Border Control and Transnational Militancy
From Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan, Ukraine, India, and Somalia, recent episodes of civil conflict highlight three prominent phenomena: (1) the U.S. is increasingly funding border control initiatives abroad, with an eye toward countering transnational, non-state threats; (2) borders are hardening in response, with counterinsurgents' efforts to secure borders against transnational militancy partially driving this trend; and (3) because rebels often exploit transnational safe havens, border control efforts that interdict transnational militant operations have important implications for the microdynamics of civil conflict. In this dissertation, I provide empirical support for these claims using a multi-method design.
Although an emerging literature studies border control, and large literatures examine the causes and consequences of state sponsorship and the externalization of civil conflict, insufficient attention has been paid to the interrelation between border control and transnational militancy. Each of these literatures is also plagued by a number of theoretical and empirical shortcomings. For instance, the border control literature emphasizes political economy explanations and traces border control strategies to domestic statebuilding trajectories, neglecting the influence of enhanced insurgent capabilities to exploit transnational havens, as well external influences on border control strategies, such as foreign aid. The state sponsorship literature takes an overly static view, assuming that foreign support---and especially foreign territorial support---for insurgents is relatively stable over time. Existing work in this vein largely ignores the fact that the transnational nature of rebellion is often a subject of contestation in and of itself. Finally, scholarship on the externalization of civil conflict focuses on the interstate and bargaining implications of cross-border insurgent activities, but devotes little attention to how insurgent access to transnational safe haven affects political microdynamics within and after conflicts. Linking these literatures, this project dispels a number of common assumptions about border control and transnational militancy, and develops a more complete framework for understanding how and why border control affects transnational militancy---and vice versa.
To summarize my core findings in brief, I show that: (1) counterinsurgent border control is a common and understudied strategy for governments facing transnational rebels; (2) that border hardening since 2001 is linked with the expansion of U.S. aid and training programs for border security, which comprise a key facet of U.S. strategy in the Global War on Terrorism; (3) that border control measures have important effects on insurgent tactics, cohesion, and political strategy; and (4) that insurgent adaptations to border control generate critical trade-offs for counterinsurgents interested in fortifying their borders against transnational threats. To elaborate these arguments, I leverage new, cross-national data on counterinsurgent border control measures and U.S. aid for border security, fine-grained microdata on border security initiatives and violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, restricted-access public opinion data from representative surveys fielded in Afghanistan, and qualitative archival evidence.
Individual chapters of my project are described in greater detail below.
Although an emerging literature studies border control, and large literatures examine the causes and consequences of state sponsorship and the externalization of civil conflict, insufficient attention has been paid to the interrelation between border control and transnational militancy. Each of these literatures is also plagued by a number of theoretical and empirical shortcomings. For instance, the border control literature emphasizes political economy explanations and traces border control strategies to domestic statebuilding trajectories, neglecting the influence of enhanced insurgent capabilities to exploit transnational havens, as well external influences on border control strategies, such as foreign aid. The state sponsorship literature takes an overly static view, assuming that foreign support---and especially foreign territorial support---for insurgents is relatively stable over time. Existing work in this vein largely ignores the fact that the transnational nature of rebellion is often a subject of contestation in and of itself. Finally, scholarship on the externalization of civil conflict focuses on the interstate and bargaining implications of cross-border insurgent activities, but devotes little attention to how insurgent access to transnational safe haven affects political microdynamics within and after conflicts. Linking these literatures, this project dispels a number of common assumptions about border control and transnational militancy, and develops a more complete framework for understanding how and why border control affects transnational militancy---and vice versa.
To summarize my core findings in brief, I show that: (1) counterinsurgent border control is a common and understudied strategy for governments facing transnational rebels; (2) that border hardening since 2001 is linked with the expansion of U.S. aid and training programs for border security, which comprise a key facet of U.S. strategy in the Global War on Terrorism; (3) that border control measures have important effects on insurgent tactics, cohesion, and political strategy; and (4) that insurgent adaptations to border control generate critical trade-offs for counterinsurgents interested in fortifying their borders against transnational threats. To elaborate these arguments, I leverage new, cross-national data on counterinsurgent border control measures and U.S. aid for border security, fine-grained microdata on border security initiatives and violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, restricted-access public opinion data from representative surveys fielded in Afghanistan, and qualitative archival evidence.
Individual chapters of my project are described in greater detail below.
