existing literature documents a variety of mixed consequences of displacement for conflict and socioeconomic welfare.³ I consider two competing accounts, which anticipate destabilising and peace-promoting consequences of internal displacement flows respectively.

Displacement and conflict

On one hand, mass IDP flows could destabilise migrant-receiving communities. Violent and disruptive consequences of internal displacement may occur through a number of mechanisms, including by: damaging local economies, straining fragile governance institutions, upsetting tribal or clan politics, and altering demographic balances. For one, direct diffusion of conflict from migrant-producing to migrant-receiving localities may occur, as combatant parties use large, mobile populations to conceal or smuggle movements of fighters, arms, and ideologies (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Van der Windt and Humphreys (2016) show that displaced populations have contributed directly to conflict spillovers.

Diffusion is particularly likely to unfold when displaced people are hosted in large-scale encampments upon arrival in host communities. Refugee and IDP camps are often characterised by poor housing infrastructure and inadequate services (Harris-Brandts and Sichinava 2024; Lischer 2008). Negative hosting conditions worsen displaced peoples' subjective well-being, fueling grievances (Mumin et al. 2022; Perelli-Harris et al. 2024), which can bear long-run consequences (Nostrand and Braithwaite 2026). Additionally, camps established in peripheral regions often lack

adequate local market integration, constraining IDPs' opportunities for work (Lischer 2008). These factors render encamped IDPs a ripe target for insurgent recruitment (Achvarina and Reich 2006). In Somalia, al-Shabaab operates robust recruitment and dispute adjudication networks within IDP camps, offering services in order to win popular support (Anderson and McKnight 2015, 543). This strategy often allows combatant parties to develop durable support among displaced people with whom they develop ties in destination communities (Rizkallah 2024).

Internal displacement may also exacerbate insecurity through its consequences for economic life in migrant-receiving communities. Existing research suggests that mass inflows of IDPs disrupt local economies, increasing resource competition and reducing opportunity costs of rebellion. For instance, internal displacement represents a labor supply shock, reducing wages of host and displaced workers in host localities (Morales 2018). These inflows may also blunt formal sector production while expanding informal and illicit economies in destination areas (Rozo and Winkler 2021). Competition between IDPs and low-income host community members over housing drives up rents, compounding integration challenges (Depetris-Chauvin and Santos 2018). Nor is competition limited to contention over housing stock. IDPs also compete with non-migrants in migrant-receiving communities over access to schools, food, and land (Osman and Abebe 2023). Resource competition bears significant implications for security in host communities. Tension between IDPs and their non-migrant neighbors over aid access and land can spur violent communal conflicts (Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug 2021; Breslawski 2024; Duncan 2005) or criminality (Depetris-Chauvin and Santos 2018). Where government policies privilege segments of the host or displaced population, parochial rules and laws compound resource-related tensions, spurring particularly serious and deadly feuds (Wiederkehr et al. 2022).

Ethnopolitical consequences of internal displacement can further fuel conflict risks in IDP-receiving localities. In many IDP-producing countries, ethnic, tribal, and clan-based politics matter deeply for governance. In this context, displacement is often a strategy used by belligerent parties to consolidate territorial control by forcing out rival social groups or spurring assortative migration along identity-based lines (Adamson and Greenhill 2026; Balcells and Steele 2016; Garrity 2023; Lichtenheld 2020; Zhukov 2015). Inflows of displaced people, particularly marginalised groups fleeing eliminationist policies, can disrupt fragile ethnic and demographic balances, straining already fragile state and community-based institutions (Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug 2018; Gaikwad and Nellis 2017).⁴ In India, these dynamics have contributed to violent, nativist riots targeting internal migrants (Bhavnani and Lacina 2015). In Syria, climate-induced displacement reshaped the demographic political power of host communities that received co-ethnic IDPs. In turn, shifting constellations of ethnotribal authority fueled anti-regime protests that culminated in the Syrian civil war (Ash and Obradovich 2020). IDPs exposed to ethnic strife suffer disproportionately from trauma, depression, and food insecurity (Ali et al. 2023), compounding violence-exacerbating grievances (Choi and Piazza 2016). While marginalised or minoritised displaced populations may cluster together for 'strength-in-numbers' during identity-based civil wars, this behavior may simply lead combatants to engage in indiscriminate, collective targeting (Kalyvas 2006; Steele 2009, 2018).⁵

Even in non-ethnic conflict environments, IDPs may face systematic exclusion and marginalisation from political life (Balcells 2018; Steele 2017). Internal migrants confront

a number of logistical and administrative barriers to political participation, including burdensome bureaucratic red tape (Gaikwad and Nellis 2021b) and weak enforcement of policies intended to facilitate IDPs' electoral participation (Woroniecka-Krzyzanoska and Palaguta 2017).

These dynamics can lead local politicians to ignore or neglect internal migrant constituents, further contributing to the marginalisation of displaced populations (Gaikwad and Nellis 2021a).

Displacement and stability

On the other hand, a small but growing body of recent work highlights reasons to suspect that internal displacement might have no effect on conflict in destination communities, or could even contribute to peacebuilding (e.g. Thalheimer, Schwarz, and Pretis 2023). This perspective views IDPs as a source of human capital and an engine for economic growth. One reason internally displaced populations may contribute to security and development is psychological. Experiences of displacement increase empathy, expanding the willingness of once-displaced people to host future waves of IDPs (Peisakhin, Stoop, and van der Windt 2025). Empathy-based support for migrant settlement and integration is important for helping smooth over resource-related competition and other frictions (Arias and Blair 2022, 2024). IDPs' familiarity with the hardships of displacement and conflict may also lead them to oppose future violence. Social networks in host communities amplify these effects. IDPs migrating to host communities where they have pre-existing kinship ties have an easier time integrating, finding jobs, and housing, and contributing to local economies (Okeke-Ihejirika et al. 2020).

Positive developmental contributions of IDPs can also foster stability. Examining refugee populations, Zhou and Shaver (2021) find that states and international organisations target infrastructural investments toward large, concentrated settlements of displaced people. In turn, these investments contribute to expanding economic growth, and can help undercut risks of social conflict or militancy. Similarly, aid targeting displaced people may raise living standards for entire host communities due to spillovers from displaced beneficiaries to their non-migrant neighbors (Blair and Wright 2024; Kreibaum 2016; Lehmann and Masterson 2020). Recent research on internal displacement in east Africa suggests that IDP inflows facilitate entrepreneurship, market exchange, and economic growth, benefiting host and displaced citizens (Jacobs, Kubiha, and Katembera 2020; Yasukawa 2020). Under these conditions, migration can reduce conflict and bolster economic productivity.

Theory

In this paper, I undertake two analytical tasks. First, applying canonical insights from research on migrant decisionmaking, I study descriptive, geographic and temporal patterns of IDP flows. I document meaningful, distinct categories of conflict-induced and climate-induced IDPs and find common factors shape flow patterns of these different migrants.⁶ Second, I examine the consequences of IDP inflows for the trajectory of conflict in IDP-receiving communities.⁷ Building on information-centric theories of conflict, I argue that large-scale influxes of IDPs drive combatant parties to escalate surveillance and influence efforts, with an aim towards gathering politically- and militarily

useful intelligence about displaced populations. Beyond insurgent violence, I also argue that mass internal displacement risks exacerbating social tensions and communal strife in IDP-receiving communities. I develop these latter arguments below. This theory is scoped by my focus on conflict settings where sovereignty is fragmented and displacement is not state-planned.⁸ I specifically focus on settings where territory is contested between government and insurgent forces and civilians displace between zones of combatant control.⁹

Information, displacement, and conflict

In irregular wars and conflicts – precisely the type that produce a majority of the world's IDPs – information is a paramount resource for combatant parties. To build stability, counterinsurgents aim to win civilian ‘hearts-and-minds.’¹⁰ This entails discriminately targeting militants, protecting civilians from harm, implementing good governance reforms, and improving public service provision (e.g. Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Galula 1964; Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013). These efforts are key building blocks of population-centric counterinsurgency strategies, and success in each facet of this endeavor requires intelligence. For security forces, intelligence facilitates selectivity, honing the ability of government forces to distinguish civilians from embedded insurgents (Blair 2022; Kalyvas 2006). Information is also important for ensuring that governance is responsive to local needs (Karim 2020; Sexton and Zürcher 2023), and that broader state-building efforts are protected from militant sub-version (Berman, Felter, and Shapiro 2018). With administratively-useful information about their populations, governments can act on tips and information to suppress insurgency (Blair 2025; Mir 2018).¹¹

Information is equally important for insurgent forces, who rely on support from civilians to sustain themselves in the face of counterinsurgent pressure. Particularly in areas in which they seek to consolidate authority and control, insurgents rely on civilian-provided tips and resources to deter defection and enforce compliance (Kalyvas 2006).¹² With more information about the distribution of local support, militants can selectively punish government collaborators (Bauer, Reese, and Ruby 2022), pull off larger and more devastating attacks against government forces (Blair 2024; Sonin and Wright 2024), and minimise collateral damage inflicted on civilians in the course of insurgent-initiated operations (Condra and Shapiro 2012; Condra and Wright 2019).

Existing accounts elaborate a number of links between forced displacement and the imperatives of information-gathering during civil wars. For one, combatants may intentionally displace people into camps or secure villages in order to improve their capacity to monitor civilians and prevent enemy infiltration (Zhukov 2015). This strategy has been used by counterinsurgent forces in diverse settings, from South Africa and Vietnam to Algeria and Mozambique (Jentsch 2022; Race 1973; Nostrand and Braithwaite 2026). The logic of forced resettlement is simple: where combatants face severe informational asymmetries and cannot reliably punish civilian collaboration with enemy forces through selective violence, displacement into guarded areas simplifies the task of intelligence-gathering and raises logistical barriers to defection.

