I am involved in a number of collaborative projects that aim to unpack questions surrounding militancy, terrorism, and relationships between militant groups. These projects are detailed below:
Honor Among Thieves: Understanding Rhetorical and Material Cooperation Among Militant Groups -- With Erica Chenoweth, Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter
Abstract: Cooperation among militant organizations contributes to capability, but also presents security risks. As a consequence, for cooperation to persist when it is needed most, militant groups must have means of committing to cooperation even in the context of substantial state repression. We posit that shared ideology plays this role. Specifically, shared ideology aids cooperation by lengthening the shadow of the future, facilitating monitoring and enforcement, leveraging pre-existing authority structures, and fostering trust. We test this theory using new, comprehensive, time-series data on all relationships between militant organizations from 1950-2016, which we introduce here. Results show that when groups share an ideology, and especially a religion, they become more likely to cooperate materially as repression increases. By contrast, commitment is more difficult to sustain in rhetorical alliances. These findings help contextualize important existing research that suggests the connections between violent, nonstate actors strongly shape their tactical and strategic behavior.
Abstract: Cooperation among militant organizations contributes to capability, but also presents security risks. As a consequence, for cooperation to persist when it is needed most, militant groups must have means of committing to cooperation even in the context of substantial state repression. We posit that shared ideology plays this role. Specifically, shared ideology aids cooperation by lengthening the shadow of the future, facilitating monitoring and enforcement, leveraging pre-existing authority structures, and fostering trust. We test this theory using new, comprehensive, time-series data on all relationships between militant organizations from 1950-2016, which we introduce here. Results show that when groups share an ideology, and especially a religion, they become more likely to cooperate materially as repression increases. By contrast, commitment is more difficult to sustain in rhetorical alliances. These findings help contextualize important existing research that suggests the connections between violent, nonstate actors strongly shape their tactical and strategic behavior.
- Invited to revise and resubmit at International Organization
- SSRN
Restitution or Retribution? Detainee Payments and Insurgent Violence
Abstract:
Counterinsurgents frequently rely on mass arrests to impede rebel operations, but in so doing, risk detaining innocent civilians. Wrongful detention can backfire, fueling insurgent violence by alienating detainees and their kin. Can counterinsurgents mitigate wrongful detention through targeted compensation? I study this question using declassified micro-data on U.S. payments to individuals deemed innocent and released from Coalition custody in Iraq between 2004 and 2008. Leveraging plausibly exogenous sources of variation in the allocation of detainee release payments, I document a robust, negative association between counterinsurgent compensation for wrongful detention and insurgent violence. The violence-reducing effects of detainee release payments were greatest in mixed and Sunni areas; for the types of insurgent attacks most prone to civilian informing; and when detainee release was complemented by other population-centric reforms to detention. These results suggest that post-harm mitigation helps shift civilian perceptions, inducing civilians to share more information with counterinsurgent forces.
Abstract:
Counterinsurgents frequently rely on mass arrests to impede rebel operations, but in so doing, risk detaining innocent civilians. Wrongful detention can backfire, fueling insurgent violence by alienating detainees and their kin. Can counterinsurgents mitigate wrongful detention through targeted compensation? I study this question using declassified micro-data on U.S. payments to individuals deemed innocent and released from Coalition custody in Iraq between 2004 and 2008. Leveraging plausibly exogenous sources of variation in the allocation of detainee release payments, I document a robust, negative association between counterinsurgent compensation for wrongful detention and insurgent violence. The violence-reducing effects of detainee release payments were greatest in mixed and Sunni areas; for the types of insurgent attacks most prone to civilian informing; and when detainee release was complemented by other population-centric reforms to detention. These results suggest that post-harm mitigation helps shift civilian perceptions, inducing civilians to share more information with counterinsurgent forces.
- Invited to revise and resubmit at the Journal of Conflict Resolution
- SSRN
The Puzzle of Large Alliance Networks -- With Sam Plapinger and Philip B.K. Potter
Abstract:
In the past two decades, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have built expansive alliance networks. We study the strategic logic underpinning these networks. We argue that ideological and operational legitimacy are essential attributes of successful transnational terrorist organizations, and that alliances allow groups to use relative surpluses of one type of legitimacy to remedy deficits in the other. Organizations with substantial operational legitimacy and relatively less ideological clout—typified by Islamic State—can draw on their violent reputations and operational successes to build international networks, which in turn provide ideological legitimacy. In contrast, organizations with an ideological surplus and an operational deficit—typified by al-Qaeda—can lend their ideological legitimacy to affiliates who in turn supply the organization with reach into active conflicts, bolstering operational capabilities. These findings suggest militant alliances may be a strategic response to underlying deficits. If alliances reveal vulnerabilities, analyzing them can enhance allocation of counterterrorism resources.
Abstract:
In the past two decades, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have built expansive alliance networks. We study the strategic logic underpinning these networks. We argue that ideological and operational legitimacy are essential attributes of successful transnational terrorist organizations, and that alliances allow groups to use relative surpluses of one type of legitimacy to remedy deficits in the other. Organizations with substantial operational legitimacy and relatively less ideological clout—typified by Islamic State—can draw on their violent reputations and operational successes to build international networks, which in turn provide ideological legitimacy. In contrast, organizations with an ideological surplus and an operational deficit—typified by al-Qaeda—can lend their ideological legitimacy to affiliates who in turn supply the organization with reach into active conflicts, bolstering operational capabilities. These findings suggest militant alliances may be a strategic response to underlying deficits. If alliances reveal vulnerabilities, analyzing them can enhance allocation of counterterrorism resources.
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5774-5976