Buying Border Control: Transnational Militancy and Border Security Assistance
Conventional explanations for border hardening link states' choices about border control to political economy influences like illicit smuggling and migration, or to concerns about external security threats. These explanations neglect two empirical trends: (1) insurgents' abilities to exploit transnational havens have improved over time; and (2) U.S. concerns about transnational militancy since the start of the Global War on Terror have prompted a major expansion of foreign aid programs tied explicitly border control. Focusing on a highly visible form of border hardening, the construction of border barriers, I document a significant association between transnational insurgency and border fortification. Then, using original data on U.S. aid and training programs for border security since 1996, I show that the proliferation of border fortification in the past two decades is linked with U.S. border security assistance, and especially training programs. A novel instrumental variable strategy supports a causal interpretation of this finding. Overall, results suggest that transnational insurgency and U.S. border security assistance are partially responsible for the proliferation of border walls, particularly since 2001.
Conventional explanations for border hardening link states' choices about border control to political economy influences like illicit smuggling and migration, or to concerns about external security threats. These explanations neglect two empirical trends: (1) insurgents' abilities to exploit transnational havens have improved over time; and (2) U.S. concerns about transnational militancy since the start of the Global War on Terror have prompted a major expansion of foreign aid programs tied explicitly border control. Focusing on a highly visible form of border hardening, the construction of border barriers, I document a significant association between transnational insurgency and border fortification. Then, using original data on U.S. aid and training programs for border security since 1996, I show that the proliferation of border fortification in the past two decades is linked with U.S. border security assistance, and especially training programs. A novel instrumental variable strategy supports a causal interpretation of this finding. Overall, results suggest that transnational insurgency and U.S. border security assistance are partially responsible for the proliferation of border walls, particularly since 2001.
Border Control and Insurgent Tactics
Where cross-border sanctuary enables rebels to marshal external support, classical theories of counterinsurgency extol the strategic value of border control. By sealing borders, counterinsurgents can erode transnational rebels’ resources, degrading the quality of rebellion. While little existing work tests this conventional wisdom, its prescriptions resonate with policymakers: counterinsurgent border control is increasingly common. Building on theories linking resources and technologies of rebellion, I posit a fortification dilemma inherent in border control strategies. Well-resourced rebels with external support can afford conventional attacks and indiscriminate violence. However, when counterinsurgent border control efforts interdict foreign logistics, insurgents compensate by cultivating greater local support. In turn, rebels prefer more irregular attacks and reduced civilian victimization. These effects are mitigated when rebels enjoy active sponsorship from state patrons and where rebels can access alternate smuggling routes, both of which subvert counterinsurgents’ border interdiction efficacy. Because counterinsurgent border control efforts trade-off reduced insurgent capabilities for greater competition over local hearts-and-minds, border control is best used in tandem with population-centric counterinsurgency. I illustrate this theory with archival evidence from the Algerian War of Independence, and test it using declassified microdata on border fortification, violence, and insurgent smuggling networks in Iraq. A difference-in-differences design leveraging spatio-temporal variation in border fortification during Operation Iraqi Freedom shows that U.S.-led border control efforts caused insurgents to substitute conventional for irregular tactics, and to reduce civilian victimization.
Where cross-border sanctuary enables rebels to marshal external support, classical theories of counterinsurgency extol the strategic value of border control. By sealing borders, counterinsurgents can erode transnational rebels’ resources, degrading the quality of rebellion. While little existing work tests this conventional wisdom, its prescriptions resonate with policymakers: counterinsurgent border control is increasingly common. Building on theories linking resources and technologies of rebellion, I posit a fortification dilemma inherent in border control strategies. Well-resourced rebels with external support can afford conventional attacks and indiscriminate violence. However, when counterinsurgent border control efforts interdict foreign logistics, insurgents compensate by cultivating greater local support. In turn, rebels prefer more irregular attacks and reduced civilian victimization. These effects are mitigated when rebels enjoy active sponsorship from state patrons and where rebels can access alternate smuggling routes, both of which subvert counterinsurgents’ border interdiction efficacy. Because counterinsurgent border control efforts trade-off reduced insurgent capabilities for greater competition over local hearts-and-minds, border control is best used in tandem with population-centric counterinsurgency. I illustrate this theory with archival evidence from the Algerian War of Independence, and test it using declassified microdata on border fortification, violence, and insurgent smuggling networks in Iraq. A difference-in-differences design leveraging spatio-temporal variation in border fortification during Operation Iraqi Freedom shows that U.S.-led border control efforts caused insurgents to substitute conventional for irregular tactics, and to reduce civilian victimization.