A second way displacement may facilitate information-gathering is through assortment. During war, civilians have agency and choose whether, when, and where to flee

(Milli! 2024). Combatants observing these decisions may infer civilian loyalties based on patterns of displacement, particularly because civilians tend to displace into areas populated by co-ethnics and co-partisans (Balcells 2018; Balcells and Steele 2016; Steele 2017). Inducing displacement, then, can help belligerent parties improve their information about the distribution of civilian support, as well as tailor coercion to dissuade further defections or reinforce compliance. As Lichtenheld (2020, 263) explains, '[b]y triggering displacement at [time] t_1 , combatants can then monitor the locations and movements of civilians for further signals of loyalty and affiliation at [time] t_2 .' Where assortative dynamics motivate IDPs to cluster in specific host communities, combatants have an easier time monitoring and surveilling displaced populations, and discerning their identities. This, in turn, can facilitate collective violence against IDPs on the basis of ascriptive or group characteristics, a classic tactic of eliminationism (Lichtenheld and Schon 2021; Steele 2018).¹³

Third, and related to the assortative logic discussed above, combatants can direct measures to improve their intelligence and information-gathering capacities during the process of mass displacement. One particularly common tactic armed groups use in response to flows of displaced people is movement control (Schon 2016). By expanding control infrastructure like checkpoints and roadblocks, warring parties can leverage local presence to inspect, tax, and influence civilian populations (Blair 2024; Schouten 2022). In transit areas, through which displaced people travel as they flee from an origin to a destination, checkpoints can specifically help belligerents detect and monitor the identities and allegiances of refugees and IDPs (Lichtenheld and Schon 2021).¹⁴

Building on these insights, I argue that internal displacement generates two key incentives for information-dependent combatants.¹⁵ First, in response to IDP inflows, combatants increase intelligence-gathering and spy operations, which aim to make displaced populations legible. Legibility – the 'the breadth and depth of a[n authority]'s knowledge' about a populace and its ability to organise that knowledge to facilitate administration – is essential for governance (Lee and Zhang 2017; Scott 1998). By gathering information through surveillance and espionage, rebels can better organise and direct combat operations (Sonin and Wright 2024), while also improving their capacity to assess risks and opportunities posed by large-scale population movements. These efforts are complemented by efforts at social control, through which rebels seek to shape civilian decisionmaking and behavior – especially civilians' patterns of movement (Blair 2024, 29).¹⁶

Second, in response to mass internal displacement, armed groups may escalate their efforts to enforce civilian compliance and dissuade potential defection through the use of selective killings (i.e. assassinations) and intimidation.¹⁷ As a belligerent party gains information about the distribution of civilian support among a displaced population, these violent tactics can help consolidate control and deter enemy collaboration through a demonstrative and deterrent logic. As Weber (2025, 215) puts it, violence and coercion may help 'enforce compliance ... [by] signalling strength to the local population[,] by violently punishing all potential dissidents[,] ... [and by] ensur[ing] that individuals with no clear preference towards one conflict actor do not dare to release information to opponents.'

Of course, not all flows of IDPs are equally likely to spur combatant surveillance and intimidation. Information-gathering imperatives are more acute given large-scale inflows

of IDP populations that are less legible to warring parties *ex ante* (see also Weber 2025). I specifically focus on IDP inflows arriving from localities outside the receiving community.¹⁸ This conceptualisation of ‘outsiders’ is context-specific. In Somalia, regional and clan identities order social life in important ways (Ali and Norman 2023).¹⁹

When ‘outsider’ IDPs flee *en masse* into an area they did not previously live, governing authorities and combatants based in destination communities confront greater identification challenges (Bryld, Kamau, and Sinigallia 2014, 24–27). Informational frictions operate in two directions. Officials in receiving areas lack networks within newly-arriving IDP communities, while these IDPs often lack documentation or connections to host authorities (Bryld, Kamau, and Mohamoud 2020). Several pieces of information are particularly valuable to combatant parties in control of IDP-receiving communities. First, who are outsider IDPs? In particular, to whom are they loyal? Second, do outsider IDPs hold potentially valuable information about where adversary (or friendly) forces are located, either in their origin locations or in areas they transited through in the process of displacement?²⁰ Third, what are outsider IDPs’ immediate socioeconomic needs? For authorities (whether insurgent or government) in IDP-receiving communities, information about these key facets is valuable for honing violence and governance and assessing risks and opportunities posed by IDP in-flows. Hence, given their lower *ex-ante* legibility to combatant parties, I expect that outsider IDPs (i.e. those originating from outside the IDP-receiving community) are most likely to be targeted by escalating surveillance, influence, and intimidation efforts in host communities.

*H*₁: Large-scale inflows of outsider IDPs spur increasing rebel surveillance and insurgent-initiated efforts to impose social control.

*H*₂: Large-scale inflows of outsider IDPs spur increasing insurgent-perpetrated selective violence and insurgent intimidation.

Displacement and communal tensions

Beyond combatants’ responses to IDP inflows, host community responses are also relevant.²¹ As noted above, large-scale inflows of IDPs risk enflaming social strife in hosting regions. This may occur as a result of economic deterioration (Depetris-Chauvin and Santos 2018), institutional fragility (Bhavnani and Lacina 2015; Gaikwad and Nellis 2017), local ethnotribal or demographic tensions (Ash and Obradovich 2020; Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug 2018), and political exclusion of migrants (Gaikwad and Nellis 2021a, 2021b). Across these potential pathways, mass inflows of *outsider* IDPs are particularly likely to enflame social conflict. This is because outsiders often lack access to informal powerbrokers and elites upon arrival in destination communities (Bryld, Kamau, and Mohamoud 2020). Without access to local mediators and informal institutions for dispute resolution, outsider IDPs are at particular risk for extortion, abuse, harassment, and land conflicts with host community members (Jelle et al. 2021).

*H*₃: Large-scale inflows of outsider IDPs spur increasing communal conflict.

Context: internal displacement in Somalia

I test these arguments in the context of Somalia, focusing on the period from January 2016 – April 2019.²² Somalia is one of the countries most affected by internal displacement worldwide.²³ Figure 2 reveals that as of 2023, more than 20% of the Somali population – over 3.86 million people – are forcibly internally displaced.²⁴ Since 2016, the share of Somalis who are IDPs has always exceeded 10%. This massive scale of internal displacement has taken a huge economic toll. Estimates suggest that losses tied to internal displacement in Somalia total more than \$1 billion per year, amounting to roughly 22% of Somalia’s GDP (Cazabat and Yasukawa 2020).

Displacement in Somalia today is caused by several overlapping challenges, including a long-standing civil war, climate change, and clan, ethnic, and regional disputes over land and resources (Bryld, Kamau, and Sinigallia 2014; Maystadt and Ecker 2014; Oh et al. 2024; Thalheimer, Schwarz, and Pretis 2023). The ongoing Somali civil war first began in 1991, when a constellation of opposition groups overthrew the regime of Siad Barre. The collapse of the Somali central government gave way to nearly a decade of factional infighting, as a variety of warlords and armed militias vied for control over Mogadishu and other regions of the country (Lewis 2003). Millions of Somalis were forcibly displaced in this period, and a protracted population of refugees and IDPs first emerged at this point. Over the course of the 1990s, a network of Sunni scholars and clerics organised a coalition of Islamic courts to challenge the influence of Somali warlords in south-central Somalia. This network gradually morphed into the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Between 2000–2004, efforts were made to stabilise the conflict in Somalia and form a Transitional Federal Government; however, worsening drought




Figure 2. Significant Shares of the Somali Population are Forcibly Displaced.

Note: The solid black line shows the share of all Somalis internally displaced by year. The dashed grey line shows the share of all Somalis displaced across international borders (i.e. as refugees) by year. All data come from the UNHCR Refugee Data Finder.

and warlordism constrained the formation of a stable central administration and spurred continuing displacement.

From 2001–2004, affiliates of the ICU operated as a faction within the transitional government structure, but broke away from the central administration after an Ethiopian-backed leader rose to power in 2004 (Yuusuf 2021). As the ICU gained in strength around Mogadishu in 2004–2005, Ethiopia and the US began backing anti-ICU clans and warlords, culminating in a full-scale Ethiopian invasion in 2006. Between 2006–2009, US-backed Ethiopian forces moved to destroy the ICU and reinstall the Transitional Federal Government. Although Ethiopian and US forces inflicted severe damage on the ICU, the transitional government established little effective capacity outside parts of Mogadishu (Harper 2012). By 2007, a significant Somali insurgency emerged to counter the Ethiopian-backed invasion. Within this insurgency, al-Shabaab, a militia that grew out of the ICU's military wing, emerged as the leading actor. At this time, the US-supported African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed to support and legitimise the transitional government and the Ethiopian invasion (Williams 2018). While the Ethiopian occupation wound down in 2009, al-Shabaab gained strength; between 2010–2011, al-Shabaab fighters waged intense operations against AMISOM and Somali federal forces, conquering large swaths of south-central Somalia. Government and peacekeeping forces gradually turned the tide against al-Shabaab from 2011–2015, though counterinsurgency operations induced a significant increase in internal displacement (Bryld, Kamau, and Mohamoud 2020).

In this paper, I focus on the immediate aftermath of these AMISOM and Somali government offensives. Beginning in 2016, the US escalated its support for and involvement in counterinsurgency operations in Somalia, deploying a growing contingent of special forces to lead counterterrorism raids and advise and train AMISOM and Somali forces (Williams 2020). These operations expanded significantly in 2017, as US forces waged a wide-ranging covert campaign against al-Shabaab. At the same time, a severe drought amplified insurgent efforts to deepen their control in south-central Somalia. The nexus of drought and conflict conditions in 2017–2019 precipitated a large increase in internal displacement countrywide (Warsame, Frison, and Checchi 2023).

Data

I study the causes and consequences of internal displacement in Somalia between January 2016 – April 2019, the time period for which I have high-fidelity microdata on IDP flows and conflict. My analyses combine several novel sources of microdata. Descriptive statistics are available in Tables A-1 and A-2.

Internal displacement

Data on internal displacement come from the Protection & Re-turn Monitoring Network (PRMN), a network funded by the Somalia office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The PRMN is implemented by the Norwegian Refugee Council's (NRC) Somalia country office, and relies on support from 41 local partners in the field. Staff from partner organisations are trained by NRC and UNHCR officials in protection and monitoring skills, and operate across twelve NRC field offices and

operational bases in every state of Somalia. This structure gives local partners capacity for displacement tracking in every administrative division of Somalia. PRMN built out of earlier tracking efforts launched by UNHCR, including the Population Movement tracking database and the Protection Monitoring Network.

