Border Control and Transnational Militancy
From Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan, Ukraine, India, and Somalia, recent episodes of civil conflict highlight three prominent phenomena: (1) the U.S. is increasingly funding border control initiatives abroad, with an eye toward countering transnational, non-state threats; (2) borders are hardening in response, with counterinsurgents' efforts to secure borders against transnational militancy partially driving this trend; and (3) because rebels often exploit transnational safe havens, border control efforts that interdict transnational militant operations have important implications for the microdynamics of civil conflict. In this dissertation, I provide empirical support for these claims using a multi-method design.
Although an emerging literature studies border control, and large literatures examine the causes and consequences of state sponsorship and the externalization of civil conflict, insufficient attention has been paid to the interrelation between border control and transnational militancy. Each of these literatures is also plagued by a number of theoretical and empirical shortcomings. For instance, the border control literature emphasizes political economy explanations and traces border control strategies to domestic statebuilding trajectories, neglecting the influence of enhanced insurgent capabilities to exploit transnational havens, as well external influences on border control strategies, such as foreign aid. The state sponsorship literature takes an overly static view, assuming that foreign support---and especially foreign territorial support---for insurgents is relatively stable over time. Existing work in this vein largely ignores the fact that the transnational nature of rebellion is often a subject of contestation in and of itself. Finally, scholarship on the externalization of civil conflict focuses on the interstate and bargaining implications of cross-border insurgent activities, but devotes little attention to how insurgent access to transnational safe haven affects political microdynamics within and after conflicts. Linking these literatures, this project dispels a number of common assumptions about border control and transnational militancy, and develops a more complete framework for understanding how and why border control affects transnational militancy---and vice versa.
To summarize my core findings in brief, I show that: (1) counterinsurgent border control is a common and understudied strategy for governments facing transnational rebels; (2) that border hardening since 2001 is linked with the expansion of U.S. aid and training programs for border security, which comprise a key facet of U.S. strategy in the Global War on Terrorism; (3) that border control measures have important effects on insurgent tactics, cohesion, and political strategy; and (4) that insurgent adaptations to border control generate critical trade-offs for counterinsurgents interested in fortifying their borders against transnational threats. To elaborate these arguments, I leverage new, cross-national data on counterinsurgent border control measures and U.S. aid for border security, fine-grained microdata on border security initiatives and violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, restricted-access public opinion data from representative surveys fielded in Afghanistan, and qualitative archival evidence.
Individual chapters of my project are described in greater detail below.
Although an emerging literature studies border control, and large literatures examine the causes and consequences of state sponsorship and the externalization of civil conflict, insufficient attention has been paid to the interrelation between border control and transnational militancy. Each of these literatures is also plagued by a number of theoretical and empirical shortcomings. For instance, the border control literature emphasizes political economy explanations and traces border control strategies to domestic statebuilding trajectories, neglecting the influence of enhanced insurgent capabilities to exploit transnational havens, as well external influences on border control strategies, such as foreign aid. The state sponsorship literature takes an overly static view, assuming that foreign support---and especially foreign territorial support---for insurgents is relatively stable over time. Existing work in this vein largely ignores the fact that the transnational nature of rebellion is often a subject of contestation in and of itself. Finally, scholarship on the externalization of civil conflict focuses on the interstate and bargaining implications of cross-border insurgent activities, but devotes little attention to how insurgent access to transnational safe haven affects political microdynamics within and after conflicts. Linking these literatures, this project dispels a number of common assumptions about border control and transnational militancy, and develops a more complete framework for understanding how and why border control affects transnational militancy---and vice versa.