Border Control and Rebel Forbearance
Well-resourced rebels with external support are less reliant on civilians in target states. As such, externally supported rebels can afford more indiscriminate violence against civilians, and need to invest fewer resources in local governance. When counterinsurgent border control efforts interdict foreign logistics, rebels compensate by cultivating greater local support from civilians in target states. This compensation effect manifests in the form of reduced civilian victimization and increased investment in local governance by affected rebel actors. In other words, effective counterinsurgent border control can prompt rebel forbearance in relations with civilians. A multi-method research design pairing cross-national statistical analyses with subnational difference-in-differences estimates from Iraq and Afghanistan shows support for the theory. Counterinsurgent border control efforts spur externally-supported rebel groups to reduce civilian victimization and provide more services in an attempt to recoup external losses by cultivating civilian support. Geo-referenced public opinion data from Afghanistan also support the theory. Border control efforts are associated with a significant increase in civilian perceptions of insurgent discrimination in targeting
Well-resourced rebels with external support are less reliant on civilians in target states. As such, externally supported rebels can afford more indiscriminate violence against civilians, and need to invest fewer resources in local governance. When counterinsurgent border control efforts interdict foreign logistics, rebels compensate by cultivating greater local support from civilians in target states. This compensation effect manifests in the form of reduced civilian victimization and increased investment in local governance by affected rebel actors. In other words, effective counterinsurgent border control can prompt rebel forbearance in relations with civilians. A multi-method research design pairing cross-national statistical analyses with subnational difference-in-differences estimates from Iraq and Afghanistan shows support for the theory. Counterinsurgent border control efforts spur externally-supported rebel groups to reduce civilian victimization and provide more services in an attempt to recoup external losses by cultivating civilian support. Geo-referenced public opinion data from Afghanistan also support the theory. Border control efforts are associated with a significant increase in civilian perceptions of insurgent discrimination in targeting
Border Control and Public Opinion: Survey Evidence from Afghanistan
How do border control efforts shape civilians’ attitudes and beliefs? Despite the proliferation of border fortifications, little existing work studies the micro-level, perceptual consequences of border hardening. The dearth of research linking border control and public opinion is particularly severe in persistently insecure contexts, where transnational militancy and illicit economic activities are rife, but research access to borderland populations is poor. I argue that by visibly demonstrating state presence and capacity in border communities, border control efforts enhance legibility, fostering improved perceptions of security and greater civilian willingness to collaborate with government security forces. However, because border control efforts disrupt local, borderland economies, which frequently rely on cross-border markets, there is a perceptual trade-off entailed in border hardening. By raising the costs of cross-border flows, border control drives up the price of smuggling, incentivizing greater corruption among border guards, and increasing civilian reliance on traffickers. I study these questions using geo-referenced, restricted-access data from the representative Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Research (ANQAR) survey sponsored by NATO and fielded across Afghanistan. A generalized difference-in- differences design leveraging spatio-temporal variation in the expansion of border fortification efforts during the war in Afghanistan shows that Coalition-led border control efforts caused civilians to feel more secure, and to be more willing to collaborate with Afghan security forces. However, these same border control efforts also increased perceptions of police and army corruption and increased civilian reliance on traffickers. These effects are importantly moderated by perceptions of territorial control.
How do border control efforts shape civilians’ attitudes and beliefs? Despite the proliferation of border fortifications, little existing work studies the micro-level, perceptual consequences of border hardening. The dearth of research linking border control and public opinion is particularly severe in persistently insecure contexts, where transnational militancy and illicit economic activities are rife, but research access to borderland populations is poor. I argue that by visibly demonstrating state presence and capacity in border communities, border control efforts enhance legibility, fostering improved perceptions of security and greater civilian willingness to collaborate with government security forces. However, because border control efforts disrupt local, borderland economies, which frequently rely on cross-border markets, there is a perceptual trade-off entailed in border hardening. By raising the costs of cross-border flows, border control drives up the price of smuggling, incentivizing greater corruption among border guards, and increasing civilian reliance on traffickers. I study these questions using geo-referenced, restricted-access data from the representative Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Research (ANQAR) survey sponsored by NATO and fielded across Afghanistan. A generalized difference-in- differences design leveraging spatio-temporal variation in the expansion of border fortification efforts during the war in Afghanistan shows that Coalition-led border control efforts caused civilians to feel more secure, and to be more willing to collaborate with Afghan security forces. However, these same border control efforts also increased perceptions of police and army corruption and increased civilian reliance on traffickers. These effects are importantly moderated by perceptions of territorial control.
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5774-5976