PRMN partners assess and track population displacements through targeted observation of strategic sites, including transportation centers, bus and taxi stops, road junctions, known transit hubs, IDP settlements, border crossings, and other ad hoc locations. Staff deployed at these sites interview internally displaced people to produce household-level reports. These individual and household-level records are supplemented through key informant interviews with local notables, clan elders, and other informal authority figures in IDP settlements and other IDP-receiving communities.²⁵ To ensure consistent measurement across communities over time, all PRMN interviews use a standardised form. Through retrospective survey interviews, local partner agencies generate household-level data on displacement and protection incidents, including detailed information on IDPs' districts of origin and destination and date of displacement, IDPs' self-reported reasons for displacement, and details about IDPs' humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities.²⁶ Field reports are uploaded in real-time to an NRC-administered web platform, and quality-control assessments are conducted both by NRC – Somalia staff and third-party verifiers. Using information from field reports, UNHCR and NRC organise emergency support and assistance for victims of conflict, disasters, and other serious protection incidents.

In the period under study in this paper, the PRMN records more than 2.4 million IDP flows. [Figure 3](#) maps temporal trends in internal displacement, and [Figure 4](#) maps district-level inflows of these IDPs over time. In the average month, internal displacement




Figure 3. Monthly Flows of IDPs in Somalia.

Note: Bars show the number of IDP flows per month observed in Somalia according to PRMN data.




Figure 4. Total IDP Inflows. (a) April 2016. (b) Oct. 2016. (c) April 2017. (d) Oct. 2017. (e) April 2018. (f) Oct. 2018. (g) April 2019.

Note: Panels shade districts by the number of IDP inflows.

generated flows of 60,515 IDPs nationwide. Over the full span of the data, the average district received 32,711 IDPs, though the distribution of flows was highly spatially uneven, with urban centers like Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Galkayo receiving larger numbers of migrants. Most IDPs originated from severely conflict- and drought-affected districts in South-Central Somalia, such as Merca, Baidoa, and Beledweyne. The median IDP displaced fewer than 150 kilometers from their home district – nearly half of IDPs displaced within their origin district, and more than two-thirds displaced within their region of origin. Looking at drivers of displacement, the PRMN data record more than 1.6 million climate-induced IDPs, more than 740,000 conflict-induced IDPs, and more than 70,000 IDPs displaced by other causes. [Figures 5 and 6](#) map spatio-temporal patterns of climate-driven versus conflict-driven IDP inflows.²⁷

PRMN reports offer the best-available information on flows of IDPs within Somalia. However, the data do suffer one primary limitation. Because data collection relies on a network of field monitors, measurement quality may be impacted by security conditions or other constraints on enumeration (UNHCR-Somalia 2017). Several factors build confidence in the quality of the data. First, UNHCR staff have compared PRMN data with other internal data sources and concluded that the PRMN IDP flow matrix is broadly representative of internal displacement dynamics within Somalia over time. Second, because of its broad geographic coverage, international organisations and humanitarian agencies widely use PRMN data to respond to real-time displacement crises. As




Figure 5. Climate-Induced IDP Inflows. (a) April 2016. (b) Oct. 2016. (c) April 2017. (d) Oct. 2017. (e) April 2018. (f) Oct. 2018. (g) April 2019.


Note: Panels shade districts by the number of climate-induced IDP inflows.

UNHCR-Somalia (2007) note, the PRMN tool has become ‘critical to the planning and programming of most humanitarian actors operating in Somalia.’

Third, in a series of forensic tests (Figure A-8; Table A-3) I investigate whether measurement quality is endogenous to security conditions in the field. I specifically examine digit heaping in the raw IDP flow data from PRMN. Digit heaping occurs when a disproportionate share of measured values end in 0 or 5. As developed in literature on census-taking and state capacity, digit heaping is a well-known indicator of flawed data collection. In particular, heaping is a sign that ‘enumerators [are] hav[ing] difficulty finding or reaching the population to be counted’ (Lee and Zhang 2017, 121). If conflict systematically hampered enumeration by PRMN field monitors, I would expect a positive correlation between violence and digit heaping in the raw flow data. I find no evidence for digit heaping in the PRMN data, raising confidence in its quality.

Violence

Conflict records in the main analyses come from the International Distributed Unified Reporting Environment (INDURE), a restricted-access platform maintained by the US Defense Department.²⁸ Events described in INDURE are sourced from the US military’s classified Combined Information Data Network Exchange. The INDURE files cover



source conflict trackers used in extant analyses of the war in Somalia (e.g. Maystadt and Ecker 2014; Oh et al. 2024; Schon 2016; Thalheimer, Schwarz, and Pretis 2023). On average over the study period I observe 194 more events per month in INDURE than ACLED and 394 more events per month in INDURE than UCDP.

In the full INDURE data, I observe 5,578 insurgent-initiated attacks resulting in 8,151 counterinsurgent casualties and 12,836 civilian casualties. Figure 7 plots spatiotemporal variation in the intensity of insurgent-initiated violence. One notable feature of the rich combat reports I use is that, in addition to insurgent violence, they also cover a range of counterinsurgent-initiated operations, social conflicts, and non-combat events related to intelligence-gathering or civilian informing.³¹ In addition to insurgent attacks, my data document 4,841 civilians-provided tips, 748 counterinsurgent-initiated security operations, 321 communal clashes and clan-based feuds, 2,184 insurgent-initiated attempts at social control or intimidation, and 62 insurgent-initiated spy operations. These unique reports offer direct evidence on questions related to how combatants shift information-gathering efforts in response to local influxes of IDPs.

Although the INDURE records do not suffer reporting bias inherent in media-based conflict event data, they do have several relevant weaknesses (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011, 790, 808-809). First, incidents only enter the data when they were detected by US, AMISOM, or Somali partner forces present on the ground. Consequently, the data potentially undercount the total volume of events other than insurgent attacks against




Figure 7. Insurgent Violence in Somalia. (a) April 2016. (b) Oct. 2016. (c) April 2017. (d) Oct. 2017. (e) April 2018. (f) Oct. 2018. (g) April 2019.

Note: Panels shade districts by the intensive margin of conflict as reported in INDURE.

counterinsurgent forces. This concern raises the risk that internal displacement is mechanically correlated with INDURE events. For instance, if counterinsurgent forces deploy to IDP-receiving areas or if IDPs gravitate to areas near military bases, proximity of government forces could increase the observability (but not the actual incidence) of events. I take several steps to address this concern, including controlling for counterinsurgent presence in the main analyses.

Second, counterinsurgent units may differ in their propensity for reporting any given engagement as a conflict event. This concern raises the risk that changes in unit-level leadership (e.g. of AMISOM or Somali units) lead to shifts in reporting policies. I am sanguine because Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011, 790) investigate this concern in the Iraqi context and find no evidence that errors from unit-level differences in reporting thresholds are nonrandom with respect to the variables of interest. Moreover, documentary evidence suggests US advisory teams pushed Somali and AMISOM forces to standardise information and reporting guidelines (Williams 2020), reducing concern about heterogeneous reporting standards.

Evictions

I also assemble unique microdata on forced evictions in Somalia, which occur when displaced and otherwise marginalised communities are driven from their homes and occupancies by coercive threats or force (Jelle et al. 2021). These data come from the NRC – Somalia office’s Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) team, which maintains a purpose-built platform for documenting incidents of forced eviction in Somalia. To monitor evictions, the NRC – Somalia office operates a network of 40 paralegals trained in legal advocacy around land and tenancy issues in Somalia. This team compiles reports of attempted and actual evictions using a network of local monitors, along with information from other humanitarian actors working on IDP protection in Somalia, including the PRMN, the UNHCR’s Camp Coordination and Camp Management cluster, local advocacy organisations, and community volunteers. All incidents in the data are verified through on-site assessment and interviews with victims and local authorities. Figure A-10 plots temporal variation in evictions, and Figure A-11 maps the incidence of these expulsions.

Security infrastructure

I exploit information on security infrastructure in Somalia using data from the US Government’s GEOnet Names Server (GNS), maintained by the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the US Board on Geographic Names. The GNS records millions of infrastructure sites worldwide, including hundreds of security installations in Somalia. With this data, I chart the completion of military and police bases in Somalia at the district-month from 2016–2019. I define an indicator for counterinsurgent presence that takes a value of 1 in all district-months in which a completed base exists, and 0 otherwise. Figure A-12 traces the expansion of security infrastructure across districts over time.

Other data

I compile a rich array of supplemental data to complement the core empirical analyses. Information on climatic conditions, land use, economic and industrial potential, road networks, market prices, and clan settlement patterns come from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and specifically the Somali Water and Land Information Management system and the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit. Data on nighttime luminosity were remotely sensed using the Visible and Infrared Imaging Suite–Day Night Band deployed aboard the Joint Polar-orbiting Satellite System (Elvidge et al. 2021). Population data were shared by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

Estimation strategy

In the main analysis, I examine how inflows of IDPs shape the incidence of conflict in IDP-receiving communities.³² Of course, identifying the effect of IDP inflows on conflict is challenging because displaced people gravitate to specific destination communities. For instance, IDPs tend to flow to more economically prosperous, more climate-resilient, and less violent areas around government-held security infrastructure. Existing research on internal displacement and violence in IDP-receiving communities has made little progress in overcoming these identification concerns, instead relying on a selection-on-observables assumption (e.g. Choi and Piazza 2016; Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug 2018, 2021) or³³ offering strictly qualitative evidence (Achvarina and Reich 2006; Rizkallah 2024).

Following Morales (2018) and Rozo and Winkler (2021), I use a shift-share design, which exploits historical patterns of IDP flight to predict contemporary IDP inflows.³⁴ This approach follows a long tradition in migration scholarship (e.g. Boustan 2010; Card 2001), which recognises that contemporary migrants gravitate toward areas prior migrants settled.³⁵ Gravitation to areas settled by prior waves of migrants is intuitive. Migrant networks help facilitate integration in destination communities by offering supportive social infrastructure (Munshi 2003).