To summarize my core findings in brief, I show that: (1) counterinsurgent border control is a common and understudied strategy for governments facing transnational rebels; (2) that border hardening since 2001 is linked with the expansion of U.S. aid and training programs for border security, which comprise a key facet of U.S. strategy in the Global War on Terrorism; (3) that border control measures have important effects on insurgent tactics, cohesion, and political strategy; and (4) that insurgent adaptations to border control generate critical trade-offs for counterinsurgents interested in fortifying their borders against transnational threats. To elaborate these arguments, I leverage new, cross-national data on counterinsurgent border control measures and U.S. aid for border security, fine-grained microdata on border security initiatives and violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, restricted-access public opinion data from representative surveys fielded in Afghanistan, and qualitative archival evidence.
Individual chapters of my project are described in greater detail below.
Buying Border Control: Transnational Militancy and Border Security Assistance
Conventional explanations for border hardening link states' choices about border control to political economy influences like illicit smuggling and migration, or to concerns about external security threats. These explanations neglect two empirical trends: (1) insurgents' abilities to exploit transnational havens have improved over time; and (2) U.S. concerns about transnational militancy since the start of the Global War on Terror have prompted a major expansion of foreign aid programs tied explicitly border control. Focusing on a highly visible form of border hardening, the construction of border barriers, I document a significant association between transnational insurgency and border fortification. Then, using original data on U.S. aid and training programs for border security since 1996, I show that the proliferation of border fortification in the past two decades is linked with U.S. border security assistance, and especially training programs. A novel instrumental variable strategy supports a causal interpretation of this finding. Overall, results suggest that transnational insurgency and U.S. border security assistance are partially responsible for the proliferation of border walls, particularly since 2001.
Conventional explanations for border hardening link states' choices about border control to political economy influences like illicit smuggling and migration, or to concerns about external security threats. These explanations neglect two empirical trends: (1) insurgents' abilities to exploit transnational havens have improved over time; and (2) U.S. concerns about transnational militancy since the start of the Global War on Terror have prompted a major expansion of foreign aid programs tied explicitly border control. Focusing on a highly visible form of border hardening, the construction of border barriers, I document a significant association between transnational insurgency and border fortification. Then, using original data on U.S. aid and training programs for border security since 1996, I show that the proliferation of border fortification in the past two decades is linked with U.S. border security assistance, and especially training programs. A novel instrumental variable strategy supports a causal interpretation of this finding. Overall, results suggest that transnational insurgency and U.S. border security assistance are partially responsible for the proliferation of border walls, particularly since 2001.
Border Control and Insurgent Tactics
Where cross-border sanctuary enables rebels to marshal external support, classical theories of counterinsurgency extol the strategic value of border control. By sealing borders, counterinsurgents can erode transnational rebels’ resources, degrading the quality of rebellion. While little existing work tests this conventional wisdom, its prescriptions resonate with policymakers: counterinsurgent border control is increasingly common. Building on theories linking resources and technologies of rebellion, I posit a fortification dilemma inherent in border control strategies. Well-resourced rebels with external support can afford conventional attacks and indiscriminate violence. However, when counterinsurgent border control efforts interdict foreign logistics, insurgents compensate by cultivating greater local support. In turn, rebels prefer more irregular attacks and reduced civilian victimization. These effects are mitigated when rebels enjoy active sponsorship from state patrons and where rebels can access alternate smuggling routes, both of which subvert counterinsurgents’ border interdiction efficacy. Because counterinsurgent border control efforts trade-off reduced insurgent capabilities for greater competition over local hearts-and-minds, border control is best used in tandem with population-centric counterinsurgency. I illustrate this theory with archival evidence from the Algerian War of Independence, and test it using declassified microdata on border fortification, violence, and insurgent smuggling networks in Iraq. A difference-in-differences design leveraging spatio-temporal variation in border fortification during Operation Iraqi Freedom shows that U.S.-led border control efforts caused insurgents to substitute conventional for irregular tactics, and to reduce civilian victimization.
