I am involved in a number of collaborative projects that aim to unpack questions surrounding militancy, terrorism, and relationships between militant groups. These projects are detailed below:
Restitution or Retribution? Detainee Payments and Insurgent Violence
Abstract:
Counterinsurgents frequently rely on mass arrests to impede rebel operations, but in so doing, risk detaining innocent civilians. Wrongful detention can backfire, fueling insurgent violence by alienating detainees and their kin. Can counterinsurgents mitigate wrongful detention through targeted compensation? I study this question using declassified micro-data on U.S. payments to individuals deemed innocent and released from Coalition custody in Iraq between 2004 and 2008. Leveraging plausibly exogenous sources of variation in the allocation of detainee release payments, I document a robust, negative association between counterinsurgent compensation for wrongful detention and insurgent violence. The violence-reducing effects of detainee release payments were greatest in mixed and Sunni areas; for the types of insurgent attacks most prone to civilian informing; and when detainee release was complemented by other population-centric reforms to detention. These results suggest that post-harm mitigation helps shift civilian perceptions, inducing civilians to share more information with counterinsurgent forces.
Abstract:
Counterinsurgents frequently rely on mass arrests to impede rebel operations, but in so doing, risk detaining innocent civilians. Wrongful detention can backfire, fueling insurgent violence by alienating detainees and their kin. Can counterinsurgents mitigate wrongful detention through targeted compensation? I study this question using declassified micro-data on U.S. payments to individuals deemed innocent and released from Coalition custody in Iraq between 2004 and 2008. Leveraging plausibly exogenous sources of variation in the allocation of detainee release payments, I document a robust, negative association between counterinsurgent compensation for wrongful detention and insurgent violence. The violence-reducing effects of detainee release payments were greatest in mixed and Sunni areas; for the types of insurgent attacks most prone to civilian informing; and when detainee release was complemented by other population-centric reforms to detention. These results suggest that post-harm mitigation helps shift civilian perceptions, inducing civilians to share more information with counterinsurgent forces.
- Invited to revise and resubmit at the Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Working Paper
The Strategic Logic of Large Alliance Networks -- With Philip B.K. Potter
Abstract:
In the past two decades, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have built expansive alliance networks. We study the strategic logic underpinning these networks. We argue that ideological and operational legitimacy are essential attributes of successful transnational terrorist organizations, and that alliances allow groups to use relative surpluses of one type of legitimacy to remedy deficits in the other. Organizations with substantial operational legitimacy and relatively less ideological clout—typified by Islamic State—can draw on their violent reputations and operational successes to build international networks, which in turn provide ideological legitimacy. In contrast, organizations with an ideological surplus and an operational deficit—typified by al-Qaeda—can lend their ideological legitimacy to affiliates who in turn supply the organization with reach into active conflicts, bolstering operational capabilities. These findings suggest militant alliances may be a strategic response to underlying deficits. If alliances reveal vulnerabilities, analyzing them can enhance allocation of counterterrorism resources.
Abstract:
In the past two decades, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have built expansive alliance networks. We study the strategic logic underpinning these networks. We argue that ideological and operational legitimacy are essential attributes of successful transnational terrorist organizations, and that alliances allow groups to use relative surpluses of one type of legitimacy to remedy deficits in the other. Organizations with substantial operational legitimacy and relatively less ideological clout—typified by Islamic State—can draw on their violent reputations and operational successes to build international networks, which in turn provide ideological legitimacy. In contrast, organizations with an ideological surplus and an operational deficit—typified by al-Qaeda—can lend their ideological legitimacy to affiliates who in turn supply the organization with reach into active conflicts, bolstering operational capabilities. These findings suggest militant alliances may be a strategic response to underlying deficits. If alliances reveal vulnerabilities, analyzing them can enhance allocation of counterterrorism resources.
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5774-5976