To construct a measure of prior IDP settlement patterns I use data on the universe of IDP flows in 2016, the earliest available year in the PRMN matrix. I sum all nationwide IDP flows in 2016, and then calculate the share of the total, nationwide 2016 IDP flow that arrived in each district. Formally, this share is expressed as District IDP Inflows₂₀₁₆. These 2016 shares, depicted in Figure A-13, define cross-sectional exposure to subsequent IDP flows in 2017 and beyond. Then, I sum the total, nationwide flow of IDPs for all months from January 2017 onward. Multiplying 2016 shares by the monthly, nationwide flow of IDPs gives a time-varying measure of predicted IDP inflows at the district level. As reflected in Figure 8, predicted and observed returns are highly correlated (Pearson's $\omega = 0.727$), suggesting 2016 IDP settlement patterns are a good proxy for subsequent IDP inflows. I use predicted inflows to instrument for observed inflows in the analysis.³⁶

This shift-share design is given by the following equations:

$$Y_{d,t+1} = \varepsilon_d + \vartheta_t + \omega(\text{IDP Inflows}_{d,t}) + \varrho(X_{d,t}) + s(Z_{d \rightarrow t}) + \varphi_{d,t} \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{IDP Inflows}_{d,t} = \varepsilon_d + \vartheta_t + \omega(\text{Predicted IDP Inflows}_{d,t}) + \varrho(X_{d,t}) \\ + s(Z_d \rightarrow \vartheta_t) + \varphi_{d,t} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$




Figure 8. Predicting IDP Inflows Using Past IDP Settlement Patterns.

Note: The scatterplot plots the correlation between observed IDP inflows and predicted IDP inflows based on 2016 settlement patterns.

where d indexes districts and t indexes year-specific months. ε_d and ϑ_t are district and year-specific month fixed effects, which absorb time-invariant differences across administrative units and common time shocks affecting all districts. $X_{d,t}$ is a vector of time-varying covariates, including the presence of military infrastructure and climatic conditions. Z_d is a vector of time-invariant covariates, including measures of clan presence and historical violence. I incorporate these covariates flexibly by interacting them with year-specific month fixed effects. In the first stage, $IDP\ Inflows_{d,t}$ denotes the number of IDPs arriving in district d at time t .³⁷ In the second stage, $Y_{d,t+1}$ are district-level outcomes, including instances of social unrest and communal conflict, insurgent-initiated surveillance, assassinations, and efforts by insurgents to intimidate civilians or exert social control. $\varphi_{d,t}$ are robust, district-clustered standard errors. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

For this shift-share design to be valid, two assumptions are required. First, the instrument must be relevant. This is precisely what Figure 8 reveals – predicted IDP inflows are highly correlated with observed IDP inflows.³⁸ As reflected in Tables 1–3, F-statistics well above 10 allay concerns about weak instruments. Second, the instrument must meet the exclusion restriction. This condition implies that predicted IDP inflows – taken by interacting cross-sectional 2016 shares with temporal variation in total internal displacement flows – are uncorrelated with outcomes except through observed IDP inflows.

Because all specifications include district and year-specific month fixed effects, threats to inference come from time-varying covariates potentially correlated with outcomes and the instrument. One possibility raised by the gravity analyses is that IDPs flee to climate-resilient areas with stronger government presence. To address this concern I control for climatic conditions and military infrastructure in all specifications. Another possibility is that districts with larger shares of IDPs also varied in key ways initially, and that these initial differences resulted in differential patterns (not captured by IDP inflows) of

Table 1. IDP inflows increase insurgent surveillance and control Elorts.

| | Insurgent Spy Operations (=1) | | | Insurgent Social Control (=1) | | |
|--|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Between-District IDP Inflow | 0.002*** (0.000) | 0.003*** (0.001) | 0.003*** (0.001) | 0.010*** (0.001) | 0.009*** (0.002) | 0.009*** (0.002) |
| Observations | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 |
| AIC | -1192 | -1726 | -1724 | 830 | 429 | 430 |
| Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic | 136.265 | 146.480 | 149.178 | 136.265 | 146.480 | 149.178 |
| Parameters | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| District FE | | | | | | |
| Year-Specific Month FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Within-District IDP Inflow Clan Covariates | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Historical Conflict | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Military Base Road | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Access Trade Routes | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| NDVI Anomaly | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Growing Season | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| IDP Outflow | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| | | | Yes | | | Yes |

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The estimation sample includes district-months from January 2017–April 2019. Within-district IDP inflow is the number of IDPs arriving from elsewhere in the same district. Clan covariates are time-invariant indicators for the dominant clan family present in a district and for the presence of minority clans in a district. All clan covariates are interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Historical conflict is a measure of per capita insurgent violence in 2016 interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Military base is an indicator for whether a counterinsurgent base exists in a given district. Road access and trade routes are indicators for the existence of major roads or livestock trade routes in a district interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. NDVI anomaly is a measure of the deviation of each district-month's climate conditions from the long-run historical average. Lower values indicate drought conditions and higher values indicate greater vegetative health. Growing season denotes district-specific timing of biannual wet seasons. IDP outflow is the number of IDPs originating in a district. Estimates are scaled using analytic population weights.

conflict and development over time. For instance, the gravity analysis suggests historical IDPs likely settled in areas that were less violent and more prosperous. I account for these possibilities by including pre-treatment controls for violence, clan settlement patterns, and economic development interacted with time fixed effects. All estimates are robust to the inclusion of these and other covariates.³⁹

Results

In the main analyses I examine how inflows of IDPs shape conflict and welfare in IDP-hosting communities.⁴⁰ The empirical results comport with theoretical expectations, suggesting that IDP inflows, and especially inflows of outsider IDPs (i.e. those from other districts):

(1) increased insurgent information-gathering activities, including surveillance and social control; (2) increased insurgent intimidation designed to dissuade civilian collaboration with government forces; and (3) increased social and communal unrest. I provide evidence of these dynamics in sequence.

Insurgent surveillance and social control

Information-centric theories of conflict suggest combatants should respond to inflows of displaced people by engaging in information-gathering activities designed to render IDPs legible. By doing so, armed groups can improve their intelligence about migrant

Table 2. IDP inflows increase insurgent Efforts to dissuade collaboration.

| | Assassinations (=1) | | | Insurgent Intimidation (=1) | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Between-District IDP Inflow | 0.006*** (0.001) | 0.005** (0.002) | 0.005** (0.002) | 0.008*** (0.001) | 0.007*** (0.001) | 0.007*** (0.001) |
| Observations | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 |
| AIC | -343 | -733 | -732 | 643 | 261 | 261 |
| Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic | 136.265 | 146.480 | 149.178 | 136.265 | 146.480 | 149.178 |
| Parameters | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| District FE | | | | | | |
| Year-Specific Month FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Within-District IDP Inflow | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Clan Covariates | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Historical Conflict | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Military Base Road | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Access Trade | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Routes NDVI | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Anomaly Growing | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Season IDP | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Outflow | | | Yes | | | Yes |

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The estimation sample includes district-months from January 2017–April 2019. Within-district IDP inflow is the number of IDPs arriving from elsewhere in the same district. Clan covariates are time-invariant indicators for the dominant clan family present in a district and for the presence of minority clans in a district. All clan covariates are interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Historical conflict is a measure of per capita insurgent violence in 2016 interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Military base is an indicator for whether a counterinsurgent base exists in a given district. Road access and trade routes are indicators for the existence of major roads or livestock trade routes in a district interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. NDVI anomaly is a measure of the deviation of each district-month’s climate conditions from the long-run historical average. Lower values indicate drought conditions and higher values indicate greater vegetative health. Growing season denotes district-specific timing of biannual wet seasons. IDP outflow is the number of IDPs originating in a district. Estimates are scaled using analytic population weights.

populations (e.g. their loyalties, knowledge of force deployments, previous conflict experiences) and act to dissuade defection, which could expose them to counterinsurgent suppression. In Table 1, I consider two outcomes from INDURE: (1) insurgent spy operations, which are incidents in which insurgent forces are detected by counterinsurgents while engaged in surveillance and monitoring of government or civilian activities; and (2) insurgent social control, which are incidents in which insurgent forces seek to influence civilian beliefs and behavior through erection of illegal checkpoints, meetings with clan elders, taxation, or dissemination of propaganda. Insurgent spy operations represent a direct measure of information-gathering effort, while social control captures a wider range of influence activities intended to improve the legibility of displaced populations and host communities.⁴¹

I find that across outcomes, between-district (i.e. outsider) IDP inflows increase insurgent monitoring and surveillance. For every 1000 IDPs arriving from outside the district, insurgents in receiving communities increase the extensive margin of spy operations by 0.2–0.3 percentage points (pp) and the extensive margin of social control efforts by 1pp. For the average district-month, these effects translate to an expected 0.7pp increase in the probability of insurgent surveillance and a 2.2pp increase in the probability of insurgent social control. Together, these results offer direct evidence that combatants escalate intelligence-gathering effort in response to inflows of IDPs. The findings also comport with Schon (2016)’s argument about how checkpoints and movement controls – an important facet of social control efforts – are used to shape the dynamics of internal displacement.

Table 3. IDP inflows increase communal conflict.

| | Social Unrest (=1) | | | Communal Conflict (=1) | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Between-District IDP Inflow | 0.010*** (0.001) | 0.009*** (0.001) | 0.009*** (0.001) | 0.008*** (0.001) | 0.006*** (0.001) | 0.006*** (0.001) |
| Observations | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 |
| AIC | 1454 | 1046 | 1047 | 1382 | 954 | 956 |
| Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic | 136.265 | 146.480 | 149.178 | 136.265 | 146.480 | 149.178 |
| Parameters | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| District FE | | | | | | |
| Year-Specific Month FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Within-District IDP Inflow | Yes | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Clan | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Covariates | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Historical Conflict | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Military Base | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Road Access | | | Yes | | | Yes |
| Trade Routes | | | | | | |
| NDVI Anomaly | | | | | | |
| Growing Season | | | | | | |
| IDP Outflow | | | | | | |

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The estimation sample includes district-months from January 2017–April 2019. Within-district IDP inflow is the number of IDPs arriving from elsewhere in the same district. Clan covariates are time-invariant indicators for the dominant clan family present in a district and for the presence of minority clans in a district. All clan covariates are interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Historical conflict is a measure of per capita insurgent violence in 2016 interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Military base is an indicator for whether a counterinsurgent base exists in a given district. Road access and trade routes are indicators for the existence of major roads or livestock trade routes in a district interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. NDVI anomaly is a measure of the deviation of each district-month's climate conditions from the long-run historical average. Lower values indicate drought conditions and higher values indicate greater vegetative health. Growing season denotes district-specific timing of biannual wet seasons. IDP outflow is the number of IDPs originating in a district. Estimates are scaled using analytic population weights.