Where cross-border sanctuary enables rebels to marshal external support, classical theories of counterinsurgency extol the strategic value of border control. By sealing borders, counterinsurgents can erode transnational rebels’ resources, degrading the quality of rebellion. While little existing work tests this conventional wisdom, its prescriptions resonate with policymakers: counterinsurgent border control is increasingly common. Building on theories linking resources and technologies of rebellion, I posit a fortification dilemma inherent in border control strategies. Well-resourced rebels with external support can afford conventional attacks and indiscriminate violence. However, when counterinsurgent border control efforts interdict foreign logistics, insurgents compensate by cultivating greater local support. In turn, rebels prefer more irregular attacks and reduced civilian victimization. These effects are mitigated when rebels enjoy active sponsorship from state patrons and where rebels can access alternate smuggling routes, both of which subvert counterinsurgents’ border interdiction efficacy. Because counterinsurgent border control efforts trade-off reduced insurgent capabilities for greater competition over local hearts-and-minds, border control is best used in tandem with population-centric counterinsurgency. I illustrate this theory with archival evidence from the Algerian War of Independence, and test it using declassified microdata on border fortification, violence, and insurgent smuggling networks in Iraq. A difference-in-differences design leveraging spatio-temporal variation in border fortification during Operation Iraqi Freedom shows that U.S.-led border control efforts caused insurgents to substitute conventional for irregular tactics, and to reduce civilian victimization.
Border Control, Public Opinion, and the Legibility-Corruption Tradeoff
States often fortify borders in response to transnational militancy. How do these efforts shape civilian perceptions in conflict-affected, borderland communities? I posit a tradeoff between legibility and corruption inherent in border control strategies. Border fortification bolsters state penetration into borderlands, where historical state capacity is low. By demonstrating state presence, fortification efforts reduce the social distance between the state and civilians in border areas, ultimately improving the legibility of border communities. By enhancing legibility and contact, border fortification hones the capacity of security forces to engage in selective violence, improves civilian perceptions of state security provision, and fosters national identification. However, border control also disrupts borderland economies, raising the costs of cross-border flows. By increasing the price of smuggling, border hardening incentivizes corruption among security forces and increases civilian reliance on traffickers. These effects are magnified in contested and insurgent-controlled areas, where pre-fortification government access is weakest. I study these questions using granular, representative data from a quarterly, NATO-commissioned survey fielded across Afghanistan. A generalized difference-in-differences design leveraging spatio-temporal variation in the expansion of border fortification efforts during the war in Afghanistan shows support for the theory. Administrative military data on violence complement the analyses. Border control efforts improved beliefs that Afghan forces could provide security, and promoted national identification, but also increased civilian perceptions of government corruption. The findings point to a key dilemma for states hardening their borders against militant threats.
States often fortify borders in response to transnational militancy. How do these efforts shape civilian perceptions in conflict-affected, borderland communities? I posit a tradeoff between legibility and corruption inherent in border control strategies. Border fortification bolsters state penetration into borderlands, where historical state capacity is low. By demonstrating state presence, fortification efforts reduce the social distance between the state and civilians in border areas, ultimately improving the legibility of border communities. By enhancing legibility and contact, border fortification hones the capacity of security forces to engage in selective violence, improves civilian perceptions of state security provision, and fosters national identification. However, border control also disrupts borderland economies, raising the costs of cross-border flows. By increasing the price of smuggling, border hardening incentivizes corruption among security forces and increases civilian reliance on traffickers. These effects are magnified in contested and insurgent-controlled areas, where pre-fortification government access is weakest. I study these questions using granular, representative data from a quarterly, NATO-commissioned survey fielded across Afghanistan. A generalized difference-in-differences design leveraging spatio-temporal variation in the expansion of border fortification efforts during the war in Afghanistan shows support for the theory. Administrative military data on violence complement the analyses. Border control efforts improved beliefs that Afghan forces could provide security, and promoted national identification, but also increased civilian perceptions of government corruption. The findings point to a key dilemma for states hardening their borders against militant threats.
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5774-5976