Insurgent intimidation

Information is useful because it can facilitate the application of selective violence wielded by combatants to dissuade civilian defection and punish collaboration (Kalyvas 2006). Successful efforts to gather information should facilitate discriminant coercion designed at ensuring civilian compliance (Berman, Felter, and Shapiro 2018). An implication is that combatant surveillance of IDP populations should also be associated with intimidation efforts, such as assassinations and kidnapping. The conflict microdata I use do not identify targets of violence such that I can say with certainty that IDPs (versus host community members) are targeted. Bearing this caveat in mind, I consider two key outcomes to assess whether insurgents respond to outsider IDP inflows by taking steps to dissuade civilian collaboration. First, from the INDURE records I consider assassinations, which are deliberate, targeted killings of individuals. Second, I consider a broader set of events from ACLED, such as assaults and kidnappings, which are individually targeted and intended at intimidation. These types of operations are discriminant and selective, and

consistent with insurgent efforts to precisely target political opponents in order to deter defection (Bauer, Reese, and Ruby 2022; Vanden Eynde 2018).

As with insurgent surveillance, I find that outsider IDP inflows increase insurgent intimidation. An inflow of 1000 IDPs from outside the host district increases the incidence of insurgent-perpetrated assassinations by 0.5–0.6pp and the extensive margin of intimidation by 0.7–0.8pp. For the average district-month, these effects translate to an expected 1.2pp increase in the probability of assassinations and a 1.7pp increase in the probability of insurgent intimidation. These findings represent evidence for classical theories of information-centric conflict, which anticipate that combatant information-gathering helps hone the selectivity of violence (Condra and Shapiro 2012; Kalyvas 2006), and specifically violence against suspected opponents and collaborators (Bauer, Reese, and Ruby 2022).

Communal conflict

In the final step of the analyses I turn from militancy to consider how IDP inflows shape the incidence of social and communal strife in IDP-receiving communities. Existing work suggests that large-scale arrivals of displaced people, and especially of outsiders (whether defined in ethnic, national, racial, or other terms), are an important risk factor for conflict between host community members and migrants (Bhavnani and Lacina 2015; Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug 2018). In Table 3, I consider one outcome from INDURE and another from ACLED. Because the INDURE data are tailored to focus primarily on insurgent-related violence, studying an additional outcome from ACLED is important to help verify the robustness of the main results. First, from INDURE I examine episodes of social unrest, which are incidents of tribal or clan feuds, sectarian strife, demonstrations, and protests detected by counterinsurgent forces. While the data are not granular enough to identify whether IDPs or host community members are involved in these incidents, they offer a benchmark indicator of social turmoil in migrant-hosting areas. Second, from ACLED I examine a similar set of events, which I call communal conflicts. These events are violent incidents perpetrated by communal or clan-based militias. Whereas the INDURE measure of social unrest captures a broader range of social tension and upheaval, the ACLED measure of communal conflict represents a narrower but more severe set of conflicts in which organised, identity-based militias initiate armed clashes.⁴²

In columns 1–3 of Table 3 I find that a 1000 IDP increase in inflows from an outside district is associated with a 0.9–1pp increase in social unrest. Estimates in columns 4–6 are consistent, revealing that for every 1000 outsider IDPs arriving in a district, the probability of communal conflict increases 0.6–0.8pp. For the average district, this translates to a 2.3pp increase in the extensive margin of social unrest and a 1.5pp increase in the extensive margin of communal conflict. Although typically less severe than insurgent attacks, social conflicts are nevertheless economically important. In Somalia, these disputes often involve entire clans or sub-clans, and are prone to protraction as they metastasize into long-running honor feuds (Keating and Waldman 2019). Social conflict also risks exacerbating militancy, since al-Shabaab fighters often leverage communal violence to sow ties with local communities and informal elites (Anderson and McKnight 2015). Specifically, by interceding in disputes and offering adjudication mechanisms, al-Shabaab forces have cultivated local favor during episodes of communal violence (Hansen 2013).

Beyond their implications for civilian welfare and the broader trajectory of the militant conflict, disputes and feuds in IDP-hosting areas also risk perpetuating eliminationist policies that contribute to internal displacement in the first place. For instance, Kapteijns (2013) shows that eliminationist policies of clan-based cleansing and expulsion during the collapse of Barre regime in Somalia in the 1990s contributed to durable institutional fragility, large-scale population movements, and clan-based segregation. In more recent years, these dynamics have reemerged in the form of forced evictions, which often target marginalised groups, such as IDPs from minority clans (Hill 2010). In turn, forced evictions are themselves an important cause of IDP flows within Somalia. More than 11,000 IDPs are evicted in Mogadishu every month, and evicted IDPs are often forced to settle in slums or return to conflict and climate-affected origin communities (Bryld, Kamau, and Mohamoud 2020, 983). IDPs evicted in the midst of communal conflicts in Somalia are disproportionately likely to face militant and sexual violence, loss of income-generating opportunities and assets, and destruction of their social and kinship networks (Jelle et al. 2021). In Figure A-14, I find that increasing inflows of outsider IDPs are associated with large increases in forced evictions at the household and individual levels. These results reinforce the compounding, feedback effects of internal displacement and social strife, and suggest stark negative implications of communal tensions in IDP-receiving areas.

Robustness

I take a range of steps to confirm the robustness of these core results. First, the main analyses rely on a two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variables estimator. In Tables A-7 – A-9 I confirm that substantively similar results are obtained using an OLS estimator. Second, the main specifications study the extensive margin of outcomes. By looking at variation in the incidence of conflict across district-months, this approach helps mitigate concerns about undercounting events. Nonetheless, there are substantive reasons to be interested not just in how IDP inflows shape the probability of conflict, but also in how internal displacement shapes the intensity of conflict in host communities. Table A-10 confirms the results are robust when I examine the intensive margin of the core outcomes. Third, identification could be threatened by factors correlated with the instrument and which directly affect the conflict-related outcomes. In the main estimations I control for a range of potential confounders including clan dynamics, historical violence, security infrastructure, and climatic conditions. In Table A-11 I also verify the results are robust to incorporating several additional covariates, including: agricultural production, nighttime luminosity, disbursements of humanitarian aid, and al-Shabaab territorial control. Fourth, there are likely to be a variety of pre-treatment differences between communities more and less impacted by inflows of IDPs. In Table A-12 I confirm the results are robust when I balance treatment and control units on a range of covariates using entropy balancing weights.

Finally, I explore whether the effect of IDP inflows is heterogeneous by displacement driver. Recent work suggests that conflict-induced IDPs are more likely than climate-induced IDPs to spur increasing conflict in their destination communities (Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug 2021). On the other hand, arrivals of both conflict and climate-driven migrants reinforce combatants' incentives to engage in information-gathering

to discern IDPs' loyalties. Likewise, conflict- and climate-induced IDPs may exacerbate communal tensions through similar mechanisms, including resource competition and institutional strain (Bhavnani and Lacina 2015). In Table A-13 I disaggregate the main measure of IDP inflows into separate measures of inflows of outsider IDPs driven by conflict and driven by climatic conditions. I find few distinguishable differences in the effects of inflows of these different IDP categories. Both types of inflows are associated with large, precise increases in insurgent spy operations, insurgent social control, assassinations, and social unrest. Outsider climate IDPs have a greater effect on insurgent intimidation and communal conflict. Overall, these results give little reason to suspect there are systematic differences in the consequences of IDP inflows spurred by different drivers. Rather, the evidence is consistent with the notion that combatants have similar incentives to respond to arriving outsider IDPs by escalating information-gathering and enforcement, irrespective of the factors that caused internal displacement initially.

Conclusion

Internal displacement is one of the paramount challenges for international security and development. In settings like Somalia, where millions of people are forcibly displaced, the implications of displacement for stability, prosperity, and humanitarian welfare are particularly critical to understand. In this project I leverage granular new data on IDP flows and conflict in Somalia to study the spatiotemporal patterns of flight, as well as the consequences of large-scale IDP inflows for host communities. On the latter question, I develop and extend information-centric theories of conflict to highlight why inflows of outsider IDPs – those originating from outside the host district – spur armed groups to engage in intelligence-gathering and intimidation. I also systematise and test a diverse set of arguments linking displacement with the incidence of social conflict.

In the main analyses I⁴³ offer microfoundational quantitative support for recent accounts (Balcells 2018; Lichtenheld and Schon 2021; Steele 2018), which emphasise combatants' strategic responses to internal displacement. I find that outsider IDP inflows prompt militants to escalate efforts to surveil and control displaced populations, as well as to intimidate displaced people and their non-migrant neighbors in host communities. Through selective violence and coercion enabled by information-gathering, combatant parties can enforce compliance and dissuade collaboration. Turning to communal conflict, I also find that IDP inflows are associated with worsening social strife, clan feuds, and forced evictions.

These findings bear important implications for our understanding of eliminationist politics (Garrity and Mylonas 2026). In Somalia and elsewhere, expulsion, forced displacement, and anti-migrant repression are some of the key tools governments and non-state armed groups use to target social and identity-based groups. Future work should expand this paper's findings to examine displacement settings where collective targeting and combatant policies aim explicitly at forced relocation or cleansing. Scholars should also consider how eliminationist tactics like forced displacement beget or exacerbate other forms of eliminationism, like coercive assimilation or mass killing (Adamson and Greenhill 2026). Identifying the consequences of eliminationist policies and the ways internal displacement can compound risks marginalised people face from violence, climate change, and communal strife should be a priority for scholars and policymakers interested in mitigating atrocities, expulsion, and civilian victimisation.

Notes

1. This includes internally displaced people (IDPs); refugees, who are individuals recognised as having fled their homes for reasons specified in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and who fled to a location outside their origin country; asylum-seekers, who are individuals seeking refugee status; refugees under the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); and other individuals in need of international protection as designated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
2. This cost includes humanitarian support and estimated income losses.
3. Section A.3 offers a more comprehensive review of literature on the consequences of displacement, mostly drawing from work on international rather than internal migration.
4. Demographic engineering is often an explicit goal of state-directed displacement (Mylonas 2012).
5. These perspectives generally imply that IDPs are targets of violence in host communities. However, arriving IDPs can also initiate violence against host community members. For instance, Balcells (2018) shows that IDPs can disseminate credible news of atrocities perpetrated against them and their social groups. When these IDPs share identity-based ties with authorities in host communities, word of victimisation perpetrated by out-groups may motivate host officials to engage in retributive attacks in IDP-receiving communities against non-migrant groups perceived as loyal to rival belligerent parties operating in localities from which arriving IDPs originated.
6. Section A.2 offers a more comprehensive review of literature on migrant decisionmaking.
7. While many other contextual factors may also shape the effect of displacement on violence in host communities, the Somalia setting allows me to examine this question in the context of an active civil war characterised by fragmented territorial control and ethnosectarian divides.
8. I do not offer explicit hypotheses about the correlates of IDP flows because a well-developed literature (discussed above) offers a number of clear predictions on this front – e.g., that distance negatively correlates with displacement flows. I instead choose to focus on developing arguments related to the consequences of displacement, since I have more empirical leverage to make inferences on this question, and because extant literature suggests competing expectations.
9. This is a general condition characteristic of most civil conflicts (Kalyvas 2006).
10. Counterinsurgents can alternatively use repression to suppress militancy, though this strategy requires extreme levels of coercion and force (Zhukov 2015).
11. Administratively useful information on ethnicity (e.g., from censuses) can be gathered and manipulated in various ways to benefit governments' priorities (Frost 2026; Livny and Kabaoglu 2026).
12. Scapegoating and fifth-column rhetoric is common in these areas (Mylonas and Radnitz 2022; Chernykh, Goldsmith, and Nanlohy 2026; Jenne and Ejiyofor 2026).
13. Displaced people can also serve as vectors for information transmission. Balcells (2018) shows that IDPs can make credible reports of atrocities perpetrated by combatants in their origin communities, prompting host officials to launch retributive attacks. This is particularly likely when displaced people settle among co-ethnics, co-partisans, or other identity-based groups with whom they share ties.
14. In the Somalia context, clan and regional identities are generally fixed prior to the experience of displacement. These identities inform combatant support (Lyll, Blair, and Imai 2013), but experiences at the hands of belligerents also shape civilians' decisions around what side to supply with information and other resources (Berman, Shapiro, and Felner 2011). In many contexts, displaced people have incentives to engage in 'fence-sitting,' refraining from fully supporting government or rebel forces until their loyalties are earned through good governance or compelled through coercion or shifts in territorial control (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2016).
15. Since my focus is on the quantitative microfoundations of information-centric theories of conflict, I primarily consider first-order responses to IDP inflows, rather than downstream

consequences of combatant responses to displacement. That is, I primarily consider how insurgents seek to gain information about IDPs (e.g., their loyalties, identities), and not whether and how they use that information to prosecute violence.

16. Social control can include instances where an armed group erects checkpoints, enforces tax collection, disseminates propaganda, or organises meetings with community elders. These activities are intended to build influence and information about civilian populations, and to shape civilian perceptions and behaviors.
17. Intimidation often targets non-compliant civilians or local elites.
18. In the period I study, about 41% of IDPs were outsiders, who moved to a destination district other than the district from which they originated. There are a variety of reasons ‘outsider’ IDPs might flow into a community in which they had little prior connection, including conflict geography and transit networks (Weber 2025, 214).
19. In other settings, ‘outsiders’ might be defined by ethnic, racial, or religious rather than geographic or clan identity.
20. Belligerents can use this information to tailor subsequent attack targeting.
21. Information-centric theories are less relevant for understanding these communal reactions to displacement. These theories are primarily suited for understanding insurgent and counterinsurgent conflict in irregular wars (Berman, Felter, and Shapiro 2018).
22. This is the period for which I have both administrative microdata on conflict and reliable data on internal displacement.
23. Somali IDPs include all individuals ‘who ha[ve] been displaced from his/her region/area of origin (because of conflict, human rights violations, natural or man-made disaster) and ha[ve] remained within’ the internationally-recognised boundaries of Somalia. This includes individuals displaced within or between the regions of south–central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland (Bryld, Kamau, and Sinigallia 2014, 8–9).
24. A further 6% of the Somali population – roughly 1 million people – are refugees displaced across international borders.
25. Informal authority structures govern life in Somalia’s IDP settlements. Local notables, headmen, influential clan chiefs, and businessmen act as ‘gatekeepers’ or ‘informal settlement managers’ (Bryld, Kamau, and Mohamoud 2020). These figures play an important role in helping IDPs access shelter, water, aid, and other social services.
26. Determining IDPs’ reasons for displacement is difficult because of overlapping security and climatic vulnerabilities that many people in Somalia face (Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug 2021; Yuen, Warsame, and Checchia 2022; Thalheimer and Oh 2023; Momeni et al. 2024). Migration scholars now often frame movements that occur in the context of multiple drivers as ‘mixed migration’ (Norman 2020; Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein 2022a).
27. In the supplementary appendix I offer more descriptive information from PRMN to characterise patterns of internal displacement in Somalia. Figures A-2 plots the incidence of climate-driven and conflict-driven displacement over time. Figure A-3 maps within-district IDP inflows, and Figure A-4 maps between-district IDP inflows. Finally, Figure A-5 maps total IDP outflows, Figure A-6 maps climate-induced IDP outflows, and Figure A-7 maps conflict-induced IDP outflows.
28. For robustness, I also consider a number of outcomes from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh, Kishi, and Linke 2023).
29. I obtained these records through a legal data-sharing agreement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
30. Weidmann (2016, 211) explains that the analogous SIGACTs data from Afghanistan represent the ‘universe’ of insurgent-related violence.
31. See Blair (2022, 2025) and Sonin and Wright (2024) for analyses of these additional outcomes in analogous SIGACTs data from Iraq and Afghanistan.
32. The first step of the analysis – examining descriptive patterns of displacement flows using a gravity model (section A.10) – is consigned to the appendix for space.

33. Bhavnani and Lacina (2015) are an important exception, and leverage climate shocks to instrument for internal migration.
34. Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift (2020) and Borusyak, Hull, and Jaravel (2025) describe this strategy more comprehensively. Depetris-Chauvin and Santos (2018) employ a related strategy.
35. Table A-4 shows past IDP flows are a strong predictor of current and future flows
36. This instrument assigns monthly Somali IDP flows to Somali districts proportionally to the shares of IDPs who settled there in 2016, prior to the main increase in internal displacement coinciding with the 2017 fighting season and drought.
37. This design is optimised to identify the effects of between-district IDP inflows, since migrant networks are more important for determining the locations of inter- (rather than intra-) district displacement patterns. Between-district IDPs are also the most theoretically interesting population, since these individuals confront greater integration challenges (Bryld, Kamau, and Sinigallia 2014).
38. The bottom right panel of Figure A-13 confirms this more formally, showing that the strong correlation between observed and predicted IDP inflows holds in a regression framework, conditioning on district and year-specific month fixed effects and a battery of covariates.
39. After extensive qualitative investigation, I can find no evidence of other unobserved shocks that could affect the outcome via the exposure shares used to construct the instrument.
40. In Tables A-4 – A-6 I first examine descriptive patterns of IDP flows.
41. Sonin and Wright (2024) consider analogous data on insurgent spy operations in Afghanistan.
42. Fein and Van Den Hoek (2022) also use ACLED to measure communal violence in migrant-hosting communities.
43. I also study descriptive patterns of displacement and other evidence consistent with prominent choice-based, utility-maximising models of migrant decisionmaking. IDPs in Somalia typically flee conflict-affected and climate-vulnerable localities, and gravitate toward nearer, more stable, safer, more prosperous, and more climate-resilient destinations.

Acknowledgements

I thank Meghan Garrity, Harris Mylonas, and participants in the 2025 International Studies Association Annual Meeting for helpful comments and advice. I am grateful to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Joint Assessments Division (JAS DIV), Headquarters Joint Forces Command Brunssum (JFCBS), for granting access to data used in this study. Interpretations of the data and conclusions reached from it are solely the responsibility of the author, and are not attributable to NATO or the US military.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

References

- Achvarina, Vera, and Simon F. Reich. 2006. "No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers." *International Security* 31:127–164. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.127>
- Adamson, Fiona B., and Kelly M. Greenhill. 2026. "Organised Forced Migration and the Ex-Ternal Drivers of Eliminationist Politics." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2595809>
- Adida, Claire L. 2014. *Immigrant Exclusion and Insecurity in Africa: Coethnic Strangers*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Ali, Faisal, and Jethro Norman. 2023. "Divided loyalties." *Africa Is a Country*.
- Ali, Mustafa, Teresia Mutavi, John Maina Mburu, and Muthoni Mathai. 2023. "Prevalence of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Depression among Internally Displaced Persons in Mogadishu-Somalia." *Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment* 19:469–478. <https://doi.org/10.2147/NDT.S398423>
- Anderson, David M., and Jacob McKnight. 2015. "Understanding al-Shabaab: Clan, Islam and Insurgency in Kenya." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 9:536–557. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2015.1082254>
- Arias, Sabrina B., and Christopher W. Blair. 2022. "Changing Tides: Public Attitudes on Climate Migration." *The Journal of Politics* 84 (1): 560–567. <https://doi.org/10.1086/715163>
- Arias, Sabrina B., and Christopher W. Blair. 2024. "In the Eye of the Storm: Hurricanes, Climate Migration, and Climate Attitudes." *American Political Science Review* 118 (4): 1593–1613. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055424000352>.
- Ash, Konstantin, and Nick Obradovich. 2020. "Climatic Stress, Internal Migration, and Syrian Civil War Onset." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64:3–31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719864140>
- Balcells, Laia. 2018. "Dynamics of Internal Resettlement during Civil war: Evidence from Catalonia (1936–39)." *Journal of Peace Research* 55:236–251. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317750464>
- Balcells, Laia, and Abbey Steele. 2016. "Warfare, Political Identities, and Displacement in Spain and Colombia." *Political Geography* 51:15–29. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2015.11.007>
- Bauer, Vincent, Michael Reese, and Keven Ruby. 2022. "Does Insurgent Selective Punishment Deter Collaboration? Evidence from the Drone War in Pakistan." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66 (2): 297–326. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002200272111041158>
- Berman, Eli, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2018. *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Berman, Eli, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter. 2011. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq." *Journal of Political Economy* 119 (4): 766–819. <https://doi.org/10.1086/661983>
- Betts, Alexander, Louise Bloom, Josiah Kaplan, and Naohiko Omata. 2016. *Refugee Economies: Forced Displacement and Development*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Bhavnani, Rikhil R., and Bethany Lacina. 2015. "The Effects of Weather-Induced Migration on Sons of the Soil Riots in India." *World Politics* 67:760–794. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887115000222>
- Blair, Christopher W. María Ballesteros, Igor Kolesnikov and Austin L. Wright. 2024. "Territorial Control in Civil Wars." Princeton University.
- Blair, Christopher W. 2022. "Restitution or Retribution? Detainee Payments and Insurgent Violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66 (7-8): 1356–1392. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221080118>
- Blair, Christopher W. 2024. "The Fortification Dilemma: Border Control and Rebel Violence." *American Journal of Political Science* 68 (4): 1366–1385. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12794>
- Blair, Christopher W. 2025. "Border Fortification and Legibility: Evidence from Afghanistan." *American Journal of Political Science* 69 (4): 1559–1580.
- Blair, Christopher W., Guy Grossman, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2022a. "Forced Displacement and Asylum Policy in the Developing World." *International Organization* 76 (2): 337–378. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000369>
- Blair, Christopher W., Guy Grossman, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2022b. "Liberal Displacement Policies Attract Forced Migrants in the Global South." *American Political Science Review* 116 (1): 351–358. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000848>
- Blair, Christopher W., and Austin L. Wright. 2024. "Refugee Return and Conflict: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." Princeton University.
- Bohnet, Heidrun, Fabien Cottier, and Simon Hug. 2018. "Conflict-induced IDPs and the Spread of Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62:691–716. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716665209>
- Bohnet, Heidrun, Fabien Cottier, and Simon Hug. 2021. "Conflict versus Disaster-Induced Displacement: Similar or Distinct Implications for Security?" *Civil Wars* 23:493–519. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2021.1963586>

- Borusyak, Kirill, Peter Hull, and Xavier Jaravel. 2025. "A Practical Guide to Shift-Share Instruments." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 39:181–204. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.20231370>
- Boustan, Leah Platt. 2010. "Was Postwar Suburbanization 'White Flight'? Evidence from the Black Migration." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 125 (1): 417–443. <https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.1.417>
- Breslawski, Jori. 2024. "Who Deserves Aid? Perceptions of Fairness in Contexts of Forced Displacement." *World Development* 183:1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106710>
- Bryld, Erik, Christine Kamau, and M. A. Mohamoud. 2020. "Using an Adaptive Approach to Making Gatekeepers Accountable to Internally Displaced Persons in Mogadishu, Somalia." *Development in Practice* 30:982–993. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2020.1754765>
- Bryld, Erik, Christine Kamau Kamau, and Dina Sinigallia. 2014. "Analysis of Displacement in Somalia." *The World Bank Group* 1–89.
- Cantor, David James, and Jacob Ochieng Apollo. 2020. "Internal Displacement, Internal Migration, and Refugee Flows: Connecting the Dots." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 39:647–664. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdaa016>
- Card, David. 2001. "Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Market Impacts of Higher Immigration." *Journal of Labor Economics* 19 (1): 22–64. <https://doi.org/10.1086/209979>
- Cardona-Fox, Gabriel. 2020. "The Politics of IDP Data." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 39:620–633.
- Caterina, Martina, and Andrés Lizcano Rodríguez. 2020. "The Question of Data in Internal Displacement Law-and-Policy-Making." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 39:634–646.
- Cazabat, Christelle, and Louisa Yasukawa. 2020. *The Ripple Effect: Economic Impacts of Internal Displacement*. Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2016. *Stability*. Armed Forces of the United States.
- Chernykh, Svitlana, Benjamin E. Goldsmith, and Sascha Nanlohy. 2026. "A Special Kind of Hate? The Rhetoric of Genocide." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2595812>.
- Choi, Seung-Whan, and James A. Piazza. 2016. "Internally Displaced Populations and Sui-Cide Terrorism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60:1008–1040. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714550086>
- Condra, Luke N., and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2012. "Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (1): 167–187. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00542.x>
- Condra, Luke N., and Austin L. Wright. 2019. "Civilians, Control, and Collaboration during Civil Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 63 (4): 897–907. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz042>
- Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio, and Rafael J. Santos. 2018. "Unexpected Guests: The Impact of Internal Displacement Inflows on Rental Prices in Colombian Host Cities." *Journal of Development Economics* 134:289–309. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.05.006>
- Duncan, Christopher R. 2005. "Unwelcome Guests: Relations between Internally Displaced Persons and Their Hosts in North Sulawesi, Indonesia." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 18 (1): 25–46. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/18.1.25>
- Echevarria-Coco, Jon, and Javier Gardeazabal. 2021. "A Spatial Model of Internal Displacement and Forced Migration." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 65:591–618. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720958470>
- Elvidge, Christopher D., Mikhail Zhizhin, Tilottama Ghosh, Feng-Chi Hsu, and Jay Taneja. 2021. "Annual Time Series of Global VIIRS Nighttime Lights Derived from Monthly Averages: 2012 to 2019." *Remote Sensing* 13 (5): 922. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rs13050922>
- Fein, Frieda, and Jamon Van Den Hoek. 2022. "Do Refugee Camps Offer a Refuge from Conflict? A Spatially Explicit Analysis of Conflict Incidence at 1,543 Refugee Camps across Africa (1997–2020)." *Frontiers in Human Dynamics* 4 (857250): 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fhumd.2022.857250>
- Frost, Lillian. 2026. "Ambiguous Elimination: Jordan's Denationalization of West Bank Palestinians." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2595817>

- Gaikwad, Nikhar, and Gareth Nellis. 2017. "The Majority-Minority Divide in Attitudes to-Ward Internal Migration: Evidence from Mumbai." *American Journal of Political Science* 61:456–472. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12276>
- Gaikwad, Nikhar, and Gareth Nellis. 2021a. "Do Politicians Discriminate against Internal Migrants? Evidence from Nationwide Field Experiments in India." *American Journal of Political Science* 65:790–806. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12548>
- Gaikwad, Nikhar, and Gareth Nellis. 2021b. "Overcoming the Political Exclusion of Migrants: Theory and Experimental Evidence from India." *American Journal of Political Science* 115:1129–1146.
- Galula, David. 1964. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Garrity, Meghan, and Harris Mylonas. 2026. "Eliminationist Politics: An Analytical Framework." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2595805>
- Garrity, Meghan M. 2023. "What Enables or Constrains Mass Expulsion? A New Decision-Making Framework." *Security Studies* 32 (3): 537–567. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2229238>
- Garrity, Meghan M., and Harris Mylonas. 2024. "The Various Facets of Eliminationist Politics: Conflict, Nation-Building, and Forced Migration." *International Political Science Review* 46 (3): 336–352. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121241260429>.
- Ghosn, Faten, Alex Braithwaite, and Tiffany S. Chu. 2019. "Violence, Displacement, Contact, and Attitudes toward Hosting Refugees." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (1): 118–133. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318804581>
- Goldsmith-Pinkham, Paul, Isaac Sorkin, and Henry Swift. 2020. "Bartik Instruments: What, When, Why, and How." *American Economic Review* 110:2586–2624. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181047>
- Hagen-Zanker, Jessica, Marcela G. Rubio, and Marta Bivand Erdal. 2024. "How Do perceptions, Fears, and Experiences of Violence and Conflict affect Considerations of Moving Internally and Internationally?" *Journal of Refugee Studies* 37 (2): 416–437. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feae021>
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. "Public Attitudes toward Immigration." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17:225–249. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-102512-194818>
- Hansen, Stig Jarle. 2013. *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Harper, Mary. 2012. *Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State*. London: Zed Books.
- Harris-Brandts, Suzanne, and David Sichinava. 2024. "Reconceptualizing the Social, Environmental, and Political Hazards Associated With Conflict-Induced Displacement in the Republic of Georgia." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science*, 1–32.
- Hill, Martin. 2010. *No Redress: Somalia's Forgotten Minorities*. London: Minority Rights Group International.
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 2024. *2024 Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID)*. Norwegian Refugee Council.
- Jacobs, Carolien, Stanislas Lubala Kubiha, and Rachel Sifa Katembera. 2020. "The Upward Spiral towards Local Integration of IDPs: Agency and Economics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 39:537–543.
- Jelle, Mohamed, Joanna Morrison, Hani Mohamed, Raha Ali, Andrea Solomon, and Andrew J. Seal. 2021. "Forced Evictions and Their Social and Health Impacts in Southern Somalia: A Qualitative Study in Mogadishu Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camps." *Global Health Action* 14:1–11. <https://doi.org/10.1080/16549716.2021.1969117>
- Jenne, Erin K., and Promise Frank Ejiofor. 2026. "Ethnopoliticism and Genocidal Eliminationism: A Discourse Analysis of Hate Speech in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2595808>.
- Jentsch, Corinna. 2022. *Violent Resistance: Militia Formation and Civil War in Mozambique*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Kapteijns, Lidwien. 2013. *Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Karim, Sabrina. 2020. "Relational State-Building in Areas of Limited Statehood: Empirical Evidence on the Attitudes of the Police." *American Political Science Review* 114 (2): 536–551. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000716>
- Keating, Michael, and Matt Waldman, eds. 2019. *War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Kreibaum, Merle. 2016. "Their Suffering, Our Burden? How Congolese Refugees Affect the Ugandan Population." *World Development* 78:262–287. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.019>
- Lee, Melissa M., and Nan Zhang. 2017. "Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State Capacity." *The Journal of Politics* 79 (1): 118–132. <https://doi.org/10.1086/688053>
- Lehmann, M. Christian, and Daniel T.R. Masterson. 2020. "Does Aid Reduce Anti-refugee Violence? Evidence from Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." *American Political Science Review* 114 (4): 1335–1442. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000349>
- Lewis, I. M. 2003. *A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
- Lichtenheld, Adam G. 2020. "Explaining Population Displacement Strategies in Civil Wars: A Cross-National Analysis." *International Organization* 74:253–294. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000089>
- Lichtenheld, Adam G., and Justin Schon. 2021. "The Consequences of Internal Displacement on Civil War Violence: Evidence from Syria." *Political Geography* 86:1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102346>
- Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. 2008. "Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced Migration Crisis." *International Security* 33 (2): 95–119. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.95>
- Livny, Avital, and Abdullah Kabaoğlu. 2026. "Don't Count Me Out: Erasure of Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups from National Censuses." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2595815>
- Lyll, Jason, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai. 2013. "Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan." *American Political Science Review* 107 (4): 679–705. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000403>
- Maystadt, Jean-François, and Olivier Ecker. 2014. "Extreme Weather and Civil War: Does Drought Fuel Conflict in Somalia through Livestock Price Shocks?" *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 96:1157–1182. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aa010>
- Millil, Aidan. 2024. "Making Sense, Making Choices: How Civilians Choose Survival Strategies during Violence." *American Political Science Review* 118:1379–1397. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423001259>
- Mir, Asfandyar. 2018. "What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan." *International Security* 43 (2): 45–83. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00331
- Momeni, Rahman, Tuba Bircan, Robert King King, and Eloy Zafra Santos. 2024. "Deciphering Climate-Induced Displacement in Somalia: A Remote Sensing Perspective." *PLoS One* 19:1–27. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0304202>
- Morales, Juan S. 2018. "The Impact of Internal Displacement on Destination Communities: Evidence from the Colombian Conflict." *Journal of Development Economics* 131:132–150. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.10.003>
- Mumin, Farah I., Fred D. Wesonga, Jibril I.M. Handuleh, Ross G. White, and Siobhan M. Mor. 2022. "COVID-19 and Its Prevention in Internally Displaced Person (IDP) Camps in Somalia: Impact on Livelihood, Food Security and Mental Health." *BMC Public Health* 22:1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-022-14878-z>
- Munshi, Kaivan. 2003. "Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U. S. Labor Market." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118:549–599. <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355303321675455>

- Mylonas, Harris. 2012. *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-nationals, Refugees, and Minorities*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Mylonas, Harris, and Scott Radnitz, eds. 2022. *Enemies Within: The Global Politics of Fifth Columns*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Norman, Kelsey P. 2020. *Reluctant Reception: Refugees, Migration and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Nostrand, Rachel Van, and Alex Braithwaite. 2026. "Race, Railways, and the Long-Term Legacy Effects of Concentration Camps: Evidence from South Africa." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2595823>
- Oh, Woi, Rachata Muneeppeerakul, Daniel Rubenstein, and Simon Levin. 2024. "Emergent Network Patterns of Internal Displacement in Somalia Driven by Natural Disasters and Conflicts." *Global Environmental Change* 84:1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2023.102793>
- Okeke-Ihejirika, Philomina, Temitope B. Oriola, Bukola Salami, Michael Obiefune, Nwene Ejike, Ayodotun Olutola, and Omolola Irinoye. 2020. "Beyond Poverty Fixation: Interro-Gating the Experiences of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria." *Third World Quarterly* 41:1476–1497. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1782732>
- Osman, Alinor Abdi, and Gumataw Kifle Abebe. 2023. "Rural Displacement and Its Implications on Livelihoods and Food Insecurity: The Case of Inter-riverine Communities in Somalia." *Agriculture* 13:1–19. <https://doi.org/10.3390/agriculture13071444>
- Peisakhin, Leonid, Nik Stoop, and Peter van der Windt. 2025. "Who Hosts? The Correlates of Hosting the Internally Displaced." *American Political Science Review* 119 (3): 1143–1158.
- Perelli-Harris, Brienna, Jane Zavisca, Nataliia Levchuk, and Theodore P. Gerber. 2024. "Internal Displacement and Subjective Well-Being: The Case of Ukraine in 2018." *Social Forces* 102:1157–1179. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soad124>
- Peters, Margaret E. 2017. *Trading Barriers: Immigration and the Remaking of Globalization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pham, Katherine Holmann, and Miguel Luengo-Oroz. 2023. "Predictive Modelling of Movements of Refugees and Internally Displaced People: Towards a Computational Framework." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 49:408–444. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2022.2100546>
- Race, Jeffrey. 1973. *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Raleigh, Clionadh, Roudabeh Kishi, and Andrew Linke. 2023. "Political Instability Patterns Are Obscured by Conflict Dataset Scope Conditions, Sources, and Coding Choices." *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 10 (74): 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-01559-4>
- Rizkallah, Amanda. 2024. "Foreign Intervention and Internal Displacement: Urban Politics in Postwar Beirut." *International Security* 48:86–128. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00478
- Rozo, Sandra V., and Hernan Winkler. 2021. "Is Informality Good for Business? The Impacts of Inflows of Internally Displaced Persons on Formal Firms." *The Journal of Human Resources* 56:1141–1186. <https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.56.4.1018-9794R2>
- Salehyan, Idean, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2006. "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War." *International Organization* 60 (2): 335–366. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060103>
- Schon, Justin. 2016. "The Centrality of Checkpoints for Civilians during Conflict." *Civil Wars* 18:281–310. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2016.1215638>
- Schouten, Peer. 2022. *Roadblock Politics: The Origins of Violence in Central Africa*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Sexton, Renard, and Christoph Zürcher. 2023. "Aid, Attitudes, and Insurgency: Evidence from Development Projects in Northern Afghanistan." *American Journal of Political Science* 68 (3): 1168–1182. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12778>
- Shaver, Andrew, Benjamin Krick, Judy Blancaflor, Ghassan Samara, Sarah Yein Ku, Shengkuo Hu, Joshua Angelo, et al. 2025. "The Causes and Consequences of Refugee Flows: A Contemporary

- Reanalysis.” *American Political Science Review* 119 (1): 526–534. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055424000285>.
- Sonin, Konstantin, and Austin L. Wright. 2024. “Rebel Capacity, Intelligence Gathering, and Combat Tactics.” *American Journal of Political Science* 68 (2): 459–477. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12750>
- Steele, Abbey. 2009. “Seeking Safety: Avoiding Displacement and Choosing Destinations in Civil Wars.” *Journal of Peace Research* 46:419–429. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309102660>
- Steele, Abbey. 2017. *Democracy and Displacement in Colombia’s Civil War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Steele, Abbey. 2018. “IDP Resettlement and Collective Targeting during Civil Wars: Evidence from Colombia.” *Journal of Peace Research* 55:810–824. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318763706>
- Taylor, J. Edward, Mateusz J. Filipowski, Mohamad Alloush, Anubhab Gupta, Ruben Irvin Ro-jas Valdes, and Ernesto Gonzalez-Estrada. 2016. “Economic Impact of Refugees.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 113 (27): 7449–7453. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1604566113>
- Thalheimer, Lisa, and Woi Sok Oh. 2023. “An Inventory Tool to Assess Displacement Data in the Context of Weather and Climate-Related Events.” *Climate Risk Management* 40:1–10. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2023.100509>
- Thalheimer, Lisa, Moritz P. Schwarz, and Felix Pretis. 2023. “Large Weather and Conflict Effects on Internal Displacement in Somalia with Little Evidence of Feedback onto Conflict.” *Global Environmental Change* 79:1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2023.102641>
- UNHCR-Somalia. 2007. *UNHCR’s Population Movement Tracking initiative — FAQs*. United Nations.
- UNHCR-Somalia. 2017. *Protection & Return Monitoring Network (PRMN): Notes on Methodology*. United Nations.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2023. *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2023*. United Nations.
- Vanden Eynde, Oliver. 2018. “Targets of Violence: Evidence from India’s Naxalite Conflict.” *The Economic Journal* 128:887–916. <https://doi.org/10.1111/eoj.12438>
- Van der Windt, Peter, and Macartan Humphreys. 2016. “Crowdseeding in Eastern Congo: Using Cell Phones to Collect Conflict Events Data in Real Time.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60:748–781. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714553104>
- Warsame, Abdihamid, Severine Frison, and Francesco Checchi. 2023. “Drought, Armed Conflict and Population Mortality in Somalia, 2014–2018: A Statistical Analysis.” *PLOS Global Public Health* 3:1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgph.0001136>
- Weber, Sigrid. 2025. “Controlling a Moving World: Territorial Control, Displacement and the Spread of Civilian Targeting in Iraq.” *Journal of Peace Research* 62:211–229. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231202823>
- Weidmann, Nils B. 2016. “A Closer Look at Reporting Bias in Conflict Event Data.” *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (1): 206–218. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12196>
- Wiederkehr, Charlotte, Tobias Ide, Ralf Seppelta, and Kathleen Hermans. 2022. “It’s All about Politics: Migration and Resource Conflicts in the Global South.” *World Development* 157:1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.105938>
- Williams, Paul D. 2018. *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, Paul D. 2020. *Understanding US Policy in Somalia: Current Challenges and Future Options*. Chatham House, 1–24.
- Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska, Dorota, and Nika Palaguta. 2017. “Internally Displaced Persons and Elections under Military Conflict in Ukraine.” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 30:27–46.
- Yasukawa, Louisa. 2020. “The Impacts of Internal Displacement on Local Communities: Examples from Ethiopia and Somalia.” *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 39:544–551.
- Yuen, Aidan, Abdihamid Warsame, and Francesco Checchia. 2022. “Exploring the Temporal Patterns and Crisis-Related Risk Factors for Population Displacement in Somalia (2016–2018).” *Journal of Migration and Health* 5:1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmh.2022.100095>

- Yuusuf, Muuse. 2021. *The Genesis of the Civil War in Somalia: The Impact of Foreign Military Intervention on the Conflict*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Zhou, Yang-Yang, and Andrew C. Shaver. 2021. "Reexamining the Effect of Refugees on Civil Conflict: A Global Subnational Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 115 (4): 1175–1196. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000502>
- Zhukov, Yuri M. 2015. "Population Resettlement in War: Theory and Evidence from Soviet Archives." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59:1155–1185. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713520590>